Suchergebnisse

This article surveys significant cases concerning real property law decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia between the spring of 2004 and the spring of 2006. This article also details significant legislative changes flowing from the 2005 and 2006 Virginia General Assembly sessions.

Shortly after its passage the validity of the statute was sustained against a constitutional attack on the ground of class legislation and the interference with the right of contract. In the case of sales of real property, only contracts between an agent or broker and an owner are covered by the statute. An "owner" includes one whose title is only equitable or a broker who is also an owner, but excludes one who merely has an option to buy land. The statute has been construed to cover only contracts to pay a commission. The test of what constitutes a commission seems to be not the nature or manner of payment but whether the services for which the payment is made are such as to be within the category of "brokerage contracts." The statute, of course, applies to "selling," "purchasing," and exchanges of real estate.

I. DEEDS A. Construction B. Suit to set aside deed C. Restrictive covenants II. TITLES A. Easements B. Actual Possession as Notice to Purchaser III. EMINENT DOMAIN A. Right to Incidental Damages B. Value of Fee and Leasehold C. Determination of Area Condemned D. Liability of City for Land Condemned E. Procedural Problems IV. LEGISLATION

Almost two years have passed since the six-three decision in Ashford v. Reese, holding that in this state an executory forfeitable contract for the sale of real estate creates no title, legal or equitable, in the vendee. Since that time a Department of the Court has once reaffirmed the doctrine, and the legislature has initiated, but not consummated, an attempt to change the rule. It is not the purpose of this brief article to reiterate what has heretofore been discussed both in the opinions of the Court and in these pages; but merely, for the sake of completeness, to refer to some of the Washington cases not heretofore referred to in this controversy, in either the majority or dissenting opinion or elsewhere, because they have been misdigested and lost in the books.

There is pressure in Washington to abolish the forfeiture remedy from real estate contracts. Eliminating forfeiture would cripple the real estate contract and thus provide a disincentive for sellers to finance sales of their property. This result would be economically unsound and in conflict with the public policy in favor of promoting home ownership. Instead of abolishing forfeiture, the Washington State Legislature should amend current legislation to provide a more sensible and certain forfeiture remedy.

Despite great progress in Vietnam's general investment environment, barriers exist which impede U.S. investment in Vietnam's real estate market. While Vietnam remains a socialist country, drastic liberalization of its market structure and investment laws have made Vietnam a more attractive environment for most U.S. investors. However, barriers remain for U.S. investors seeking to invest in Vietnam's real estate, specifically property developers wishing to build tourism complexes. These barriers include weak transportation infrastructure, financial and humanitarian issues posed by site clearance, and lack of accountability in the real estate licensing system. To facilitate U.S. investment in Vietnam's real estate, Vietnam should strategically target transportation infrastructure projects and improve infrastructure financing schemes; decrease the issues posed by site clearance through increased government participation; and increase accountability in its licensing system by reconciling the conflicting ideologies of the local and national governments and by reducing corruption. With implementation of such changes, Vietnam may attract greater U.S. investment in its real estate market.

At the heart of contemporary property theory stands an intriguing puzzle. Unlike the relatively unconstrained freedom that contract law provides for private ordering, property law recognizes only a limited and standard list of mandatory forms. This standardization-known as the numerus clausus from the civil law concept that the "number is closed"-poses a basic conundrum: what can explain a persistent feature of the law that seems, at first glance, so clearly to restrict the autonomy and efficiency gains conventionally associated with private property? This puzzle has garnered significant scholarly attention in recent years. Some scholars have argued that standardization, although paternalistic, in fact enhances efficiency. These accounts emphasize the potential of standardization to facilitate alienation, scale property interests appropriately for productive use, and reduce information-cost externalities. Another group of scholars has argued that the numerus clausus embodies inherent categories of meaning. Under these perspectives, the numerus clausus reflects the normative coherence of existing social patterns, the objective well-being of interest holders, or underlying democratic values. Although these attempts to explain standardization in property law offer significant insights, they suffer from two interlocking limitations. Efficiency perspectives focus on the meta-structure of standardization, largely ignoring what the rich and interesting content of the individual forms reveals about the phenomenon. Conversely, approaches to standardization that focus on content have much to say about that substance, but essentially shunt aside persistent structural aspects of the phenomenon. Any comprehensive theory must thus account for what these attempts to explain standardization leave out-that structure and content together are important to unraveling the problem of the numerus clausus. To begin with structure, standardization is a feature of property law that transcends context. Versions of the numerus clausus are ...

A new movement in America espousing a novel doctrine, property-rights absolutism, has gained some popular and political appeal. But the property rights absolutists tend to ignore the societal foundations of property, and especially de-emphasize the responsibilities property owners have to the community in which they live. They fail to consider properly the significance of the police power and its vital role in the American and Washington State constitutional systems. This Article debunks the newly minted mythology of the property-rights absolutists and places the police power and property rights in their proper historical perspective.

In November 1995, Washington voters rejected Initiative 164, a revolutionary property rights law that would have required governmental entities to compensate landowners for any loss in property value due to regulations on land use, unless those regulations were designed to prevent a public nuisance. Despite the initiative's defeat at the polls, a strong property rights movement is likely to prompt legislators to consider implementing a percentage-loss formula for determining when regulators owe compensation to property owners. This Comment discusses the inherent police power of the state to regulate property use in the public interest and argues that percentage-loss laws would violate article 8, sections 5 and 7 of the Washington Constitution, which prohibit the state and municipal corporations from giving gifts to private entities.