Suchergebnisse

When trade ministers meet in the United States( ) late this year, they may launch a new round of global trade talks under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO). If the ministers indeed initiate this "millennium round," agriculture will be part of it. Otherwise, agricultural negotiations will proceed on their own, since Article 20 of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture states that agricultural negotiations should be resumed during 1999. ; Contents: 1. Overview / Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla and Sherman Robinson -- 2. Latin American perspective / Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla and Lucio Reca --3. Asian perspective / Marcus Noland -- 4. African perspective / Natasha Mukherjee and Rebecca Lee Harris -- 5. Transition Economies' perspective / Ulrike Grote and Peter Wehrheim -- 6. European Union perspective / Stefan Tangermann -- 7. United States of America perspective / Dale Hathaway -- 8. Least-developed Countries' perspective / Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla, Marcelle Thomas, and Valeria Piñeiro -- 9. Cairns Group perspective / Kym Anderson. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; Markets and Trade; 2020 ; TMD; DGO

Negotiating the liberalization of world agricultural trade in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is fraught with difficulty due to the complexity of the issues and the wide range of interests across countries. In the round of global trade negotiations under the WTO, different perspectives on trade reform have produced a highly contentious agenda. These issues are addressed from a range of perspectives in this survey of the trade agenda and its implications for both developing and developed countries. Agricultural trade specialists, including those in universities, in international organizations and think tanks, analyse a comprehensive range of topics including interests and options in the WTO trade negotiations, the trade agenda from a development patent perspective, WTO trade rules, trade barriers, tariff negotiations and patent protection for developing countries

"The Politics of Oil-Producer Cooperation is a comprehensive study of the behavior of political actors in the international oil market since 1971. In this study, Dag Harald Claes seeks to answer the question of what determines the cooperative behavior among oil-producing countries, and he also shows the benefits of approaching an empirical topic from several levels of analysis. Claes provides a case study demonstrating the problems of collective action in international politics, and he discusses multi-level approaches in studies of international relations, and international political economy."--Provided by publisher.

Lista de articulos:; Panorama de América Latina; Panorama de Asia; Panorama de África; Panorama de las economías en transición; Panorama de la Unión Europea; Panorama de los Estados Unidos de América; Panorama de los países menos adelantados; Panorama de los países del Grupo Cairns ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; Markets and Trade; 2020 ; TMD; DGO

"September 1993"--P. [i]. ; "Papers first presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium"--P. [i]. ; Title from cover. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Tables and Figures -- Acronyms -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Oil as International Politics -- 1.2 International Cooperation -- 1.3 International Political Economy -- 1.4 The Multilevel Approach -- 1.5 Relations to Economic Theory -- 1.6 A Note on Sources -- Notes -- 2 Market Context -- 2.1 Market Structure -- 2.2 Market Power -- 2.3 The Era of the International Oil Companies -- 2.4 The opec Era -- 2.5 Structural Effects of the Price Increases -- 2.6 New Market-Power Relations -- 2.7 Conclusion -- Notes -- 3 Political Context -- 3.1 Politicization -- 3.2 Oil and Security -- 3.3 The Iran-Iraq War -- 3.4 The Iraq-Kuwait War -- 3.5 Internal Threats -- 3.6 Political Cooperation Between the Gulf States -- 3.7 Conclusion -- Notes -- 4 opec as an International Organization -- 4.1 Institutional Approaches -- 4.2 The Organizational Structure of opec -- 4.3 Institutional Functions of opec -- 4.4 Conclusion -- Notes -- 5 Price and Production Policy of opec Countries -- 5.1 The Redundant Cartel: opec Price Policy, 1971-1981 -- 5.2 The Effective Cartel: opec Quota Policy, 1982-1985 -- 5.3 The Defected Cartel: opec Market-Share Policy, 1986-1998 -- Notes -- 6 Country Case I: Saudi Arabia-A Hegemonic Power -- 6.1 A Dynamic Approach to Hegemony -- 6.2 The Making of a Hegemon -- 6.3 The Incapable Hegemon, 1973-1981 -- 6.4 The Benevolent Hegemon: Swing Producer, 1982-1985 -- 6.5 The Coercive Hegemon, 1986-1996 -- 6.6 The Mixed Strategy, 1999-2000 -- 6.7 The Relative Power of the Hegemon -- Notes -- 7 opec: A Successful Cartel? -- 7.1 Conditions for Cartels -- 7.2 Cartel Behavior -- 7.3 opec as a Price-Maker -- 7.4 Quota Compliance -- 7.5 The Profits of Cooperation -- 7.6 A Cartel or a Success? -- Notes -- 8 Extending the Cooperation: opec and the Non-opec Producers

This volume provides an introduction to the basic theory behind international trade policy. The author analyses current policy issues within a theoretical framework. The book adopts a thematic approach, with each chapter examining a different issue - each of which is of central importance to contemporary trade policy. The book will be essential for all those who want to understand what governments do, in terms of trade policy and how they do it.

This volume provides an introduction to the basic theory behind international trade policy. The author analyses current policy issues within a theoretical framework. The book adopts a thematic approach, with each chapter examining a different issue - each of which is of central importance to contemporary trade policy. The book will be essential for all those who want to understand what governments do, in terms of trade policy and how they do it.

AbstractThe trade‐off between international cooperation gains and national sovereignty has become increasingly salient in recent years. This paper examines how voters assess this trade‐off in Switzerland, focusing on the choice between the economic benefits of EU integration versus sovereign immigration control. Using survey data, we identify voters for whom this choice is not clear, either because they are cross‐pressured (favouring Swiss‐EU bilateral treaties, while opposing increased immigration) or because they do not have clear preferences. We show that these are sizeable groups within the Swiss electorate and that in particular the potentially cross‐pressured mainly consist of politically mobilized, high‐income voters, supportive of right‐wing parties. Among the potentially cross‐pressured and voters with indistinct preferences, leaning towards the SVP strongly predicts a preference for immigration control over sustaining cooperation with the EU. Beyond this, our findings suggest that political variables have stronger explanatory power than individual‐level economic vulnerabilities in predicting choice.