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Cover Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1: An Overview of Protest Movements -- 2: Nonviolent Protest Is the Only Effective Means of Protest -- 3: Direct Action, Including Violence, Is Sometimes Necessary to Effect Change -- 4: Comedy and Street Theater Are Effective Protest Tactics -- 5: Theatrical Confrontation Is No Longer an Effective Protest Tactic -- 6: Civil Disobedience Is an Effective Protest Tactic -- 7: Protests Like Occupy Damage the Economy and Accomplish Nothing -- 8: The Occupy Movement Had a Lasting Impact -- 9: Economic Inequality in the United States Is an Important Issue for Protest Movements -- 10: Protest Movements Targeting Economic Inequality in the United States Are Misguided -- 11: From Slacktivism to Activism -- 12: Social Media Amplify the Power of Protest -- 13: This Independence Day, Thank a Protester -- 14: Popular Dissent Is Being Actively Suppressed in the United States -- Appendix -- What You Should Know About Social Protest -- What You Should Do About Social Protest -- Organizations to Contact -- Biblography -- Index -- Picture Credits -- Back Cover

Economic globalization creates unfavorable conditions for some countries and social groups while the situation in other countries and social is becoming worse. That is why social problems are on the rise worldwide. Thus, social protest became the major cause of the Arab spring is. Social wave overwhelmed Western Europe and the USA. The solution of social problems depends not on the political will of the elite, but on the activity of the population, as the ruling circles will not adopt a policy of self-restrictions and concessions to the majority without the hard push from the bottom. The peculiar feature of India is the general satisfaction of the society with the political system and economic situation. At the same time the protests against specific cases and events in the country mobilize hundreds of thousands of people, be it corruption scandals or violence against women. However, cultural- civilizational factors contribute to the non-violent character of almost all mass actions. Another distinctive feature of India is the desire of the organizers of the protest to reject support of the major parties due to the belief that political leaders are interested more in strengthening their social base rather than in solving the concrete problems. There are different categories of social protest in India: peasant movements; scheduled castes' (Dalits, the former untouchables) movements; anti-corruption movements; environmental movements; backward caste movements; women's movements; tribal movements; industrial proletariat movements; students' movements; middle class movements; human rights movements. The first four movements are currently the most noticeable. Social protest has not, so far, led to any serious political instability. However, a certain development of the situation can generate it, as well as the rejection of the mainly peaceful methods. In this respect, Dalit movements, especially in case of further erosion of the caste system, are the subject of the greatest concern.

Throughout the 1980s the Dominican Republic experienced simultaneously what in conventional social science would be viewed as highly contradictory trends: a severe economic crisis coupled with international pressures on the government to promote market-oriented reforms, an increase in protest movements in response to the negative impact of a declining economy, and the longest and most enduring democratic process in the country's history as measured by such classical political indicators as regular and competitive elections, absence of political exiles, and freedom of the press and association. The purpose of this article is to show how these seemingly contradictory processes unfolded in the 1980s. (Lat Am Perspect/DÜI)

ObjectiveDespite substantial theorizing, the relationship between economic inequality and participation in nonviolent protests has not been satisfactorily examined empirically.MethodsUsing multilevel models of data from four waves of the European Social Survey, this article examines whether differences in inequality across countries and over time help explain people's engagement in peaceful protest.ResultsIt finds that greater inequality reduces protest participation for all those with incomes below the top quintile.ConclusionsThis result provides strong support for the relative power theory of political participation; the predictions of grievance and resource theories regarding inequality's effects on protest are not supported.

The wave of social protest that swept across England in August 2011 has predominantly been explained by political elites through appeals to various approaches that have in common individualistic frameworks of reference. Issues related to the material condition of society are either little analysed or, among the political elite, ruled out as an explanation of the protests. However, it is clear from both the historical literature on social protest and the contemporary literature on relationships between crime and inequality that explanations ignoring inequalities, particularly economic inequalities, are problematic.

