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Recent developments in control hold that professionals are best managed through normative and concertive as opposed to bureaucratic and coercive mechanisms. This post-structuralist approach appeals to the notion of congruent values and norms and acknowledges the role of individuals' subjectivity in sustaining professional autonomy. Yet, there remains a risk of over-simplifying the manifestations of such control initiatives. By means of an in-depth case study, this article considers the challenge of implementing a knowledge-sharing portal for a community of R&D scientists through management control initiatives that relied on a blend of presumed 'peer pressure' and the rhetoric of 'facilitation'. Arguing that traditional approaches such as normative/concertive control and soft bureaucracy only partially explain this phenomenon, we draw from Pierre Bourdieu's concept of 'symbolic violence' to interpret a managerial initiative to appropriate knowledge and affirm the structure of social relations through the complicity of R&D scientists. We also examine how the scientists channelled resistance by reconstituting compliance in line with their sense of identity as creators of knowledge.

This paper presents a symbolic formulation for analytical compliance analysis and synthesis of flexure mechanisms with serial, parallel, or hybrid topologies. Our approach is based on the screw theory that characterizes flexure deformations with motion twists and loadings with force wrenches. In this work, we first derive a symbolic formulation of the compliance and stiffness matrices for commonly used flexure elements, flexure joints, and simple chains. Elements of these matrices are all explicit functions of flexure parameters. To analyze a general flexure mechanism, we subdivide it into multiple structural modules, which we identify as serial, parallel, or hybrid chains. We then analyze each module with the known flexure structures in the library. At last, we use a bottom-up approach to obtain the compliance/stiffness matrix for the overall mechanism. This is done by taking appropriate coordinate transformation of twists and wrenches in space. Four practical examples are provided to demonstrate the approach. A numerical example is employed to compare analytical compliance models against a finite element model. The results show that the errors are sufficiently small (2%, compared with finite element (FE) model), if the range of motion is limited to linear deformations. This work provides a systematical approach for compliance analysis and synthesis of general flexure mechanisms. The symbolic formulation enables subsequent design tasks, such as compliance synthesis or sensitivity analysis.

This article investigates how and to what extent member states comply with EU obligations in terms of process and outcome. The aim is to demonstrate how norm‐conform behaviour unfolds, or fails to unfold, in an interaction between a member state and the European Commission. The empirical focus is on recent rule of law crises in France, Hungary and Romania. The argument is that member states engage in symbolic and/or creative compliance, designed to create the appearance of norm‐conform behaviour without giving up their original objectives. The cases illustrate that creative and symbolic compliance strategies may be successfully employed by member states because they enable the Commission to disengage from conflicts it judges too costly and yet maintain its credibility, and are conditioned by the visibility of failure to change facts on the ground. The implication is that, at times, not only is compliance symbolic, but also to some extent is enforcement.

International audience ; The legal devices crafted within large organizations are a key component of legal endogeneity theory (LET). While symbolically complying with legislation, legal devices allow organizations to infuse managerial logics into the legal field, which eventually diverts law from its initial political goals. Although the LET has considered legal devices such as anti-discrimination guidelines and grievance procedures, this chapter argues that contracts also constitute a locus of symbolic compliance and contribute to the eventual endogenization of regulation. Supplementing LET with a focus on legal intermediation, this chapter explores how contracts are crafted and used by large organizations to respond to regulatory pressure. While other legal instruments are unambiguously managerialized from the outset, contracts are highly versatile legal objects that perform the seemingly opposite functions of symbolically complying with regulation and serving substantive commercial purposes. This discussion of the role of contracts as compliance mechanisms is based on an in-depth empirical study of the French retail industry and its response to a set of regulations that aimed at making their business practices fairer.

We show that U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is straightforward under political economy considerations. The reason is that U.S. compliance costs exceed low willingness to pay for dealing with global warming in the U.S. The withdrawal had a crucial impact on the concretion of the Protocol prior to its likely ratification at the end of 2002. Remaining non-EU Parties to the Kyoto Protocol gained veto bargaining power and, thus, were successful in asserting far reaching concessions from the EU on sink credits and tradability of emission rights. Taking these concessions into account, the Kyoto Protocol was essentially reduced to a symbolic treaty that codifies more or less business-as-usual emissions and makes compliance a rather cheap deal.

