Suchergebnisse

The Judiciary Council has been ineffective in its constitutional mission: helping to sustain the judges' independence against the other — dignified or efficient — Powers' pressures. The way its members are appointed and how they in turn elect the holders of the main judicial positions has shown their dependency on the political parties. But the 2013 reform does not resolve this problems, does not fulfil the constitutional provisions on pluralism in its composition and collegiality, creates some new ones as a consequence of the reinforcement of its president's powers and transfers a substantial part of its former competences to the Executive power. It is a deliberate setback to the pre-constitutional way of governing the judiciary: a genuine Counter-Reform. ; El Consejo General del Poder Judicial ha sido ineficaz en su misión constitucional de ayudar a defender la independencia de jueces y tribunales frente a presiones de los demás poderes, dignificados o eficientes. La forma en que se designa a sus integrantes y el modo en que éstos eligen luego a los principales cargos judiciales ha puesto de manifiesto su dependencia de los partidos políticos. Pero la reforma de 2013 no resuelve estos problemas, incumple previsiones constitucionales de pluralismo en su composición y de colegialidad y añade otros nuevos como consecuencia de su presidencialismo y transfiere una parte sustancial de sus poderes al Ejecutivo. Supone un retroceso deliberado hacia el sistema de gobierno preconstitucional: una genuina Contrarreforma.The Judiciary Council has been ineffective in its constitutional mission: helping to sustain the judges' independence against the other — dignified or efficient — Powers' pressures. The way its members are appointed and how they in turn elect the holders of the main judicial positions has shown their dependency on the political parties. But the 2013 reform does not resolve this problems, does not fulfil the constitutional provisions on pluralism in its composition and collegiality, creates some new ones as ...

The growing political polarization of Western liberal democracies often leads to situations of political deadlock that require the intervention of an external authority capable of untangling the knot. After the second (fruitless) meeting held today between Commissioner Reynders and representatives of the Spanish government and the main opposition party, there is no simple solution in sight to an issue of the renewal of the Spanish Council of the Judiciary with significant implications for the immediate future of the Spanish political scenario. In this blog, I argue that underneath all the technical layers of legal order invoked under the generic defence of the rule of law, there are political and democratic debates for which the EU may play an important yet uncertain and questionable role.

In this paper I want to analyze the process of transition to democracy, particularly in relation to two points: the lack of solution to the problem of autonomous government and the lack of lustration in the judicial system, leaving extremely conservative judges who are now at the top of the Spanish judiciary and who seem to be pushing for a hard response to any attack against the unity of Spain, using an old category of criminal offence, that seemed to have been left out from European criminal justice systems: that of political crimes.

In this paper I want to analyze the process of transition to democracy, particularly in relation to two points: the lack of solution to the problem of autonomous government and the lack of lustration in the judicial system, leaving extremely conservative judges who are now at the top of the Spanish judiciary and who seem to be pushing for a hard response to any attack against the unity of Spain, using an old category of criminal offence, that seemed to have been left out from European criminal justice systems: that of political crimes.

AbstractThis article provides an analysis of the normative framework for Spanish cannabis clubs by contextualizing it within the growing body of comparative constitutional law that recognizes legal obstructions to personal drug consumption as intrusions of the right to privacy. Article 3(2) of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 relieves State parties from the Article's obligation to criminalize drug possession and cultivation for 'personal consumption' when doing so would conflict with their constitution or basic concepts of their legal system. Spain relied on Article 3(2) in its decision not to criminalize conduct involving personal consumption. The Spanish judiciary has had to consider the legal implications of collective consumption and cultivation in the form of cannabis clubs. In addition to operating in a grey area of domestic law, Spain's cannabis clubs straddle the blurred boundary in international and European legal instruments between 'personal consumption' and 'drug trafficking'. This article explores the theoretical and doctrinal implications of both Spanish law on cannabis clubs and comparative human rights law on drug use to outline the potential contours of a constitutionally protected zone of privacy pertaining to cannabis use in a social context.

The current work seeks to ascertain whether rulings on dismissal cases issued by incumbent judges in Spanish labour courts are influenced by whether they are acting alone in their own court or sharing duties with other judges such as replacement judges, support judges or incumbent judges from other courts. We consider that a court is treated when more than one judge rules in it. Then, an analysis is conducted so as to determine the effect of such a treatment on the percentage of cases ruled in favour of the dismissed worker. The data used in the research are taken from the information recorded at court level provided by the statistics kept by the General Council of the Spanish Judiciary. A total of 2888 observations were available, corresponding to the period spanning 2004 to 2012. As regards the findings, it may be concluded that there is a significant positive impact on the number of dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers when incumbent judges are not acting alone in their court, particularly when the incumbent judge solves cases together with another professional judge.

