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The possibility of achieving decisive results from short warning attacks appears to have improved greatly with technological advances. Indeed, strategic surprise offers both golden opportunities and lethal dangers, so it attracts much attention in today's world. Dr. Gray takes a broad view of strategic surprise, and relates it to the current military transformation. He argues that the kind of strategic surprise to which the United States is most at risk and which is most dangerous to national security is the deep and pervasive connection between war and politics. Although America is usually superior at making war, it is far less superior in making peace out of war. Dr. Gray concludes that the current military transformation shows no plausible promise of helping to correct the long-standing U.S. weakness in the proper use of forces as an instrument of policy. ; "April 2005." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 33-38). ; The possibility of achieving decisive results from short warning attacks appears to have improved greatly with technological advances. Indeed, strategic surprise offers both golden opportunities and lethal dangers, so it attracts much attention in today's world. Dr. Gray takes a broad view of strategic surprise, and relates it to the current military transformation. He argues that the kind of strategic surprise to which the United States is most at risk and which is most dangerous to national security is the deep and pervasive connection between war and politics. Although America is usually superior at making war, it is far less superior in making peace out of war. Dr. Gray concludes that the current military transformation shows no plausible promise of helping to correct the long-standing U.S. weakness in the proper use of forces as an instrument of policy. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The current process of military transformation will enable the Armed Forces to do better what they already do superbly well. It is important to excel at decisive maneuver and in the application of precise, yet overwhelming firepower. But those attributes, though key in warfare against regular enemies, tend to be less valuable in conflict with irregulars. In war after war, the United States has been surprised by the poor political reward it has earned for its military effort. The IT-led transformation will do nothing to help correct the persisting American difficulty in functioning strategically and politically in its conduct of war. The author develops a cumulative seven-point argument. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1750/thumbnail.jpg

This essay examines the failure to anticipate the terrorist attacks of September 11 from four perspectives: cognitive biases of government analysts & policy makers concerned with terrorism, organizational pathologies of key bureaucracies such as the CIA & the FBI, political & strategic errors of senior government officials, & the unusual nature of al Qaeda. Drawing on past studies of strategic surprise, it argues that agencies such as the CIA at times did impressive work against the terrorist organization, but that in general the US government, & the US intelligence community in particular, lacked a coherent approach for triumphing over the skilled terrorists it faced. In hindsight, it is clear that numerous mistakes at all levels of the US government & the broader US analytic community made strategic surprise more likely. 85 References. Adapted from the source document.

The article is based on a study carried out as part of the Long-Term Organizational Development Plan project by the Center for Security and Military-Strategic Studies of the University of Defense entitled "Armed Conflict". As part of the study, the issue of strategic surprise was analyzed and assessed, the aim of which was to find causal mechanisms and connections between the security of state defense and the phenomenon of surprise in the conditions of the 21st century. The article deals with the issue of surprise and its impact on state defense security. It describes strategic surprise as a principled aspect with implications and impacts on state defense. It examines the issue of surprise as a principle of military art in the context of contemporary strategic thinking.