Suchergebnisse

Multivariate logistic regression models were estimated using panel survey data from 4,065 adults (first surveyed as junior high school students in 1971 in Houston, TX) to test the hypothesized effects of possessing a physical stigma on evoking negative social sanctions among suspects who have reported committing at least 1 of 15 specified deviant acts. Partial support was obtained for the hypothesis in that, among suspects who have reported deviant acts, physically stigmatized individuals are more likely to invite the attention of authorities than nonstigmatized individuals. However, they are no more likely to experience rejection from significant others or to serve time in prison or jail than individuals who do not have physical stigmata. The limited support for the hypothesis may have important implications for the labeling process as it is integrated into a general theory of deviant behavior. The risk for amplification of deviance may be disproportionately greater on the part of physically stigmatized vs nonstigmatized deviant actors. 2 Tables, 35 References. Adapted from the source document.

Research shows that relative deprivation, mental illness, culture, ideology, and various forms of social learning are often identified as factors that can lead an individual to terrorism. However, understanding the value of influences in the form of positive social sanctions through social contact has not been fully explored throughout terrorist studies. In regards to influencing behavior, positive social sanctions elicit a desired behavior which is reinforced through praise or rewards. By utilizing a case study approach, this thesis looks to determine the significance of positive social sanctions through social contact on select individuals who have committed an act of terror in the United States, from the time period of 2002-2012. ; 2013-05-01 ; M.A. ; Sciences, Political Science ; Masters ; This record was generated from author submitted information.

There are 67.8 million Scheduled Tribes people in India, constituting 8.74 % of India's total population (Census 2001). Scheduled Tribes are those which are notified as such by the President o f India under Article 342 o f the Constitution. The tribals in India can be divided into two categories: (i) frontier tribes, and (ii) non-frontier" tribes. The former are inhabitants of the North-East frontier states with 12.02% of India's Scheduled Tribes population at the borders of Burma, China, Tibet and Bangladesh. They occupy a special position in the sphere o f national politics. Different tribal groups together in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland form 64.22, 85.94, 94.46 and 89.15 percent of the state population respectively (Census 2001). Similarly, in Assam, Manipur and Tripura they form 12.41, 39.96 and 31.05 percent of the state population respectively (Ibid.). The rest o f the 87.98% n on-frontier tribes are distributed in most o f the mainland states, though they are concentrated in large numbers in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh. Their population ranges from 4.00 to 32.00 percent in these states (Census 2001)

Voter participation is viewed as a collective action problem overcome chiefly by means of "solidary" and "purposive" selective incentives in the contemporary United States rather than by material incentives. It is argued that these incentives are primarily in the form of civic or societal norms rather than special interest norms associated with partisan or group loyalties as in Uhlaner's (1986) model. The emphasis on civic norms is supported by positive correlations between turnout and other socially cooperative behaviors such as responding to the census, participating in parent-teacher associations, and giving to charities. Data on interpersonal pressures to vote are found to support the hypothesis that "enforcement" of voting norms via social sanctions significantly enhances turnout. The American turnout decline is interpreted in terms of a weakening of social ties adversely affecting the socialization and enforcement of norms responsible for generating civic participation.

The organization of pupils in a boys' comprehensive high school into homogeneous teaching units in order to eliminate the psychological, social and academic effects of streaming by ability may be dysfunctional if the objectives of the institution include the attainment of higher verbal standards. A practising teacher identifies the establishment by pupils of a 'verbal norm', and describes the system of social sanctions imposed by the verbally less proficient against the above‐average pupil.

When public goods are co-produced by citizens and public authorities, problems of free riding and problems of provider accountability frequently coincide. How are voluntary contributions to a public good sustained when they are vulnerable to rent extraction by a third party? In a laboratory experiment, I test whether contributions in a public goods dilemma can be decentrally enforced through costly, mutual sanctioning capacity, even if the contributions can be misappropriated by a third party. I find that costly sanctioning capacity among the beneficiaries of a public good can substantially reduce free riding, without increasing the rate at which contributions are misappropriated by the provider. However, this effect can be undermined if mutual sanctioning capacity exists between the third-party provider and the beneficiaries. Contrary to existing predictions, social sanctioning relationships which both embed the provider and encompass the beneficiaries of a public good are not associated with greater, but partly with lower public goods provision than sanctioning relationships which are only embedding or encompassing.

Election is a means of implementing popular sovereignty carried out in a direct, general, free, confidential, honest and fair manner by guaranteeing and legitimating the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Candidates who will be able to prosper and make people happy, But we know that this people's hope is not damned by the election process which is often not criminal the calen pair and the sukic team One of the acts is violated by the criminal action of the candidate pairs and the team. To minimize the practice of moneypolitic, our team has a solution by means of a partner, a candidate who has done money polyic so that he can do it in publik and be subject to a double fine as a substitute for the amount of money that has been used to bribe the people to the state. criminal Later this money can be used for the interests of the people. However, if the recapitulation, the candidate who has been found out and not willing to admit and replace, the money is recorded as the case, then the Commission will report to the nezen court. This will get more money and the state. With the existence of this regulation, the candidates will fight twice if they want to explore Money Politic s. To the Ethics Council, the alleged bribery will lead to elections, Money Politic s, fines, public recognition.