Suchergebnisse

The landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) established the right to assistance of counsel for all indigent defendants. However, it did not guarantee a right to effective assistance of counsel. An attorney must be more than a warm body standing next to a defendant. Strickland v. Washington (1984) established that not only do defendants have a right to assistance of counsel, but they must also have effective assistance. The Strickland decision established a two-part requirement in order for a defendant or petitioner to show ineffective assistance. After Strickland, the federal government continued to make decisions based off of these requirements, sometimes expanding and sometimes contracting the requirements, however, never steering too far from the Strickland test. States such as Wyoming and Colorado have continued to uphold the Strickland test. Though, states like New York and Hawaii viewed the requirement as too high, in turn these states lowered the bar for the ineffective assistance of counsel requirement. Few states have changed from Strickland indicating that the standards are fair, but the states that have changed, take a hard stance that the 6th Amendment's right to counsel has not been vindicated because the standards to show ineffective assistance are too high, resulting in only extreme cases finding ineffective assistance of counsel.

The landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) established the right to assistance of counsel for all indigent defendants. However, it did not guarantee a right to effective assistance of counsel. An attorney must be more than a warm body standing next to a defendant. Strickland v. Washington (1984) established that not only do defendants have a right to assistance of counsel, but they must also have effective assistance. The Strickland decision established a two-part requirement in order for a defendant or petitioner to show ineffective assistance. After Strickland, the federal government continued to make decisions based off of these requirements, sometimes expanding and sometimes contracting the requirements, however, never steering too far from the Strickland test. States such as Wyoming and Colorado have continued to uphold the Strickland test. Though, states like New York and Hawaii viewed the requirement as too high, in turn these states lowered the bar for the ineffective assistance of counsel requirement. Few states have changed from Strickland indicating that the standards are fair, but the states that have changed, take a hard stance that the 6th Amendment's right to counsel has not been vindicated because the standards to show ineffective assistance are too high, resulting in only extreme cases finding ineffective assistance of counsel.

This Essay suggests that many of the same reasons why Saucier proved so controversial--and perhaps even unworkable--in qualified immunity cases are less salient in the context of post-conviction habeas corpus, where the value of reaching potentially unnecessary questions of constitutional law far outweighs the cost. Put another way, my thesis is that, even though the Saucier sequence is no longer mandatory in qualified immunity jurisprudence, such a rigid methodological order of battle would be of great utility in the context of post-conviction habeas corpus--and in the adjudication of "new" rules of criminal law more generally. In that context, this Essay argues, the case for rights-first constitutional adjudication is far stronger. To elaborate upon this argument, Part II begins with a brief descriptive overview of the Supreme Court's post-conviction habeas corpus jurisprudence, focusing on the particular significance of "new" rules of criminal law, and their applicability. Part III introduces the Court's qualified immunity case law, and explores both the origins of the Saucier sequence and the growing criticisms of the rights-first approach that led to its overruling this Term in Callahan. Finally, Part III turns to whether the Saucier sequence could be extrapolated into the context of post-conviction habeas corpus, considering both why it might work, and the counterarguments against it. Ultimately, as this Essay concludes, although AEDPA's deferential standard of review crystallizes the problem that federal courts face in post-conviction habeas cases today, the need for rights-first adjudication in that context actually predates the 1996 statute--and will survive any legislative attempt to repeal it.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. Alden v. Maine -- 2. Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes -- 3. Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye -- 4. United States v. Whren -- 5. County of Sacramento v. Lewis -- 6. Chavez v. Martinez -- 7. Saucier v. Katz -- 8. Strickland v. Washington -- Note to the Reader Regarding Legal Citations -- About the Contributors -- Index