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In 2017 the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering were asked by the UK Government to consider scientific and engineering views on greenhouse gas removal. This report draws on a breadth of expertise including that of the Fellowships of the two academies to identify the range of available greenhouse gas removal methods, the factors that will affect their use and consider how they may be deployed together to meet climate targets, both in the UK and globally.

AbstractThis paper describes an investigation using biological‐iron removal for the elimination of arsenic (III). Groundwater was spiked with sodium arsenite and filtered through a pilot unit. As the water filtered through the sand, arsenic was retained on the iron oxides which were continuously produced by the bacteriological activity. Under specific aeration and pH conditions, both arsenic and iron were eliminated. This process can be used for the design of a full‐scale biological treatment plant.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1973

The Federal Reserve ("the Fed") can remove bankers from office if they violate the law, engage in unsafe or unsound practices, or breach their fiduciary duties. The Fed, however, has used this power so rarely that few even realize it exists. Although major U.S. banks have admitted to repeated and flagrant lawbreaking in recent years, the Fed has never removed a senior executive from one of these institutions. This Article offers the first comprehensive account of the banker removal power. It makes four contributions. First, drawing on a range of primary sources, it recovers the power's statutory foundations, showing that Congress created the authority to better align the interests of senior bankers and the public. Second, using a novel dataset obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests, it maps the actual practice of banker removal—who is removed, how often removal occurs, and for what reasons. It reveals that the Fed now uses the removal power mostly to prevent already-terminated, low-level employees from working at other banks, even though Congress never intended for the power to be used primarily in this way. Third, harnessing corporate law theory, the Article defends the legislative design. It argues that removal of senior bank executives for unsound management practices is a critical component of effective bank supervision, filling gaps left by regulatory rules and traditional corporate governance measures. Finally, the Article concludes by assessing obstacles to the use of the removal power against bank leadership and suggesting policy responses.