Suchergebnisse

Abstract
This article explores the possibility of distorting the regulator's objective function as a way of overcoming the dynamic consistency problem of regulatory policy toward investment. We derive general conditions under which having the legislator distort the regulator's objective function away from social welfare allows increasing the range of parameter values for which it is possible to induce socially desirable investment. In particular, we show that when the regulator cannot commit to a regulatory policy, the legislator should give a relatively higher weight to the incumbent's profit in the regulator's objective function, if the incumbent invests, and a relatively higher weight to consumer surplus, if the incumbent does not invest.

State aid aimed to certain market participants, especially some of its categories, carries a risk of distortion of competition. Therefore, it is necessary to control allocation of state aid and its direction from the sectoral objectives towards more justified horizontal objectives of allocating. This paper examines the practice of assigning sectoral state aid in the European Union and in the selected Western Balkan countries by using the methods of comparative and correlation analysis. The aim is to identify deviations and point out to the preferred ways of state aid allocation.

Abstract
After the end of the postwar reconstruction boom, the decline of traditional large-scale industries and intensified international competition increased the demand for state aid in the Federal Republic of Germany. This article discusses the relevance of overall industrial policy concepts for the utilization of subsidies from the 1960s to the 1980s. Concentrating on the federal level, it delineates the development of industrial subsidies in relation to the financial support of other sectors and identifies the main benefitting industries. Then the focus turns to attempts to professionalize reporting on subsidies and ideas on the "scientization" of industrial policy, the disillusionment with these instruments, and debates about subsidy cuts. Overall it becomes clear that the extent and composition of federal subsidies were not the result of a coherent policy.

We explore the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branch of government as a way of overcoming the dynamic consistency problem of regulatory policy towards investment. We model the industry as a regulated duopoly. The incumbent is a vertically integrated firm that owns a wholesaler and a retailer. The entrant owns a retailer. Either retailer needs access to the input produced by the wholesaler to operate. The incumbent can make an investment that improves the quality of the input produced by the wholesaler. The regulator sets the access price and is unable to commit. The legislator sets the regulator's objective function and is able to commit. We derive general conditions under which having the legislator distort the regulator's objective function away from social welfare allows increasing the range of parameter values for which it is possible to induce socially desirable investment.

The phenomenon of administrative controls designed to segment
credit markets is not only widespread in less developed countries, but
is prevalent in highly sophisticated forms in most Soviet-type
economies.1 The rationale behind these controls lies in the fact that in
planned or semi-planned economies investment programmes are prepared as
disaggregated sectoral totals, usually broken down further by projects.
Monetary policy can be of little assistance in realizing these sectoral
plans, but some form of financial planning which relies on segmented
credit markets is available for such a task. In particular, manipulation
of the financial system by direct controls can be employed in order to
direct funds into the planned investment projects and to prevent them
from being used to finance unplanned investments. A common way of doing
this is to set maximum interest rates below market equilibrium levels
and then to ration credit on the basis of the planned priorities.
Differential rediscount rates and other incentives can be used to
encourage private financial insti¬tutions to lend in accordance with
these planning objectives.

We study growth in an economy composed of sectors producing specific goods with advantage under fragmented competition. The government allocates public inputs. Sectorial political power defines government objectives and restrictions, and consists of passive resistance (bounding taxation), organized resistance (an effective minimum welfare demand), and socially organized power (pushing Sectorial objectives). Income distribution and growth, mechanisms and incentives for public investment allocation, and political organization incentives, are strikingly different functions of input dependence and political power in open and closed economies. Long-term political economy equilibria and tendencies in political transition due to technical or trade policy changes can be modeled. ; Estudiamos el crecimiento en una economía compuesta de sectores que producen bienes específicos con ventajas, bajo competencia fragmentada. El gobierno asigna insumos públicos según objetivos y restricciones, funciones del poder sectorial, originado en resistencia pasiva (que acote impuestos), resistencia organizada (demanda efectiva de bienestar mínimo) y poder socialmente organizado (que propugna objetivos sectoriales). Las dependencias económicas intersectoriales y el poder político implican distribución del ingreso, crecimiento, mecanismos e incentivos de inversión pública, e incentivos de organización política muy diferentes en economías abiertas y cerradas. Pueden modelarse equilibrios político-económicos de largo plazo y transiciones políticas debidas al cambio técnico o de política comercial.

ABSTRACTThe objective of this article is to present a new way to incorporate the sectoral dimension within the components of regional growth provided by the traditional shift–share analysis. The new methodology elaborates the way that the dynamics of a specific sector in a region are influenced by the performance of other sectors, the latter decomposed between national, structural, and differential effects. To illustrate this extension of the shift–share method, an application is provided using data for the Spanish region of Extremadura for the period 1990–2004. The results highlight how these new components can shed new insights into the analysis of sectoral and regional economic growth processes.

