Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis paper addresses two discrete but related and essential attributes of an SDRM. It first considers an SDRM that would provide a procedure for proposing and adopting a restructuring plan for a sovereign debtor's debt which would not involve any tribunal or administrator (a No-Tribunal SDRM). The paper examines the merits and feasibility of a No-Tribunal SDRM. In particular, the No-Tribunal SDRM proposed here would undertake the restructuring as if the sovereign debtor and its creditors were subject to the International Capital Markets Association Model Collective Action Clause regime. Second, this paper addresses the means by which a sovereign debt restructuring plan may become legally binding on a sovereign debtor's creditors. It focuses on the various legal structures that could be employed to cause a sovereign debtor's creditors to be legally bound by a restructuring plan – the implementation of a restructuring plan under an SDRM. This matter of binding creditors is an area of legal analysis that is somewhat underdeveloped and neglected in the literature. The paper addresses on implementation of a restructuring plan under a statutory approach – an SDRM imposed by rule of law. The manner of implementing an SDRM may be significant in several contexts, including the acceptability of the SDRM to political actors and market participants, the effectiveness of the operation of an SDRM, and the costs of devising and adopting an SDRM.

Abstract The establishment of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is one of the important issues in the academic debate on a viable constitution for the European Monetary Union (EMU). Yet the topic seems to be taboo in official reform contributions to the debate. Against this backdrop, the article identifies the SDRM interests of key players, including the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank and national governments. The empirical section takes advantage of the recently established EMU Positions Database. The findings confirm political economy expectations: Low-debt countries support an EMU constitution that includes an insolvency procedure whereas a coalition of high-debt countries and European institutions oppose it. The analysis points towards a possible political-economic equilibrium for coping with sovereign insolvencies: an institutional set-up without an SDRM and with hidden transfers. Recent European fiscal innovations in response to the Covid-19 solvency shock confirm this prediction.

The establishment of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is one of the important issues in the academic debate on a viable constitution for the European Monetary Union (EMU). Yet the topic seems to be taboo in official reform contributions to the debate. Against this backdrop, the article identifies the SDRM interests of key players, including the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank and national governments. The empirical section takes advantage of the recently established EMU Positions Database. The findings confirm political economy expectations: Low-debt countries support an EMU constitution that includes an insolvency procedure whereas a coalition of high-debt countries and European institutions oppose it. The analysis points towards a possible political-economic equilibrium for coping with sovereign insolvencies: an institutional set-up without an SDRM and with hidden transfers. Recent European fiscal innovations in response to the Covid-19 solvency shock confirm this prediction.

The establishment of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is one of the important issues in the academic debate on a viable constitution for the European Monetary Union (EMU). Yet the topic seems to be taboo in official reform contributions to the debate. Against this backdrop, the article identifies the SDRM interests of key players, including the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank and national governments. The empirical section takes advantage of the recently established EMU Positions Database. The findings confirm political economy expectations: Low-debt countries support an EMU constitution that includes an insolvency procedure whereas a coalition of high-debt countries and European institutions oppose it. The analysis points towards a possible political-economic equilibrium for coping with sovereign insolvencies: an institutional set-up without a SDRM and with hidden transfers. Recent European fiscal innovatios in response to the Covid-19 solvency shock confirm this prediction.

I will describe & justify the rationale & design of the proposal put forward by the International Monetary Fund for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). Its major goal is to help reduce the unacceptably large costs associated with disorderly defaults by sovereign governments whose debt burdens have become unsustainable. The SDRM aims to get the countries' debts to sustainable positions & deal with the broader needs of the countries through the full array of aid & other mechanisms that are available -- &, indeed, to enlarge & enhance these initiatives. I will also explain my misgivings about some of the other proposals, including the ones coming from the NGO community. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis paper argues that the Covid recession, and aggressive monetary tightening in the US accompanying the post-Covid recovery, are likely to cause a sovereign debt overhang in emerging market economies—i.e. debt which is unlikely to be fully repaid. A sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism (SDRM) seems necessary to avoid widespread disorderly debt write-downs. We discuss a range of procedures that are available, building upon Anne Krueger's proposal for an SDRM in 2002 (Krueger, 2002a,b). At that time Krugman (1988) had already argued that any SDRM should incentivize debtors so that they put in effort to clear their debts (a Krugman contract). Menzies (2004) went further than this to show that these effects should be further sharpened, creating what he called 'hyper-incentive effects' (a Menzies contract). The International Monetary Fund has argued that risk-sharing between debtors and creditors will also be important (IMF, 2020). But we show that risk-sharing will—in general—pull in the opposite direction to incentive effects, and we doubt the extent to which the IMF has recognized this trade-off. Finally, we argue that collective action clauses (CACs) increase the probability of achieving any agreement, whatever it might be. They will help avoid the alternative of disorderly debt write-downs, outcomes which will deliver neither incentive effects nor risk-sharing.

