Suchergebnisse

Since the recent advances in the institutional perspective of
economic development, there is considerable increase in the literature
on the evolution of institutions. In this study, while employing the
game theoretic approach, we explore the rent-seeking fundamentals of
institutions. We model the manner in which the rent-seeking behaviour of
state actors results in inefficiency of the institutional framework. The
main focus is on the rents provided by the availability of natural
resources wealth, foreign aid or corruption potential. By originating a
framework where rulers, agents of the state, and citizens act
endogenously, we show that the rents from these resources can be a
significant constraint to institutional reforms. In order to come out of
the bad institutions trap, the society needs to offer a substantial
amount of incentives to the privileged groups. The focus is on two
privileged groups, i.e. the rulers and the state agents. In most of the
societies, these two groups have the highest bargaining power in the
negotiations over the rules and institutions. JEL Classification:JEL
Classification: P48, P16, P14, O43, D73 Institutional Reforms, Natural
Resources Wealth, Foreign Aid,Corruption Potential, Rulers, Agents of
the State

In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, their inherent asymmetric nature may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish. In this paper we experimentally investigate public good provision in normal and privileged groups with and without decentralized punishment. We find that compared to normal groups, privileged groups are relatively ineffective in using costly sanctions to increase everyone's contributions. Punishment is less targeted towards strong free-riders and they exhibit a weaker increase in contributions after being punished. Thus, we show that privileged groups are not as privileged as they initially seem.

In public-good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of their members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, the inherent asymmetric nature of these groups may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish. In this article, the authors experimentally investigate public-good provision in normal and privileged groups with and without decentralized punishment. The authors find that compared to normal groups, privileged groups are relatively ineffective in using costly sanctions to increase everyone's contributions. Punishment is less targeted toward strong free riders, and they exhibit a weaker increase in contributions after being punished. Thus, the authors show that privileged groups are not as privileged as they initially seem.

In public-good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of their members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, the inherent asymmetric nature of these groups may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish. In this article, the authors experimentally investigate public-good provision in normal and privileged groups with and without decentralized punishment. The authors find that compared to normal groups, privileged groups are relatively ineffective in using costly sanctions to increase everyone's contributions. Punishment is less targeted toward strong free riders, and they exhibit a weaker increase in contributions after being punished. Thus, the authors show that privileged groups are not as privileged as they initially seem. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright.]

AbstractHow do political gender quotas affect representation? We suggest that when gender attitudes are correlated with ethnicity, promoting female politicians may reduce the descriptive representation of traditionally disadvantaged ethnic groups. To assess this idea, we examine the consequences of the implementation of random electoral quotas for women on the representation of caste groups in Delhi. Constituencies reserved for women are less likely than unreserved constituencies to elect members of groups where the status of women is low. In practice, this means they are less likely to elect members of several traditionally underprivileged groups (especially OBC castes) and more likely to elect candidates from the Hindu upper castes. The results highlight the difficulties of balancing descriptive representation on multiple, crosscutting dimensions, and the possible unintended consequences of the type of single‐dimension quotas currently proposed for inclusion in the Indian constitution.

This article explores the use of populism by comparatively privileged groups, a specific type of populism we call the 'populism of the privileged'. Our argument is not merely that 'populisms of the privileged' are also forms of populism, but that they warrant a specific label. We first identify intersections between populism and privilege on the levels of populist actors, support for populism and beneficiaries of populism, which we call populism by, with and for the privileged. We then present a discursive conceptualization of 'populism of the privileged'. Building on this we develop analytical strategies for the study the 'populism of the privileged', zooming in on how 'the people' and 'the elite' are constructed in such populisms, their sociological directionality, the layeredness of privilege and un(der)privilege, the discursive construction of 'crisis' and 'unmet demands' and the role of discourses about populism in reproducing the claims of populisms of the privileged.

AbstractA major obstruction of Indian society to establish equality, balanced growth and development is regional and social group‐wise inequality in availing even basic human needs as well as housing conditions. The present study focuses on mapping the nationwide spatial disparity in the distribution and inequality of temporary housing among socially marginalized and privileged groups, along with three administrative hierarchies: National–State–District. Varieties of measures (Lorenz curve, Gini coefficient, correlation, and quadrant analysis) have been employed for this study. The results indicate inequality in the spatial distribution of serviceable and non‐serviceable temporary housing in India, along with a geospatial disparity in the ownership of temporary housing among different social groups. A number of districts in Orissa, Jharkhand, Bihar, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Jammu Kashmir, and Tamil Nadu have shown a higher proportion of temporary housing along with more ownership among socially marginalized groups. Besides this, districts from Bihar, Orissa, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, and Tripura have higher proportion of non‐serviceable temporary housing than the national average, along with more ownership among marginalized groups. The categorization of the states and districts based on social group‐wise inequality in the ownership and the concentration of temporary housing is significant for improving of the policies and initiatives taken by the Government to arrange safe, affordable, adequate, and sustainable housing for all.