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In this first working paper the authors present and compare systems of indicators of regulatory quality, analyzing their conceptual underpinnings, technical properties, and usage by governments, stakeholders and academics. After having discussed the datasets and the types of data available, they authors consider a set of critical aspects related to the design, data gathering and utilization of indicators, providing suggestions for improvement. The authors' major findings and proposals are the following: systems of indicators have been developed ad hoc, by organizations pursuing different objectives over time and across the world. Conceptual underpinnings, modalities of data-gathering, and types of usage reflect different operationalizations of regulatory quality. In the construction of regulatory indicator datasets, the first essential step is to gauge the quality of data, in order to construct insightful and meaningful measurements. Especially in developing countries, the consideration of the quality of data is preliminary to any technical and statistical discussion on how to treat data. Western governments tend to use single measures with the specific purpose of improving methods of regulatory analysis (through studies that analyze the conduct of regulators). The authors have not found systematic attempts to measure how regulatory reform is changing the attitudes towards regulation of regulators and policy officers who develop legislation. Aggregation should reflect basic technical rules, but more importantly, it should be performed in a way that conveys messages to those who are supposed to make use of the composite measures. To illustrate, if the goals of regulatory reform are institutionalization, economic growth, accountability, interaction with the stakeholders and communication, aggregation should be performed along these four dimensions, not in relation to abstract technical properties.

Regulatory reform and competition policy are two important and inter-related areas of regulatory policy and public administration. Both can play a key role in improving the quality of regulation, and creating healthy and competitive markets and an attractive investment climate. This in turn leads to greater economic growth, employment and incomes. Part one of this paper discusses definitions and key issues associated with regulation, regulatory quality, and competition policy. This discussion focuses on competition policy as it relates to restrictions on competition and also pro-competitive regulation, which involves protecting consumers through economic regulation. Part two of this paper considers institutions and processes for implementing regulatory quality and competition policy agendas, including regulatory agencies, regulatory reform bodies, competition authorities and broader regulation-making processes. Part three notes the importance of assessing competition policy issues on a case-by-case basis and identifies the main objectives and features of competition policy. This includes a discussion about when competition policy issues are likely to play an important role in regulatory assessment and reform. Part four considers mechanisms for coordinating- where appropriate-competition policy and regulatory quality assessments, including undertaking competition assessments and providing advice to decision makers.

We analyze the positive and normative implications of regulatory oversight when the policymaking agency can improve the quality of regulation through effort, but only some kinds of effort are observable by the overseer, and the overseer's only power is the ability to veto new regulation. Such oversight can increase the quality of agency regulation, but it also introduces inefficiencies—the agency underinvests in unobservable effort and overinvests in observable effort. Agencies have no incentive to conceal their activities from the overseer; the reforms that are likely to reduce inefficiency are therefore those that improve overseer expertise or lower the costs of agency disclosure, not those that compel disclosure. The normative implications depend on the relative severity of bureaucratic drift and slack problems. When slack is paramount, an overseer that is more anti-regulation than the agency or society improves social welfare, as long as it does not deter the agency from regulating entirely. When drift is paramount, oversight improves social welfare only when it deters regulation. In this case, regulatory oversight is weakly dominated by one of two alternatives: eliminating oversight or banning regulation.

We analyze the positive and normative implications of regulatory oversight when the policymaking agency can improve the quality of regulation through effort, but only some kinds of effort are observable by the overseer, and the overseer's only power is the ability to veto new regulation. Such oversight can increase the quality of agency regulation, but it also introduces inefficiencies-the agency underinvests in unobservable effort and overinvests in observable effort. Agencies have no incentive to conceal their activities from the overseer, the reforms that are likely to reduce inefficiency are therefore those that improve overseer expertise or lower the costs of agency disclosure, not those that compel disclosure. The normative implications depend on the relative severity of bureaucratic drift and slack problems. When slack is paramount, an overseer that is more anti-regulation than the agency or society improves social welfare, as long as it does not deter the agency from regulating entirely. When drift is paramount, oversight improves social welfare only when it deters regulation. In this case, regulatory oversight is weakly dominated by one of two alternatives: eliminating oversight or banning regulation. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThe objective of this paper is to quantify the potential gains in trade performance from the implementation of trade facilitation reform. The study applies a gravity model augmented with trade facilitation, regulatory quality and infrastructure indicators to assess the impact of trade facilitation and other trade‐related constraints on export performance. Quantitatively, our results suggest that a 10 per cent improvement in trade facilitation would yield an increase in exports of about 5 per cent. Identical percentage improvements in the regulatory environment and in the quality of infrastructure provision would result in increases of 9–11 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively. The results confirm that while trade facilitation can contribute to improved export performance, improvements in the quality of the regulatory environment and the basic transport and communications infrastructure are equally or more important, in facilitating export growth. The conclusion is that trade facilitation alone is unlikely to result in a significant improvement in export performance. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The European Union and its member states are investing in ambitious programmes for?better regulation? and targets of regulatory quality. This book lifts the veil of excessively optimistic propositions covering the whole better regulation agenda. It provides an innovative conceptual framework to handle the political complexity of regulatory governance. It approaches better regulation as an emerging public policy, with its own political context, actors, problems, rules of interaction, instruments, activities and impacts. Focusing on the key tools of impact assessment, consultation, simplificati

In recent years Italy has moved towards greater devolution of regulatory powers at regional level, in a European context where this dimension becomes increasingly important. This review analyzes first the institutional set-up for multi-level regulation, the specifics of power sharing between the state and the regions, as well as the horizontal and vertical co-ordination mechanisms in place in the country, before turning to the use of policy instruments and regulatory tools in four Italian regions: Veneto, Calabria, Campania and Tuscany.--Publisher's description

AbstractPesticides overuse is a serious threat to ecosystems and wildlife, human health, and agricultural sustainability. So far, however, social scientists have not produced systematic evidence on the political–economic determinants of pesticides overuse. We argue that the agrochemical industry, as a profit‐motivated interest group, will only mobilize politically to avoid reductions in pesticides use when regulatory institutions are potentially capable of correcting a market failure. If regulatory institutions are weakened by corruption or other factors, pesticides overuse occurs with or without the influence of the agrochemical industry. We test this interactive theory systematically against quantitative data on pesticides use in 24 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development countries, 1991–2003. Using corruption and other indicators to capture bureaucratic quality, we find substantively large and statistically robust interactive effects. The agrochemical industry is a crucial determinant of pesticides use in nations with low corruption, whereas the agrochemical industry has no effect on pesticides use under corrupt regulatory institutions. Troublingly, these results imply that reduced corruption may not improve actual regulatory effectiveness unless political institutions can somehow constrain the influence of special interests.

Cover -- Contents -- Foreword -- Overview -- About Doing Business -- What is changing in Doing Business? -- Reforming the business environment in 2014/15 -- Case studies -- Starting a business -- Dealing with construction permits -- Getting electricity -- Registering property -- Trading across borders -- Enforcing contracts -- Resolving insolvency -- Legal research findings on business regulation and the law -- References -- Data notes -- Distance to frontier and ease of doing business ranking -- Summaries of Doing Business reforms in 2014/15 -- Country tables -- Labor market regulation data -- Acknowledgments.