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Argues that while J. Angelo Corlett (2000) makes a good argument for the moral right to secession, he is wrong to recommend constitutional provisions for secession. Secession is a right only in that it derives from the violation of the right to life, liberty, & property. It is argued that secession becomes a reasonable response only if these moral rights are violated, there is no hope that future political decisions will bring an end to the violations, & it is planned to include a minimal use of violence. How circumstances in Kosovo have demonstrated the danger that secessionist movements pose to democracy is also considered. 3 References. D. Weibel

Constitutionalising secession? --Associative constitutionalism --Primary right theory --Remedial right or just-cause theory --Remedial succession and disassociation --Nationalist theory of succession --Nationalism and association --Constitutional text and context --Negotiating secession : of voice and veto --Legislating rules for secession? --Conclusions.

"National Secession" published on by Oxford University Press.

In many ethnically segregated countries, policy is directly linked to ethnicity, and thus, nonruling ethnic groups may suffer from the implemented policy. For these groups, a secession is one instrument to eliminate ethnic heterogeneity costs by implementing their own policy. However, leaving the country reduces economies of scale in the public good provision. Therefore, separatist ethnic groups face a trade-off between eliminating ethnic heterogeneity costs and losing economies of scale in the provision of public goods. I present a model for unraveling secessions in an ethnically segregated country. I use this model to derive conditions for the breakup of countries and to compare equilibrium behavior with and without the possibility of a consecutive secession. Among others, I find that a secessionist conflict will be more likely if there is a previous secession. Furthermore, aggregated conflict spending is larger in secessions with the possibility of a consecutive conflict.

In many ethnically segregated countries, policy is directly linked to ethnicity, and thus, nonruling ethnic groups may suffer from the implemented policy. For these groups, a secession is one instrument to eliminate ethnic heterogeneity costs by implementing their own policy. However, leaving the country reduces economies of scale in the public good provision. Therefore, separatist ethnic groups face a trade-off between eliminating ethnic heterogeneity costs and losing economies of scale in the provision of public goods. I present a model for unraveling secessions in an ethnically segregated country. I use this model to derive conditions for the breakup of countries and to compare equilibrium behavior with and without the possibility of a consecutive secession. Among others, I find that a secessionist conflict will be more likely if there is a previous secession. Furthermore, aggregated conflict spending is larger in secessions with the possibility of a consecutive conflict.