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ABSTRACTWe analyse the cost and benefit of outsourcing with adverse selection in a duopoly by comparing outsourcing with in‐house production in terms of the manufacturer's expected profit. When two manufacturers faced with ex ante cost uncertainty compete in a differentiated duopoly, outsourcing brings about a benefit in terms of reduced competition, while it entails the cost of information rent. We show that the manufacturers always choose in‐house production in Cournot and Bertrand competition, when outsourcing and in‐house production follow the same ex ante cost distribution. When the manufacturers compete in Cournot fashion, the cost of information rent always exceeds the benefit of reduced competition under outsourcing. On the other hand, when they compete in Bertrand fashion, it is possible that even if the benefit of outsourcing exceeds the cost, both manufacturers cannot choose outsourcing.

Increased competition may lead to incentives for firms to increase quality by incorporating higher quality inputs. This is particularly relevant in health care markets, since the supply of high quality physicians is relatively inelastic in the short run. Therefore, an increase in the relative demand for high-quality physicians could lead to an increase in their relative wages without increasing their total hours of work. Using a policy change in the Uruguayan health care system, I assess the effects of increased competition via lock-in reductions on a market for inputs. I leverage the facts that insurance companies, hospitals and physician services are completely vertically integrated in Uruguay and that in 2009 the government generated an exogenous change in the regulated mobility regime, increasing the competition in the market and providing incentives to increase quality. I combine administrative records on wages and hours of work in all hospitals for all specialists with data on the scores that specialists obtained in the test they must take to be admitted into the medical specialty graduate school, which I use as an exogenous measure of their quality. Consistent with the idea of an inelastic relative supply in the short run, I show that the increased competition shifted the relative demand for high-quality medical specialists, increasing the returns to skill. I do not find strong evidence of an increase in quality, approximated as relative hours of high-skill versus low-skill physicians

"B-250080"--P. [1]. ; Cover title. ; "GAO/IMTEC-93-3." ; "November 1992." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

We study whether competition affects banks' liquidity risk‐taking, which was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that banks with greater market power take more liquidity risk, implying that decreased competition leads to financial fragility. During a financial crisis, however, the effect of market power on liquidity risk varies across bank size. Small banks with greater market power reduce liquidity risk while large banks with greater market power do not change their liquidity risk‐taking behavior. This suggests that enhanced charter values due to reduced competition lowers small banks' risk‐shifting incentives when their default risk significantly increases during a crisis. (JELG21, G28)

The present study looked to examine reduced volume 'daily max' (near max loads) training compared to higher volume periodized training in powerlifters preparing for competition. Ten competitive powerlifters were split into 2 groups (MAX group and PER group) and participated in a 10-week training intervention either following a "daily max" training protocol or a traditional periodized training protocol while preparing for competition. All participants underwent 1RM testing for squat (SQ), bench press (BP) and deadlift (DL) prior to the 10-week intervention. The MAX group performed single sets of single repetitions using a load equating to an RPE rating of 9–9.5 while the PER group performed higher volume periodized training with loads ranging from 70%1RM up to 93%1RM as well as a taper at the final weeks of the training intervention. Both groups were tested after the 10-week training intervention at the Greek IPF-affiliate National Championships. In the PER group, powerlifting (PL) total increased for P1 and P3 by 2% and 6.5% respectively while P2 experienced no change. In the MAX group PL total increased for P1 and P2 by 4.8% and 4.2% respectively while it decreased by 0.5%, 3.4% and 5% for P3, P4 and P5 respectively. In the MAX group peri PL total increased for P1–4 by 3.6%, 4.2%, 4.5% and 1.8% respectively while it decreased by 1.2% for P5. The results of this pilot study show that single-set, single-rep, RPE based 'daily max' training may be a favorable strategy for some beginner-intermediate powerlifters preparing for competition while it may lead to performance decreases for others. Further, it suggests that performance may be comparable to traditional periodized training during shorter training cycles, though future work with larger samples is needed to further test this. Practically 'daily max' training may be useful for PL athletes looking to maintain strength during periods with limited training time available.

We show that, in the case when innovations are for sale, increased product market competition, captured by reduced product market profits, can increase the incentives for innovations. The reason is that the incentive to innovate depends on the acquisition price which, in turn, might increase despite firms in the market making lower profits. We also show that stricter, but not too strict, merger and cartel policies tend to increase the incentive for innovations for sale by ensuring the bidding competition for the innovation and by increasing the relative profitability of being the most efficient firm in the industry. Moreover, it is shown that increased intensity of competition can increase the relative profitability of innovation for sale, relative to innovation for entry.

Under international tax competition, corporate income tax rates are predicted to decrease, and the tax burden will shift onto immobile factors. This case study considers tax changes that illustrate the predictions for Norway 2012-2018. Petroleum rent was taxed at high rates in 2012, and while corporate income tax rates were reduced in four steps, the marginal tax on rent was kept constant. The four steps are analyzed in light of the tax burden shift predicted by theory, and possible intentions of the government. The tax on petroleum rent has not been increased. Government intentions seem to have been shifting.

The paper looks at two aspects of the Covid-19 pandemic. These are (i) the nature of this event and its implication for evaluating past policy and policy into the future, and (ii) the suitability of proposed changes in the implementation of competition policy affecting firm behaviour, market structures and state intervention. The first conclusion the paper reaches is that it is incorrect to describe the Covid-19 pandemic as a "Black Swan" event, unpredicted and unpredictable, and something for which it is not possible to prepare. Policy makers should accept responsibility for possible future events such as pandemics even when timing is uncertain. In the case of Covid-19, policy measures were clearly inadequate. The paper then considers the design and implementation of measures aimed at supporting economic recovery. The arguments that competition policy should be relaxed for the duration of the problem is rejected as ill-founded and counterproductive. In particular, it is wrong to treat the response to the Financial Crisis of 2008-2011 as justifying reduced competition in general. Some aspects of particular policy designs, decisions and actions in response to the recession flowing from the medical response to Covid-19 are subjected to critical analysis.

AbstractHospitals and other health‐care providers in 34 states must obtain a Certificate of Need (CON) from a state board before opening or expanding, leading to reduced competition. We develop a theoretical model of how market concentration affects health‐care spending. Our theoretical model shows that increases in concentration, such as those brought about by CON, can either increase or decrease spending. Our model predicts that CON is more likely to increase spending in markets in which costs are low and patients are sicker. We test our model using spending data from the Household Component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).

The period under review (Spring 1998—Autumn 1999) is one in which the prohibition of cartels under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty figured prominently, the Court of Justice clearing up a backlog of unfinished business relating back, in some cases, over a decade. The 1986 Polypropylene cartel decision was finally put to bed with the Court of Justice dismissing a number of appeals raised on the sole ground of the non-existence of the decision. It also dismissed an appeal involving the 1989 Welded Steel Mesh cartel decision except that, in an important development, for the first time the Court expressly applied Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides a right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time before an impartial tribunal, and reduced a Commission fine (marginally, knocking 50,000 ECUs off a 3 million ECU fine) as "reasonable satisfaction" for the excessive duration of proceedings (five-and-a-half years) before the Court of First Instance. The Court of First Instance itself upheld on review the 1994 Commission decision in the Cartonboard cartel, leaving of major cartel cases only review of the Cement decision still outstanding.