We show that U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is straightforward under political economy considerations. The reason is that U.S. compliance costs exceed low willingness to pay for dealing with global warming in the U.S. The withdrawal had a crucial impact on the concretion of the Protocol prior to its likely ratification at the end of 2002. Remaining non-EU Parties to the Kyoto Protocol gained veto bargaining power and, thus, were successful in asserting far reaching concessions from the EU on sink credits and tradability of emission rights. Taking these concessions into account, the Kyoto Protocol was essentially reduced to a symbolic treaty that codifies more or less business-as-usual emissions and makes compliance a rather cheap deal.

Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 The System of Domination -- 1.2 The Process of Compliance -- 1.3 Racism and Strangeness, a Persistent Reality -- 1.4 The Case Study of Sweden -- 1.5 The Main Objective and Questions of This Study -- 1.6 Method -- References -- Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives -- 2.1 Symbolic Violence and Socio-political Order -- 2.2 Political System, Media and Constructed Public Truths -- 2.3 Demonising the Enemy -- Punishment, Self-Control and the Techniques of Normalisation -- 2.4 The Academy, Neoliberalism and Critical Thinking -- 2.5 Mass Media and the Freedom of Speech in a Neoliberal Era -- 2.6 Popular Support of Censorship -- 2.7 Academic Freedom and the Mass Media -- 2.8 Self-Censorship and the Spiral of Silence -- 2.9 The Spiral of Silence and Symbolic Violence -- Political Realm of Self-Censorship -- 2.10 Neoliberal Racism -- References -- Chapter 3: Securitisation and Self-Censorship in Mainstream Political Parties -- 3.1 Increasing Demand for Compliance to the Party Line -- 3.2 Securitisation Policies and Engagement in Political Parties -- 3.3 Muzzling as Self-Protection -- 3.4 Being Observed and Ignored at the Same Time -- 3.5 Choosing the Path of Success or Unsuccess -- References -- Chapter 4: Securitisation and Self-Censorship in Mainstream Media -- 4.1 Increasing Demand for Compliance with Neoliberal Racism and the Securitised Mass Media -- 4.2 Muzzling as Self-Protection -- 4.3 Being Observed and Ignored at the Same Time -- 4.4 Choosing the Path of Success or Unsuccess -- 4.5 Summary -- References -- Chapter 5: Securitisation and Self-Censorship in Academia -- 5.1 Increasing Demand for Compliance to Universities' Neoliberal Racism -- 5.2 Muzzling as Self-Protection -- 5.3 Being Observed and Ignored at the Same Time.

We show that U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol can be rationalized under political economy considerations. The reason is that U.S. compliance costs exceed low willingness to pay for dealing with global warming in the U.S. The withdrawal had a crucial impact on the implementation design of the protocol prior to its likely ratification. The remaining non-EU Parties to the Kyoto Protocol gained veto bargaining power &, thus, were successful in asserting far-reaching concessions from the EU on sink credits &, in particular, on the tradability of emission rights. Taking these concessions into account, the Kyoto Protocol was essentially reduced to a symbolic treaty that codifies more or less business-as-usual emissions & makes compliance a rather cheap deal. 11 Tables, 2 Figures, 35 References. [Copyright 2004 Elsevier B.V.]

Abstract  This study used a longitudinal, panel design to examine the effects of negative information acquisition, compliance with opinion leader endorsements, and social demographic characteristics on consumers' symbolic adoption of food irradiation. Data collection coincided with the first market test of irradiated food conducted by a commercial firm, which took place in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in 2000. Approximately half the subjects (N = 116) received a packet containing information from proponents and opponents of food irradiation. The remaining subjects (N = 107) were provided with no information about the technology. The results indicated that, initially, negative information acquisition, even when accompanied by positive endorsements from opinion leaders, decreased symbolic adoption. Over time, however, this negative effect was mitigated by compliance with endorsements from opinion leaders. The results suggest that confidence in social institutions might be a determinant as well as an outcome of adoption decisions. Implications are suggested for risk communication strategies regarding controversial agricultural technologies.

This paper discusses ambiguities of mutual obligation at the levels of: defining the new political middle ground, policies for dealing with non‐compliance, the analytical frames that are used to support it, and discourses of contract. It concludes by locating these ambiguities within the cultural anthropological notion of symbol. As a symbol, mutual obligation has the power to confound its critics — criticism of the notion and its inconsistent policy prescriptions is generally not assessed as right or wrong, but rather is rendered irrelevant.