Since independence, the problem of mass poverty in Pakistan
has been substantial. The number of the destitute has continued to soar.
The problem of poverty now looks to be beyond control. The vast masses
of the people, particularly in rural areas, are indeed, miserably below
the poverty line. Moreover, the socioeconomic and demographic indicators
are dismal. Official planning and the market economy system have failed
to lessen poverty. The policies formulated to eradicate it have failed
to achieve their objectives. The issue of poverty in Pakistan has its
significance for sustainable development. Long run development is not
possible without protecting the rights of the vulnerable groups and the
participation of the entire population in the development process.
Although Pakistan's economic growth has been quite respectable for much
of the last four decades but it has failed to trickle down to the
masses. The country has experienced poverty and stagnation in 1950s,
increasing poverty and growth in the 1960s, stagnation of growth but
declining poverty in the 1970s, increasing growth and declining poverty
in the 1980s and finally, increasing poverty and falling growth in the
1990s [MHCHD/UNDP (1999)].

This thesis investigates the interaction between the sectoral balance sheets in Denmark, as they are crucial for understanding the impact and transmission of economic shocks and policies for the economy. This is particularly important in the context of rapid financial balance sheet expansion that preceded the Global Financial Crisis. The thesis thus addresses four key objectives: The first is to identify what the primary source of change in sector balance sheets is; the second is to empirically identify the connections and dependencies (interactions) between the three primary sectors - the private sector, the government sector and the foreign sector; the third is to explore the implications of these interactions, and extends this analysis to include a disaggregated private sector - split into the household sector, the non-financial corporate sector and the financial corporate sector; and, the fourth is to assimilate these interactions into a single macroeconomic framework - in order to examine the transmission of economic shocks or policy measures throughout the economy - and to use this framework to investigate the causes and implications of the unprecedented expansion of private debt relative to disposable income of Danish households. The thesis addresses these issues within the Post Keynesian economic paradigm and the Babylonian mode of thinking, where path dependency and a pluralist approach to method and methodology are encouraged. This is accomplished in the form of five independent, but progressive and related articles.

The objective of this paper is to examine certain aspects of the effectiveness of fiscal policy in the Irish economy within the framework of a mixed Leontief Keynesian system. Primarily, we are concerned with estimating sectoral (and aggregate) impact multipliers for government expenditures.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of micro‐environmental international entrepreneurship and the macro‐environmental market forces on domestic institutionalization of the industrial sector. In doing so, the paper examines the moderating effect of the degree of internationalization on the relationship between domestic market forces and domestic sectoral institutionalization.Design/methodology/approachBased upon the creation of the item pools "domestic sectoral institutionalization", "market forces" and "degree of internationalization" derived from previous research, an applied Delphi technique and a representative sample of 149 exporters in Turkey, a survey using a web‐based questionnaire was conducted. All scales were designed and a number of hypotheses were validated. Results were analyzed by the principal components of factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis and moderated hierarchical regression.FindingsThe empirical analysis resulted in an interaction effect of two sub‐elements of the market forces (trust and organization) and internationalization. The findings imply that internationalization can make an important contribution to the institutionalization of the domestic industrial sector. The paper confirms the findings of previous research on the significant importance of trust for institutionalization. Summarizing, it was found that internationalization significantly and positively moderates the effect of trust on institutionalization. Interestingly, however, internationalization negatively moderates the effect of organization on institutionalization implying that the learning process and experiences created by internationalization cause a higher level of structural adaptation.Originality/valueThis paper innovatively sheds light upon the interrelationship between macro environmental market forces, internationalization of entrepreneurship and domestic institutionalization. In doing so, it relates various disciplines, as national and international entrepreneurial behavior, with sociological aspects such as institutionalization for the sake of achieving important macro economic objectives, especially for countries in transition. The comprehensive, reliable and valid research methodology can be applied when researching this topic with important economic implications for transitional economies in other research settings.

According to the theory of sectoral clashes and coalitions, the sectoral element plays a unique role in affecting, on the one hand, the interrelationships between the economic processes of income creation, distribution, and allocation and, on the other hand, the interrelationships between economic, social, political, and institutional processes that make for change and progress. The objective of this essay is to extend the previous formulation of the theory of sectoral clashes and coalitions along two lines: first, by presenting statistical information from all of Latin America which prima facie supports the theory's basic premises; second, by defining and expanding these premises and the basic framework in an effort to obtain a clearer vision of the theory and its links to economic, political, and social reality. Although most criticisms of the theory find a specific answer and most of the suggestions for improvement are followed, this article is more than a rebuttal. In response to the urgent need for its further development, cited by all commentators and those who have applied and tested the theory in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and Peru, this essay seeks to open new ground and explore new dimensions.