The goal of this research is to analyze the state of the contemporary debate on the mechanisms for sovereign debt restructuring. The article begins by unraveling the main guidelines supported by the proposals with the greatest political and economic impact since the opening of the debate, focusing specially on the developments reported in the following years. It also identifies the promoters of each one of them and the arguments that they putforward –and they still use today– regarding the problems that determine all the processes of sovereign debt restructuring. Finally, the work culminates with some closing considerations. ; La investigación tiene como objetivo analizar el estado del debate contemporáneo sobre los mecanismos de reestructuración de deudas soberanas. En función de ello, el artículo comienza por desentrañar las principales directrices sostenidas por las propuestas que tuvieron mayor impacto político-económico desde la inauguración del debate, con especial atención a los desarrollos reportados en los años posteriores. Identifica también a los promotores de cada una de ellas y los argumentos que esgrimieron –y esgrimen hoy en día– en torno a los problemas que condicionan a todoslos procesos de reestructuración de deuda soberana. Finalmente, el trabajo culmina con reflexiones conclusivas.

Following a depiction of the problem of sovereign insolvency that touches on changes in the pattern of international financial flow to developing countries & various troubles in the debt restructuring process, attention turns to various proposals to resolve said problems. While one private sector perspective sees no real difficulty in extant international credit markets & only a need to address moral hazard generated by IMF bailout policy, the cases of Argentina & Ukraine shed light on the need for formal sovereign debt restructuring arrangements. Another perspective suggests the introduction of collective action clauses (CACs) into bond contracts. Although useful, CACs will not address core problems. Attention turns to a critique of the IMF's Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) & the Chapter 9 proposal endorsed by nongovernmental organizations. It is suggested that modifications to the SDRM can bring it closer to the spirit of intent of Chapter 9, resulting in a workable comprehensive approach. J. Zendejas

There would be few dissenters from the general proposition that we should try to deal justly with debt. We have all watched in horror the collapse that has taken place in Argentina and the enormous cost paid by so many people in that country—as well as by the creditors of Argentina—from the massive financial and economic dislocation and disruption. I do not believe that what has occurred was inevitable.Unfortunately, some who address this issue of dealing with unmanageable debt situations have offered advice that, while emotionally appealing, is not operationally helpful. I will describe and justify the rationale and design of the proposal put forward by the International Monetary Fund for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). Its major goal is to help reduce the unacceptably large costs associated with disorderly defaults by sovereign governments whose debt burdens have become unsustainable. The SDRM aims to get the countries' debts to sustainable positions and deal with the broader needs of the countries through the full array of aid and other mechanisms that are available— and, indeed, to enlarge and enhance these initiatives. I will also explain my misgivings about some of the other proposals, including the ones coming from the NGO community.

AbstractIntroductionTransmitted, or any pretreatment drug resistance (TDR, PDR) can compromise efficacy of first‐line antiretroviral therapy (ART). In Peru, genotypic resistance testing is not routinely performed before ART initiation, and estimated PDR prevalence prior to 2012 ranged from 1.0% to 4.7%. We aimed to update estimates of PDR prevalence in men who have sex with men (cis‐MSM) and transgender women (TW).MethodsWe obtained HIV sequences from three studies of ART‐naïve cisgender‐MSM and TW (n = 470) in Lima, Peru from 2013 to 2017, almost two‐thirds of whom had acute or recent infections. Sanger sequences of HIV pol were interrogated for surveillance drug resistance mutations (SDRM) using the Stanford Calibrated Population Resistance (CPR) tool and scored for resistance to nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIs) and non‐nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NNRTIs) with the HIVdb programme. We calculated binomial proportions and 95% confidence intervals. χ2 and exact or trend tests were used to examine predictors of PDR.ResultsSeventy‐seven (16.4%) individuals had PDR (95% CI: 13.2 to 20.0); most resistance was likely TDR since 63% were incident infections. SDRM were present in 9.8% (7.3 to 12.9). Resistance to any NRTI was present in <1% of individuals, while efavirenz resistance was present in 10% (6.9% to 12.4%). TW were not statistically more likely than cis‐MSM to have PDR (11.4% vs. 9.1%, p = 0.54). Age, incident versus prevalent infection, or residence district did not predict PDR. Prevalence of SDRM increased from 3% in 2013 to 21% 2017 within incident infections (p = 0.04), but not when including prevalent infections.ConclusionsPrevalence of NNRTI resistance in three studies of ART‐naïve MSM and TW in Lima, Peru reaches 10%. Because our study reports PDR in a population in which most acquired HIV recently, the overall prevalence of PDR, including previously treated persons, is likely underestimated. These results underscore the need for a nationally representative survey of PDR in Peru and consideration of non‐NNRTI anchored first‐line ART options. This study also represents the first evaluation of PDR in cis‐MSM versus TW in South America, and demonstrates that, although TW are at higher risk of acquiring HIV, they are at similar risk of acquiring a virus with resistance mutations.