Suchergebnisse

Exceptions to the general rule that perceived attitude similarity is related to enhanced cooperation suggest that the subject's goals and the behavior of the other person are important constraints of the relationship. The present study categorized subjects according to their dominant social goal; 80% of 238 female subjects had predominantly individualistic or competitive social goals. Subjects made choices in a series of different decomposed prisoner's dilemma games, interacting with a conditionally cooperative accomplice who began with either a cooperative or a competitive first choice. The attitude similarity of the accomplice was manipulated at three levels: similar, neutral, and dissimilar. Similar accomplices received a significantly higher level of cooperation only when the subjects had individualistic goals and the accomplice's first choice was competitive. The discussion focuses on conditions which facilitate or suppress cooperative behavior in mixed-motive situations.

PurposeInterorganizational cooperation (IOC) is like harnessing a swan, a crab, and a pike to a single wagon and still expecting it to go. One issue that appears significant under such conditions is building trust and inscribing it into the structure of IOC. The purpose of this study is to explore the relationships between trust and IOC structure.Design/methodology/approachTrust‐structure relationships are studied by drawing upon a case study of complex and effective IOC in The Early Childhood Center in Israel.FindingsThe analysis reveals several structural factors that support the building and maintenance of trust: choice of contribution, involvement in decision making, committee configuration, IOC culture, the director's role, and the representatives' high‐ranking positions and professional background.Research limitations/implicationsThree conditions help to inscribe trust into IOC structure: Low risk and minor expectations from the IOC, a leader willing to share information throughout the IOC structure, and high positions and professional representatives.Originality/valueThe study contributes to IOC literature by highlighting the fact that trust between organizations cannot depend on the goodwill of particular people, but must have an organizational structure to enable and support it.

AbstractThe evolution of cooperation scholarship develops evolutionary stable theories that explain the presence of cooperation when there are many reasons to defect from cooperation. In this analysis, these theories are tested using the relations between states. Focusing on the direct reciprocity strategies of Tit-for-Tat and Win-stay/Lose-shift and the indirect reciprocity strategies of Cooperative Reputation and Tag, Tit-for-Tat and Cooperative Reputation are found to be robust, while Tags have mixed results. In the end, it is the direct cooperative action by states and their cooperative reputation and not shared characteristics that are most likely to elicit cooperative action in return.