The Spanish fiscal policy during the recent "great recession"
In: Journal of post-Keynesian economics, Band 32, Heft 3, S. 371-388
ISSN: 1557-7821
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In: Journal of post-Keynesian economics, Band 32, Heft 3, S. 371-388
ISSN: 1557-7821
This paper analyzes German and Spanish fiscal policy using simple policy rules. We choose Germany and Spain, as both are Member States in the European Monetary Union (EMU) and underwent considerable increases in public debt in the early 1990s. We focus on the question, how fiscal policy behaves under rising public debt ratios. It is found that both Germany and Spain generally exhibit a positive relationship between government revenues and debt. Using Markov-switching techniques, we show that both countries underwent a change in policy behavior in the light of rising debt/output ratios at the end of the 1990s. Interestingly, this change in policy behavior differs in its characteristics across the two countries and seems to be non-permanent in the case of Germany.
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This paper analyzes German and Spanish fiscal policy using simple policy rules. We choose Germany and Spain, as both are Member States in the European Monetary Union (EMU) and underwent considerable increases in public debt in the early 1990s.We focus on the question, how fiscal policy behaves under rising public debt ratios. It is found that both Germany and Spain generally exhibit a positive relationship between government revenues and debt. Using Markov-switching techniques, we show that both countries underwent a change in policy behavior in the light of rising debt/output ratios at the end of the 1990s. Interestingly, this change in policy behavior differs in its characteristics across the two countries and seems to be non-permanent in the case of Germany.
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In: Panoeconomicus: naučno-stručni časopis Saveza Ekonomista Vojvodine ; scientific-professional journal of Economists' Association of Vojvodina, Band 60, Heft 5, S. 577-592
ISSN: 2217-2386
The paper analyses the mistakes made in the management of the fiscal policy
in Spain before the crisis. The authors argue that the low size of the public
expenditures, the adoption of a procyclical expansionary fiscal policy the
years before the crisis, and the lack of a correct coordination between the
Spanish fiscal policy and the ECB?s monetary policy, are key elements to
understand the depth and length of the economic crisis and the current high
fiscal imbalances in Spain.
Was Spanish fiscal policy destabilizing? We estimate policy reaction functions and test the impact of fiscal shocks on growth volatility over the period 19501998. We find that a transition from pro-cyclical to countercyclical fiscal policy occurred in the late years of the Franco regime, contributing to the stabilization of the growth pattern. The timing of the shift, between the late 1960s and early 1970s, was not determined by a single policy change, but rather by gradual pressure from economic liberalization, the external constraint imposed by a fixed exchange rate regime and the modernization of fiscal policy instruments. The aggressiveness of fiscal shocks also decreased over time, thus contributing to the progressive stabilization of output growth. There appears to be little necessity to appeal to a 'Great Moderation' of monetary policy to understand the greater stability of the Spanish economy from the 1980s.
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En este trabajo reflexionamos sobre el papel que puede desempeñar la política fiscal en la solución a la crisis de la zona del euro, caracterizada por niveles de endeudamiento públicos y privados elevados, que se acompañan de problemas de crecimiento y de competitividad. Analizamos el caso español como ejemplo paradigmático de las dificultades creadas por un endeudamiento elevado y de la presencia de desequilibrios internos y externos. En primer lugar, se describe el proceso de generación de los desequilibrios durante el período 1995-2007. Con posterioridad, se discute cómo la corrección de los desequilibrios macroeconómicos condiciona el progreso en la consolidación fiscal y cómo este último afecta a la corrección de los desequilibrios. Concluimos que el papel que la política fiscal puede desempeñar en estos países para expandir la demanda y reducir los costes asociados a la corrección de los desequilibrios internos y externos es limitado. La mejor contribución que la política fiscal puede efectuar en este contexto es a través de reformas del gasto público y del sistema impositivo, dirigidas a estabilizar la ratio de deuda pública. Esta política fiscal debe combinarse con reformas estructurales que aumenten la productividad de la economía y con mejoras del grado de regulación y competencia de los mercados, de forma que se reduzcan los costes de corto plazo de la devaluación interna ; In this paper we reflect on the role that fiscal policy could play in the resolution of the crisis in Eurozone countries crippled by both public and private debt, and beset by growth and competitiveness problems. As an illustration, we revisit the Spanish case, a paradigmatic example of the economic difficulties created by high debt and internal and external imbalances. After describing the build-up of fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances in Spain during the period 1995-2007, we first discuss how the correction of macroeconomic imbalances conditions progress on the fiscal consolidation front and, secondly, how fiscal consolidation affects the correction of imbalances. We conclude that the role that national fiscal policies can play in these countries to expand demand and reduce the costs of solving external and internal imbalances seems limited. Also, overall, the best contribution that fiscal policy can achieve under these constraints is through a better targeting of government expenditures and tax reforms, aimed at introducing permanent measures to stabilise debt ratios. These could then be combined with productivity-enhancing structural reforms and with improvements in product market regulation to increase competition, so that the short-term costs of the internal devaluation required are reduced
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In: Banco de Espana Occasional Paper No. 1303
SSRN
Working paper
Most of the Structural Actions are designed as an incentive to increase public investment in less-developed areas. However, we suspect that the efficiency of the policy is related to the level of fiscal autonomy of the subsidized government. In this paper we construct a paned data model in order to estimate the role of fiscal federalism on the effectiveness of the EU Structural Actions in enhancing public investment. We use data from the seventeen Spanish regions for the period 1993-2007. The estimation is run upon three alternative strategies: firstly we break the sample according to the level of fiscal autonomy of the units; secondly, we insert an interaction term capturing the join effect of both variables, fiscal decentralization and EU Structural Actions; finally, we estimate a simultaneous equation model in which public investment and the EU transfers are decided simultaneously. Results unambiguously support the hypothesis that the effectiveness of the Structural Funds decreases with larger decentralization. Our results suggest also that this could be due to the fact that regions find it more difficult to be eligible for additional EUSF as they gain fiscal autonomy. The general conclusions include the recommendation that the future design of the European Cohesion policy should take into account the heterogeneity of Fiscal Federalism across the Member States in order to the get the most out of it.
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In: Regional studies: official journal of the Regional Studies Association, Band 45, Heft 1
ISSN: 1360-0591
This paper tests the joint hypotheses that policymakers engage in fiscal policy opportunism and that voters respond by rewarding that opportunism with higher vote margins. Furthermore, it investigates the impact of fiscal illusion on the previous two dimensions. Empirical results, obtained with a sample of 68 countries from 1960 to 2006, reveal that opportunistic measures of expenditures and revenues generate larger winning margins for the incumbent and that the opportunistic manipulation of fiscal policy instruments is larger when the current government is less likely to be reelected. Furthermore, fiscal illusion contributes to the entrenchment of incumbent policymakers in office and promotes opportunistic behaviour. ; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia ...
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In: Andersen , A L & Nielsen , L H W 2010 ' Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy ' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen .
This paper examines why fiscal policy is procyclical in developing as well as developed countries. We introduce the concept of fiscal transparency into a model of retrospective voting, in which a political agency problem between voters and politicians generates a procyclical bias in government spending. The introduction of fiscal transparency generates two new predictions: 1) the procyclical bias in fiscal policy arises only in good times; and 2) a higher degree of fiscal transparency reduces the bias in good times. We find solid empirical support for both predictions using data on both OECD countries and a broader set of countries.
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In: The Limits of Fiscal, Monetary, and Trade Policies, S. 35-61