Suchergebnisse

El artículo propone, a manera de un aporte para un balance sobre dos décadas de multiculturalismo en Colombia, una reflexión sobre los efectos, alcances y límites de las circunscripciones especiales indígenas. En la primera parte brinda un acercamiento a debates que sugiere la implementación de dispositivos electorales adecuados a la multiculturalidad; posteriormente, contextualiza el caso de las circunscripciones especiales en Colombia, como vía destacada más no exclusiva de la movilización política indígena. La segunda parte se enfoca en un análisis de la puesta en práctica(s) de las circunscripciones indígenas, centrado en la articulación entre la influencia en ellas de factores institucionales -como la llamada Reforma Política de 2003- y dinámicas de las agrupaciones políticas que involucran. ; The article proposes, by way of a contribution to an assessment of two decades of multiculturalism in Colombia, a reflection on the purpose, scope and limits of special indigenous. The first part provides an approach to discussions suggested the implementation of electoral devices suitable for multiculturalism, and then contextualizes the case of special districts in Colombia, as a means but not exclusively prominent indigenous political mobilization. The second part focuses on an analysis of the implementation (s) of indigenous districts, focusing on the joint between the influence of institutional factors in them-as the so-called political reform of 2003 - and dynamics of the political groups involving.

This paper shows how political parties differentiate to reduce electoral competition. Two parties choose platforms in a unidimensional policy space, and then candidates from these parties compete for votes in a continuum of constituencies with different median voters. Departing from their parties' platforms is costly enough that candidates do not take the median voter's preferred position in every constituency. Because the candidate whose party is located closer to the median voter gets a higher expected payoff, parties acting in their candidates' best interests differentiate---when one party locates right of center, the other prefers to locate strictly left of center to carve out a "home turf,'' constituencies that can be won with little to no deviation from the platform of the candidate's party. Hence, competition that pulls candidates together pushes parties apart. Decreasing "campaign costs'' increases party differentiation as the leftist party must move further from the rightist party to carve out its home turf, as does increasing heterogeneity across constituencies.

[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] This paper shows how political parties differentiate to reduce electoral competition. Two parties choose platforms in a unidimensional policy space, and then candidates from these parties compete for votes in a continuum of constituencies with different median voters. Departing from their parties' platforms is costly enough that candidates do not take the median voter's preferred position in every constituency. Because the candidate whose party is located closer to the median voter gets a higher expected payoff, parties acting in their candidates' best interests differentiate---when one party locates right of center, the other prefers to locate strictly left of center to carve out a "home turf,'' constituencies that can be won with little to no deviation from the platform of the candidate's party. Hence, competition that pulls candidates together pushes parties apart. Decreasing "campaign costs'' increases party differentiation as the leftist party must move further from the rightist party to carve out its home turf, as does increasing heterogeneity across constituencies.

This paper uses the Hotelling-Downs spatial model of electoral competition between candidates to explore competition between political parties. Two parties choose platforms in a unidimensional policy space, and then in a continuum of constituencies with different median voters candidates from the two parties compete in first-past-the-post elections. Departing from party platform is costly enough that candidates do not take the median voters preferred position in each constituency. In equilibrium, parties acting in their candidates best interests differentiate when one party locates right of center, the other prefers to locate strictly left of center to carve out a home turf, consituencies that can be won with little to no deviation from party platform. Hence, Downsian competition that pulls candidates together pushes parties apart. Decreasing campaign costs increases party differentiation as the leftist party must move further from the rightist party to carve out its home turf. For a range of costs, parties take more extreme positions than their most extreme candidates. For small costs, parties are too extreme to maximize voter welfare, whereas for large costs they are not extreme enough.

Whether it is the politics of the nomination process, the politics of the general election, or the politics of governance, it is safe to say that all candidates will firmly announce that they represent "all the people." Each will pronounce profusely that he or she "owes no one or no special interest group." And each will insist that he or she will pursue policies based on principles, not on pressures.So much for the rhetoric, and it is quite expected and understandable. Of course, it is acceptable to be against "big government" or "big business" or "special interests." That, too, is expected. A serious (meaning, even slightly possible) contender for, and occupant of the White House will not long remain so if he or she bluntly announces otherwise, that is, that one's candidacy is largely reliant on farmers, or business, or unions, or minorities (racial or otherwise).The reality, however, is frequently somewhat different, and it is not necessarily a matter of political cynicism to say this. The nature of the three forms of the electoral/ governance system almost dictates that people who strive to govern one system develop strategies to appeal to several constituencies. Specifically, in order to be nominated one must court delegates. In order to be elected, one must count state electoral votes. In order to govern, one must construct still other kinds of coalitions. Always, at each step, the system mandates strategies that disaggregate the electorate into manageable blocs and available constituencies.

An often-forgotten passage of Philip Converse's classic essay on mass belief systems introduced the concept of an issue public - a segment of voters that has crystallized attitudes about a particular topic. This simple idea could provide an important corrective to work that casts citizens' political competence in a negative light.

We investigate strategic voting at German Bundestag elections. The common intuition about strategic voting holds that supporters of small party candidates split their ticket and cast a constituency vote for the candidate of a viable large party. We show that there is more potential for strategic voting than previously admitted. Based on the multiparty calculus of voting framework, we formulate a decision-theoretic model that allows us to take the full range of situations into account, that voters may encounter in their local constituencies. Applying this model to survey data from the 1998 and 2002 federal elections, we find that voters make use of sophisticated balloting, given the chance to influence the outcome of the constituency election. While the focus of this paper is on Germany, the approach we take is applicable to single seat elections in other countries as well. [Copyright 2008 Elsevier Ltd.]

"We investigate strategic voting at German Bundestag elections. The common intuition about strategic voting holds that supporters of small party candidates split their ticket and cast a constituency vote for the candidate of a viable large party. We show that there is more potential for strategic voting than previously admitted. Based on the multiparty calculus of voting framework, we formulate a decision-theoretic model that allows us to take the full range of situations into account, that voters may encounter in their local constituencies. Applying this model to survey data from the 1998 and 2002 federal elections, we find that voters make use of sophisticated balloting, given the chance to influence the outcome of the constituency election. While the focus of this paper is on Germany, the approach we take is applicable to single seat elections in other countries as well." (author's abstract)