Over the last two decades, fisheries surveys have shifted their focus, from providers of data for single fish stock assessments to become platforms for the multidisciplinary integrated monitoring of ecosystems (including the continued provision of the data necessary for assessing fish stocks). Such change in focus was possible in part because new research vessels built in the 1990s were sufficiently large and equipped for multidisciplinary teams to work simultaneously onboard. The shift in survey objectives, and the data provided, supported changes in policies for implementing ecosystem based approaches. In many countries around the Atlantic, sectoral fisheries management is now embedded into ecosystem conservation and environmental legislation. Similarly, integrated maritime policies now require collecting data on major ecosystem components to monitor the achievement of good environmental status. Presently, fisheries surveys undertaken yearly over large marine areas have become the multidisciplinary platforms providing the required data. ; 1

The objectives of this study are to: 1. Give an overview of the current discussion concerning competition distortion in relation to climate policy, 2. Describe results from some studies estimating the actual competition situation for selected activities, 3. Describe what sector agreement models are suggested/ discussed by EU, 4. Describe what sectors are most interesting to target with a sector agreement from a Swedish point of view, 5. Analyse what parameters are important for reducing competition distortion for Swedish Industry. Two studies, for the United Kingdom (Hourcade et al 2008) and Germany (Graichen et al 2008), have recently assessed the potential cost impact for different industrial sectors of CO2-prices due to the EU ETS. Maximum value at stake was used as metrics. The sectors with high potential impact, with a maximum value at stake larger than 10%, are in the United Kingdom Lime and cement, Basic iron and steel, Starches, Refined petroleum, Fertilizers and Nitrogen compounds and Aluminium. In Germany, the sectors with a maximum value at stake larger than 10% are: Cement and lime, Fertilizers and nitrogen compounds, Basic iron and steel, Aluminium, Paper and board, Other basic inorganic compounds and Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuels. Ex-ante studies of the impacts of competitiveness and carbon leakage due to the EU ETS fail to find actual impacts. However, that does not mean that there will be no impact in the future, which hold changes both in the EU ETS (method for allowance allocation, allowance prices etc) and possibly also other important circumstances (global demand for certain products and global product prices). In this study, based on official Swedish statistics, the maximum value a stake has been calculated for 52 Swedish sectors. Seven sectors have a maximum value a stake of more than 4%: Coke and refined petroleum (21%), Pulp and paper (11%), Basic metals (10%), Non-metallic mineral (9%), Metal ore mines (6%), Air transport (5%) and Electricity, gas and heat (4%). If Air transport and Electricity, gas and heat are omitted, the five remaining sectors account for 22% of Sweden's carbon emissions. In the Swedish Non-metallic mineral sector (including Cement and lime) the maximum value at stake is considerably lower than for Cement and lime in the UK and Germany. This is most likely due differences in system boundaries. In the Swedish statistics, the Cement and lime industry is a minor part (in terms of value added) of the Non-metallic mineral sector, a sector that also includes Stone, sand and soil industry. The calculated maximum value at stake for Non-metallic mineral is therefore a poor proxy for the Cement and lime sector since other sub sectors may 'dilute' the maximum value at stake. Differences in system boundaries may also explain the significant difference in maximum value at stake between the Swedish steel industry and UK and German steel industries. Other possible explanations may be a higher value added per unit, differences in how value added is calculated, different years applied for the analysis and lower CO2-intensity for Swedish products. In late 2008, the EU proposed three types of sector approaches to be discussed under the Ad-hoc Working Group on future commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP): i) Sector CDM - a CDM crediting mechanism with a previously established baseline ii) Sectoral no-lose mechanism - Sectoral crediting against a previously established no-lose target iii) Sectoral emission trading based on a sector emissions cap Based on these three sectoral models, we have analysed what parameters are important for reducing competition distortion for Swedish industry. We have assumed that these sector agreements are implemented in a developing country (DC). We conclude that if sector agreements are to reduce distortions on competition, it is important that the sector agreements create a real carbon price in the DC, i.e. that emissions of carbon dioxide are associated with a cost for the emitter. All three sector agreement-models suggested by the EU can potentially create a carbon price. The driver for emission reductions are in all three cases the international demand for offsets. As a potentially large buyer of off-sets, the EU demand for off-sets is likely to increase the carbon price in the DC sector. The choice of EU policy with respect to imports of off-set will therefore have great importance. Other buyers, such as other countries, emission trading systems or the voluntary credit market will of course also be important. Moreover, imports of off-sets may reduce the price on EU ETS allowances, thus further narrowing the carbon price gap between the two markets. If an important