Suchergebnisse

A review of books by John Bonner, Politics, Economics and Welfare (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986); Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland [Eds], Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge U Press, 1986); & Michale Laver, Social Choice and Public Policy (Oxford & New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986 [see listings in IRPS No. 43]). Bonner's work introduces the main elements of social choice theory to undergraduates, & presents the concepts of social welfare, utility, rationality, interpersonal comparisons, &, especially, the issue of deriving aggregate or collective welfare functions. Laver's work is also directed toward undergraduates, but its somewhat novel approach should give it a wider audience. The problem of collective action is at the core of the text. A framework for a general comparative discussion of policy outcomes in different systems is developed. The Elster & Hylland work is a collection of essays addressing substantive issues in social choice theory. F. Rasmussen

Topological social choice has evolved from a district area of social choice to a field which is integrated into the mainstreams of both social choice and general equilibrium theory. It has come to integrate and bridge these previously disparate areas, revealing deep and unexpected connections between them. In the process it has clarified the topological and geometric basis of social choice theory. This volume contains wide-ranging reviews of the economic and technical issues in this area, together with important new contributions

Theory of social choice mechanisms is a comparatively new theory. The first results were obtained as early as the beginning of the seventies. The book contains the most important results of the theory. In two main topics the book describes what mechanisms allow equilibrium solutions at any agents` preference profiles, and what outcomes can be implemented. The answer depends on the equilibrium concept. Furthermore the four equilibrium concepts Nash equilibrium, strong Nash equilibrium, equilibrium in dominant strategies, and the core were described in detail

Intro -- Social Choice Theory -- Copyright -- Table of Contents -- Guide to Chapter Dependencies -- To the Student -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 0. What is Social Choice Theory? -- Chapter 1. Simple Majority Voting -- Chapter 2. The Voting Paradox -- Chapter 3. Single-Peakedness -- Chapter 4. Chaos -- Chapter 5. Other Voting Extensions -- Chapter 6. Social Choice Rules -- Chapter 7. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem -- Chapter 8. Power -- Chapter 9. Rights -- Chapter 10. Strategy-Proofness -- Chapter 11. Counterthreats -- Chapter 12. Approval Voting -- Chapter 13. Mistakes -- Mathematical Appendix -- Answers and Hints to Selected Exercises -- Subject Index.