Instability has become a "new normal" for Spain. This relatively young democracy with numerous semiperipheral traits is seeing new challenges overlap the long-standing old ones, which makes instability greater than in more developed European Union countries. The article is the first Russian academic paper to cover the entirety of destabilizing factors in contemporary Spanish society. Among the destabilizers one can identify those that may be traced back to Spain's historical past. These include polarization of opinions on the legacy of the Civil War and the Franco regime, elements of authoritarian attitudes in mass consciousness and political practices of organizations, as well as conflicts between supporters of monarchy and the republican movement, between avid catholics and secularists. Another contributing factor is fragility of the political system that shows itself in personalist (caudillist) parties, whose mechanisms for intra-party democracy are still immature. There is also a disproportionate electoral legislation, politicized judiciary, and the unfinished nation state that has failed to truly integrate Catalonia and the Basque Country. Another destabilizer is volatile social and economic development. Spain has one of the highest rates of unemployment and precarious employment in the EU, intensive growth of precariat, flawed healthcare and education systems, immigration galvanizing both indigenous nationalism and xenophobia, with the reluctance of many immigrants to adapt to Spanish culture and society. Minimizing risks related to destabilizing factors is an imperative for Spain's present and future.

La Ley de Amnistía de 1977 sancionó la impunidad en la transición y se convirtió desde entonces en un obstáculo que impide dar respuesta a los derechos de verdad, justicia y reparación que poseen las víctimas de la dictadura franquista. Ello ha sido posible por la inacción del poder legislativo, que en la búsqueda del consenso político se ha mostrado incapaz de emitir normas decididas de justicia transicional al respecto, siendo la Ley de Memoria Histórica de 2007 el mejor ejemplo. Pero también se debe a la particular forma de ignorar el Derecho internacional y las obligaciones que éste impone en materia de violación grave de los derechos humanos por parte de la judicatura española, como refleja el juicio realizado contra el juez Baltasar Garzón. ; The Amnesty Law of 1977 sanctioned impunity in the transition and since then became an obstacle that prevents the response to the rights of truth, justice and reparation that the victims of the Franco dictatorship possess. This fact has been possible due to the inaction of the legislative power, in the search for political consensus has shown itself incapable of issuing decisive norms of transitional justice, in this regard, the Law of Historical Memory of 2007 is the best example. But it is also due to the particular way of ignoring international law and the obligations it imposes on the serious violation of human rights by the Spanish judiciary, as reflected in the trial against Judge Baltasar Garzón.

Examines judicial attitudes in cases which have raised benefit, health, and education issues and suggests that incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights may increase the role of judges as protectors of the welfare state; Great Britain. Summaries in French and Spanish.

Abstract:The Spanish Constitution of 1978 established the General Council of the Judiciary, as an organ for the Judiciary government. Since of its creaction on 1980,this organ has been objet of a constant process of reforming that shows how the Conuncil hasn't achieved to find its place in institutional system and how this organ couldn't consolidate itself under a stable model. The last most important reform, the Organic Law 4/2013, reforming the CGPJ, has introduced in a reformulation of the structure and functions of the Council, and a new way of election of its members, thus constituting. This paper presents the evolution and the changes about of Council in forty years of constitutional vigence and analyzes the reform, the new position and place of Council and its organs, the doubts on the functioning of the Council, and the questions that today remain open. ; Resumen:La Constitución española de 1978 consagró el Consejo General del Poder Judicial, como órgano de gobierno del Poder Judicial. Desde su creación en 1980, este órgano ha estado sometido a constantes reformas, en un proceso de continuas modificaciones que han derivado en un órgano que no parece haber encontrado su lugar en el sistema institucional, y no ha podido consolidarse. La última reforma más importante, la Ley Orgánica 4/2013, de reforma del CGPJ, ha introducido una nueva reformulación del modo de elección, la estructura y las funciones del CGPJ. El presente trabajo expone la evolución y los cambios habidos en el Consejo en estos cuarenta años de vigencia constitucional, y analiza el régimen establecido por la reforma de 2013, la nueva posición del Consejo y de sus órganos de funcionamiento, la dudas sobre el funcionamiento que plantea y las cuestiones que aún siguen abiertas.Abstract:The Spanish Constitution of 1978 established the General Council of the Judiciary, as an organ for the Judiciary government. Since of its creaction on 1980,this organ has been objet of a constant process of reforming that shows how the Conuncil hasn't achieved to find its place in institutional system and how this organ couldn't consolidate itself under a stable model. The last most important reform, the Organic Law 4/2013, reforming the CGPJ, has introduced in a reformulation of the structure and functions of the Council, and a new way of election of its members, thus constituting. This paper presents the evolution and the changes about of Council in forty years of constitutional vigence and analyzes the reform, the new position and place of Council and its organs, the doubts on the functioning of the Council, and the questions that today remain open. Summary:I. The reception of the Judiciary government in the Spanish Constitution: forty years about the General Council of the Judiciary.II. Regulation present and open questions. 1. About the Organic Law 4/2013, for reforming the CGPJ. 2. Elections system, status of its members and restaffinf of the organ.3. Organic Structure of the General Council of the Judiciary and questions about the functioning of its organs.4. Powers of the General Council of the Judiciary. 5. Relationship between the General Council of the Judiciary and the Spanish Parlament: the Appearance of the President anf the members of Council before the House of Representatives.III. Ultimate considerations.