objective of a sectoral agreement is to reduce competition distortion it should be implemented in sectors where the corresponding Swedish industry has significant carbon related costs and where there is significant trade intensity between Sweden and regions outside the EU. Our preliminary analysis indicates that Swedish sectors with potentially high maximum value at stake (direct carbon and indirect electricity cost) are Refineries; Pulp and Paper; Iron and Steel;Cement and Lime; and Metal ore mining. The sectors Aluminium and Fertilizers may be important, but have not been assessed explicitly in this study. In addition, electricity production can be important to include in a sectoral agreement since the electricity price may be a significant cost for certain sectors exposed to international competition. Pass-through of costs - consumer incentives. If a sectoral agreement is to reduce competition distortion it is important that the sector participating in the sectoral agreement can pass through the additional carbon costs on the commodity so the carbon intensive products become more expensive for the consumer. A full pass through of the carbon cost could be compromised in countries with centrally regulated prices on carbon intensive commodities or other measures that shield the true price of carbon from the consumer. Target setting - producer incentives. The rules for setting the targets in the DC sector are crucial from a producer incentive point of view. There are two main options here: 1) absolute targets and 2) intensity targets. Absolute targets create high incentives for carbon reductions as long as the targets are not re-negotiated. The disadvantage is that they might be difficult to negotiate due to difficulties in finding an appropriate emission level, risk for hot air and the inflexibility to future adjustments. Intensity targets are based on output times an intensity factor (called benchmarking). But benchmarking leads to reduced incentives: i) as a production subsidy it encourages overproduction and ii) dis-incentivises the substitution to carbon efficient products. A third, theoretical, option would be absolute targets that are updated according to historic emissions. This model would, however, seriously undermine the incentives for emission reductions. In this study, we have argued that from a competition point of view, it's important to create a carbon price in the developing country. A different issue relates to how different sector agreement models influence the compliance costs of participating firms. We describe a situation where a DC industry sector is linked to the EU ETS, and where the EU industry pays for allowances (no free allocation). For a Sector emission trading system where the DC industry has to pay for allowances, the compliance costs could be compatible in the two regions. For Sector CDM and Sector no-lose mechanism, if the government implements a domestic carbon tax, the compliance costs may also be compatible in the two regions. However, if allowances are allocated freely to the DC industry and no tax is implemented, the DC industry would have no costs associated with the carbon emissions below the compliance level. There could here be a significant difference in compliance costs between the industries in the two regions. We have, however, not analysed if significant asymmetries in compliance costs can lead to competitive distortions between regions. ; The objectives of this study are to: 1. Give an overview of the current discussion concerning competition distortion in relation to climate policy, 2. Describe results from some studies estimating the actual competition situation for selected activities, 3. Describe what sector agreement models are suggested/ discussed by EU, 4. Describe what sectors are most interesting to target with a sector agreement from a Swedish point of view, 5. Analyse what parameters are important for reducing competition distortion for Swedish Industry. Two studies, for the United Kingdom (Hourcade et al 2008) and Germany (Graichen et al 2008), have recently assessed the potential cost impact for different industrial sectors of CO2-prices due to the EU ETS. Maximum value at stake was used as metrics. The sectors with high potential impact, with a maximum value at stake larger than 10%, are in the United Kingdom Lime and cement, Basic iron and steel, Starches, Refined petroleum, Fertilizers and Nitrogen compounds and Aluminium. In Germany, the sectors with a maximum value at stake larger than 10% are: Cement and lime, Fertilizers and nitrogen compounds, Basic iron and steel, Aluminium, Paper and board, Other basic inorganic compounds and Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuels. Ex-ante studies of the impacts of competitiveness and carbon leakage due to the EU ETS fail to find actual impacts. However, that does not mean that there will be no impact in the future, which hold changes both in the EU ETS (method for allowance allocation, allowance prices etc) and possibly also other important circumstances (global demand for certain products and global product prices). In this study, based on official Swedish statistics, the maximum value a stake has been calculated for 52 Swedish sectors. Seven sectors have a maximum value a stake of more than 4%: Coke and refined petroleum (21%), Pulp and paper (11%), Basic metals (10%), Non-metallic mineral (9%), Metal ore mines (6%), Air transport (5%) and Electricity, gas and heat (4%). If Air transport and Electricity, gas and heat are omitted, the five remaining sectors account for 22% of Sweden's carbon emissions. In the Swedish Non-metallic mineral sector (including Cement and lime) the maximum value at stake is considerably lower than for Cement and lime in the UK and Germany. This is most likely due differences