Suchergebnisse

Contributing Authors and Summary -- Contributing Authors and Summary -- Public Choice: the State of the Art -- The Economic Theory of Political Decision-Making: A Survey and Perspective -- Critical Notes on the Neoclassical Theory of the Interaction of Politics and Economics -- Public Choice and Macroeconomic Policy -- Public Choice Theory and Macroeconomic Policy -- Public Choice and Macroeconomic Policy -- Public Choice and Public Investment Policy -- The Managerial Analysis of Public Infrastructure Investment Policies.

Interest in politics and the political process-topics that economists consider to be the purview of the sub-field of study known as public choice-appears to be as high as ever. This Special Issue aims to provide a collection of high-quality studies covering many of the varied topics traditionally investigated in the growing field of public choice economics. These include expressive and instrumental voting, checks and balances in the enforcement of rules, electoral disproportionality, foreign aid and political freedom, voting cycles, (in)stability of political ideology, federal spending on environmental goods, pork-barrel and general appropriations spending, politics and taxpayer funding for professional sports arenas, and political scandal and "friends-and-neighbors" voting in general elections. In bringing these topics together in one place, this Special Issue offers a mix of conceptual/formal and empirical studies in public choice economics.

Interest in politics and the political process—topics that economists consider to be the purview of the sub-field of study known as public choice—appears to be as high as ever. This Special Issue aims to provide a collection of high-quality studies covering many of the varied topics traditionally investigated in the growing field of public choice economics. These include expressive and instrumental voting, checks and balances in the enforcement of rules, electoral disproportionality, foreign aid and political freedom, voting cycles, (in)stability of political ideology, federal spending on environmental goods, pork-barrel and general appropriations spending, politics and taxpayer funding for professional sports arenas, and political scandal and "friends-and-neighbors" voting in general elections. In bringing these topics together in one place, this Special Issue offers a mix of conceptual/formal and empirical studies in public choice economics.

A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR A BIG CHANGE IN THE FIELD OF PUBLIC CHOICE IS NOW PROVIDED BY THE GENERAL FEELINGS ABOUT THE NEED FOR A REFORM OF THE ITALIAN CONSITUTIONAL SYSTEM DUE TO THE WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM DOES NOT OFFER SUFFICIENT INCENTIVES, BOTH TO POLITICIANS AND TO VOTERS, TO BEHAVE SO AS TO RECONCILE THEIR OWN INTERESTS WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER MEMEBERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY. THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES THE CONSERVATIVE LABEL, THE DEMOCRATIC THEORIES OF PUBLIC FINANCE, THE NEUTRALIZATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC THEORIES OF PUBLIC FINANCE AND OF THE POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE ITALIAN PUBLIC FINANCES THEORIES ARE EXAMINED AS WELL AS THE OFFICIAL SUPREMACY OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST APPROACH, THE RECEPTION OF PUBLIC CHOICE, AND THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY.

A review is given of the use of laboratory experiments in the Public Choice literature. A distinction is made in experiments on public goods, participation games, rent-seeking and lobbying, and spatial voting.

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