Argues that media discourse influences the collective action frames of social movements & protest in three ways: (1) the narrative form of media discourse tends to orient claims of injustice to specific actors; (2) media discourse amplifies a few select types of collective action that are inherently dramatic, but in general, renders invisible most forms of citizen political participation; & (3) media discourse privileges an adversiarial rather than consensual sense of identity. This argument is illustrated via review of earlier work & the secondary literature. The task of collective action frames is described as tying collective understandings to personal experience, suggesting that social movement organizers who want to use the media ought to demonstrate how their collective frames are relevant to the lives of individuals & create situations in which individuals can gain experiential knowledge of injustices. It is asserted that this strategy will draw out the latent sense of agency within people rather than approach them as passive objects to be manipulated. D. M. Smith

This article examines social protests following the collapse of an IMF-backed anti-inflation program in Turkey by people who lacked the associational bases to voice their political claims. Based on the pattern of protests following a similar economic crisis, one would expect protests by organized labor against the government. Yet it was largely shopkeepers and artisans who took to the streets in response to the 2001 crisis. I argue that the Turkish shopkeepers' ground-level understandings of economic processes-their moral economy-were at the origins of these protests. Furthermore, I demonstrate that organized labor's failure to mobilize resulted from the decline of associational capacity and strength of trade unions. The investigation of the Turkish shopkeeper protests shows that where capitalist production relations and a market economy threaten institutions of livelihood, moral economies can be the determining factor of a particular group's mobilization to contest rules and relations governing economic life. Adapted from the source document.

This article analyzes social protest in the Russian colonies in Alaska and Northern California. The main reasons for protests were the actions of the colonial administration or abuse by its representatives, along with dissatisfaction with the financial situation, rules, conditions, and remuneration for labor, as well as shortages of commodities and food for a considerable part of the population of the Russian colonies. Protest activity in Russian America was relatively insignificant, and its primary forms were complaints, minor economic sabotage, and desertion. Most protest acts took place during the 1790s–1800s, when the colonial system was formed, and exploitation of dependent natives and Russian promyshlenniki (hired hunters of fur-bearing animals) reached its peak. The representatives of the Russian-American Company who managed Alaska from 1799 on tried to block protest activity and not allow open displays of dissatisfaction, since the result could hinder trade, business, and finally, profits and its image in the eyes of the tsar's authorities.

How do economic grievances affect citizens' inclination to protest? Given rising levels of inequality and widespread economic hardship in the aftermath of the Great Recession, this question is crucial for political science: if adverse economic conditions depress citizens' engagement, as many contributions have argued, then the economic crisis may well feed into a crisis of democracy. However, the existing research on the link between economic grievances and political participation remains empirically inconclusive. It is argued in this article that this is due to two distinct shortcomings, which are effectively addressed by combining the strengths of political economy and social movement theories. Based on ESS and EU‐SILC data from 2006–2012, as well as newly collected data on political protest in 28 European countries, a novel, more fine‐grained conceptualisation of objective economic grievances considerably improves our understanding of the direct link between economic grievances and protest behaviour. While structural economic disadvantage (i.e., the level of grievances) unambiguously de‐mobilises individuals, the deterioration of economic prospects (i.e., a change in grievances) instead increases political activity. Revealing these two countervailing effects provides an important clarification that helps reconcile many seemingly conflicting findings in the existing literature. Second, the article shows that the level of political mobilisation substantially moderates this direct link between individual hardship and political activity. In a strongly mobilised environment, even structural economic disadvantage is no longer an impediment to political participation. There is a strong political message in this interacting factor: if the presence of organised and visible political action is a decisive signal for citizens that conditions the micro‐level link between economic grievances and protest, then democracy itself – that is, organised collective action – can help sustain political equality and prevent the vicious circle of democratic erosion.

This article examines social protests following the collapse of an IMF-backed anti-inflation program in Turkey by people who lacked the associational bases to voice their political claims. Based on the pattern of protests following a similar economic crisis, one would expect protests by organized labor against the government. Yet it was largely shopkeepers and artisans who took to the streets in response to the 2001 crisis. I argue that the Turkish shopkeepers' ground-level understandings of economic processes—their moral economy—were at the origins of these protests. Furthermore, I demonstrate that organized labor's failure to mobilize resulted from the decline of associational capacity and strength of trade unions. The investigation of the Turkish shopkeeper protests shows that where capitalist production relations and a market economy threaten institutions of livelihood, moral economies can be the determining factor of a particular group's mobilization to contest rules and relations governing economic life.