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I propose a theory of domination derived from republican political theory that is in contrast to the neo-republican theory of domination as arbitrary interference and domination as dependence. I suggest that, drawing on of the writings of Machiavelli and Rousseau, we can see two faces of domination that come together to inform social relations. One type of domination is extractive dominance where agents are able to derive surplus benefit from another individual, group, or collective resource, natural or human. Another is what I call constitutive domination where the norms, institutions, and values of the community shape the rationality of subjects to accept forms of power and social relations and collective goals as legitimate forms of authority. Each of these make up two faces of a broader theory of social domination that is more concrete and politically compelling than that put forth by contemporary neo-republican theory. I argue that this understanding of domination should be seen as a kind of 'radical republicanism' where the centrality of asymmetrical power relations are placed at the centre of all political concerns. I end by considering the relevance of the common interest as a central means by which to judge the existence of these kinds of domination as well as establish a convincing evaluative criteria for critical judgment.

In categorizing international hierarchies, theorists often emphasize some balance between levels of consent and coercion. I show that emphasis on these terms is conceptually problematic. Borrowing insights from republican political theory, I argue that we can better distinguish hierarchies on the basis of whether they feature domination. Under domination the subordinate's freedom of choice is contingent upon the predilections of the superordinate state, which can assert its supremacy whenever and possibly, however, it may please. Moreover, subordinate states cannot unilaterally and peacefully withdraw from the hierarchy. By contrast, in hierarchies of non-domination the superordinate state enjoys the 'powers of attorney' with which it might be permitted to practice coercion in order to advance an agreed-upon goal. The contract underpinning this type of hierarchy also allows for the unilateral and peaceful termination by the subordinate, either through withdrawal or expiry. I demonstrate the applicability of this conceptual framework by examining Soviet and American relations with Central-Eastern and Western Europe, respectively, during the Cold War.

This paper claims that established accounts of international political theory overlook the neo-roman strand of republican political theory. It seeks to address this case of neglect and extend republican observations into international political theory in three steps. The first step examines the nature of international political theory. The second step examines the neo-roman strand of republicanism's conception of liberty and the institutions whereby this type of liberty is secured. Lastly, the main elements of a republican approach to international political theory are developed in a way that highlights republicanism's institutional approach to world politics and its commitment to the state.