in system boundaries. In the Swedish statistics, the Cement and lime industry is a minor part (in terms of value added) of the Non-metallic mineral sector, a sector that also includes Stone, sand and soil industry. The calculated maximum value at stake for Non-metallic mineral is therefore a poor proxy for the Cement and lime sector since other sub sectors may 'dilute' the maximum value at stake. Differences in system boundaries may also explain the significant difference in maximum value at stake between the Swedish steel industry and UK and German steel industries. Other possible explanations may be a higher value added per unit, differences in how value added is calculated, different years applied for the analysis and lower CO2-intensity for Swedish products. In late 2008, the EU proposed three types of sector approaches to be discussed under the Ad-hoc Working Group on future commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP): i) Sector CDM - a CDM crediting mechanism with a previously established baseline ii) Sectoral no-lose mechanism - Sectoral crediting against a previously established no-lose target iii) Sectoral emission trading based on a sector emissions cap Based on these three sectoral models, we have analysed what parameters are important for reducing competition distortion for Swedish industry. We have assumed that these sector agreements are implemented in a developing country (DC). We conclude that if sector agreements are to reduce distortions on competition, it is important that the sector agreements create a real carbon price in the DC, i.e. that emissions of carbon dioxide are associated with a cost for the emitter. All three sector agreement-models suggested by the EU can potentially create a carbon price. The driver for emission reductions are in all three cases the international demand for offsets. As a potentially large buyer of off-sets, the EU demand for off-sets is likely to increase the carbon price in the DC sector. The choice of EU policy with respect to imports of off-set will therefore have great importance. Other buyers, such as other countries, emission trading systems or the voluntary credit market will of course also be important. Moreover, imports of off-sets may reduce the price on EU ETS allowances, thus further narrowing the carbon price gap between the two markets. If an important objective of a sectoral agreement is to reduce competition distortion it should be implemented in sectors where the corresponding Swedish industry has significant carbon related costs and where there is significant trade intensity between Sweden and regions outside the EU. Our preliminary analysis indicates that Swedish sectors with potentially high maximum value at stake (direct carbon and indirect electricity cost) are Refineries; Pulp and Paper; Iron and Steel;Cement and Lime; and Metal ore mining. The sectors Aluminium and Fertilizers may be important, but have not been assessed explicitly in this study. In addition, electricity production can be important to include in a sectoral agreement since the electricity price may be a significant cost for certain sectors exposed to international competition. Pass-through of costs - consumer incentives. If a sectoral agreement is to reduce competition distortion it is important that the sector participating in the sectoral agreement can pass through the additional carbon costs on the commodity so the carbon intensive products become more expensive for the consumer. A full pass through of the carbon cost could be compromised in countries with centrally regulated prices on carbon intensive commodities or other measures that shield the true price of carbon from the consumer. Target setting - producer incentives. The rules for setting the targets in the DC sector are crucial from a producer incentive point of view. There are two main options here: 1) absolute targets and 2) intensity targets. Absolute targets create high incentives for carbon reductions as long as the targets are not re-negotiated. The disadvantage is that they might be difficult to negotiate due to difficulties in finding an appropriate emission level, risk for hot air and the inflexibility to future adjustments. Intensity targets are based on output times an intensity factor (called benchmarking). But benchmarking leads to reduced incentives: i) as a production subsidy it encourages overproduction and ii) dis-incentivises the substitution to carbon efficient products. A third, theoretical, option would be absolute targets that are updated according to historic emissions. This model would, however, seriously undermine the incentives for emission reductions. In this study, we have argued that from a competition point of view, it's important to create a carbon price in the developing country. A different issue relates to how different sector agreement models influence the compliance costs of participating firms. We describe a situation where a DC industry sector is linked to the EU ETS, and where the EU industry pays for allowances (no free allocation). For a Sector emission trading system where the DC industry has to pay for allowances, the compliance costs could be compatible in the two regions. For Sector CDM and Sector no-lose mechanism, if the government implements a domestic carbon tax, the compliance costs may also be compatible in the two regions. However, if allowances are allocated freely to the DC industry and no tax is implemented, the DC industry would have no costs associated with the carbon emissions below the compliance level. There could here be a significant difference in compliance costs between the industries in the two regions. We have, however, not analysed if significant asymmetries in compliance costs can lead to competitive distortions between regions.