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AbstractThis paper discusses regulatory failure within the context of the 1995 and 1997–98 bank failures in Zambia. It starts by acknowledging the difficulties that exist in establishing credible techniques for measuring the quality of on‐going bank regulation and supervision performance and criterion for distinguishing between regulatory failure and regulatory success. It then proceeds to detail the choice of instruments the Bank of Zambia employed in responding to increasing financial distress amongst local banks. Using 'excessive regulatory forbearance' as an indicator of 'regulatory failure', the paper examines why regulatory forbearance occurred; why the Bank of Zambia failed to enforce the required corrective action in a timely and consistent manner, even at the risk of encouraging and permitting fraudulent and wrongful trading. Through in‐depth interviews and documentary analysis, the paper concludes that delays in regulatory decision‐making were not always the result of direct political interference, but rather bureaucratically institutionalised regulatory forbearance. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

AbstractThis article analyses two aspects of the regulatory conduct of Ofsted in protecting children from abuse by strangers. The first concerns the problems associated with child protection and safeguarding in the context of facilitating multicultural norms whereby certain social behaviours which would be unacceptable in one culture can be tolerated or condoned in another. The second aspect arises because, following Ofsted's failure to protect thousands of children from child abuse in many UK cities, children's social services' departments may have adopted strategic behaviour which may protect them rather than the children.

Widespread S & L failures during the 1980s required the federal government to spend over 100 billion dollars bailing out the deposit insurance fund. This paper interprets the S & L debacle as a regulatory failure. Review of the S & L debacle suggests that regulators failed to manage the deposit insurance system efficiently. But the regulatory agencies' structure appears to have played a secondary role in contributing to regulatory failure. Faced with the same incentives, objectives, and resources, regulators probably would have behaved similarly regardless of the regulatory structure.

IT USED TO BE COMMONLY ACCEPTED THAT REGULATORY AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES WERE DOOMED TO FALL UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE INDUSTRY WITH WHICH THEY DEALT AND THUS BE CAPTURED BY IT. THIS ARTICLE CONSIDERS THE DEGREE TO WHICH EXPLANATIONS OF SUCH CAPTURE WERE VINDICATED BY THE SOCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES CREATED IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE LATE 1960S AND EARLY 1970S WHICH WERE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND THE PRESSURES IDENTIFIED BY POLITICAL SCIENTISTS AS LEADING TO THE CAPTURE OF REGULATORY AGENCIES. THE POLITICAL SCIENTISTS WHO IDENTIFIED THE FACTORS LEADING TO THE CAPTURE OF REGULATORY AGENCIES IN AMERICA ARE FOUND TO HAVE BEEN PARTLY VINDICATED BY THE HISTORY OF THE NEW SOCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES. THERE ARE IMPORTANT REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE NEW SOCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES, HOWEVER, WHICH WERE NOT IDENTIFIED BY SUCH WRITERS.

Co-regulation presents an odd paradox in today's context of a shifting emphasis from government to governance. In the first place, co-regulation implies horizontal, 'networked' relations between government and industry. Yet at the same time, it has the hierarchical connotation inherent in regulation. The main concern addressed in this paper is what this ambiguity means for evaluations of co-regulation. What is failure here? Two contrasting interpretations of 'governance' are described, and a case study from the Dutch poultry sector is presented to seek explanations for failure. The two interpretations are found to provide complementary explanations for failure. This suggests that evaluations adopting a single perspective may produce all-too-easy – though misleading – conclusions.

It used to be commonly accepted that regulatory agencies in the United States were doomed to fall under the control of the industry with which they dealt and thus be captured by it. This article considers the degree to which explanations of such capture were vindicated by the social regulatory agencies created in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s which were designed to withstand the pressures identified by political scientists as leading to the capture of regulatory agencies. The political scientists who identified the factors leading to the capture of regulatory agencies in America are found to have been partly vindicated by the history of the new social regulatory agencies. There are important reasons for the failure of the new social regulatory agencies, however, which were not identified by such writers.

AbstractFollowing the traditional doctrine of the "regulatory state", regulatory agencies should be given very focused mandates and stay away from the politicized realm of distributive policies and decisions. An opposing perspective would state that if regulatory agencies can contribute to economic redistribution, positive results such as network expansion, economies of scale, and fiscal efficiency will ultimately lead to lower levels of regulatory failure. This article tests whether, in countries of high socio‐economic inequality, such as Brazil, the active incorporation of distributive considerations by regulatory agencies leads to lower levels of failure. Through the analysis of the activities of seven Brazilian network regulatory agencies, the article develops theory‐driven expectations and tests these expectations using crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). It concludes that not prioritizing redistribution is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for regulatory agencies' failure. In most types of failure, a lack of priority to redistribution leads to failure when combined with low regulatory capacity and low levels of competence.