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This paper studies a sequential model of multilateral bargaining under majority rule in which legislators make decisions in both private and public good dimensions via an endogenous recognition process. Legislators can expend resources to become the proposer and to make proposals about the allocation of private and public goods. We show that legislators exert unproductive effort to be the proposer and make proposals in both dimensions depending on legislative preferences. Effort choices in equilibrium depend mainly on preferences in both distributional and ideological dimensions as well as the patience level of legislators and the legislature's size. We also show that in a diverse legislature it may be possible to observe distributive policies when the majority of legislators have collective-leaning preferences, or vice versa.

Much political thinking today, particularly that influenced by liberalism, assumes a clear distinction between the public and the private, and holds that the correct understanding of this should weigh heavily in our attitude to human goods. It is, for instance, widely held that the state may address human action in the ''public'' realm but not in the ''private.'' In Public Goods, Private Goods Raymond Geuss exposes the profound flaws of such thinking and calls for a more nuanced approach. Drawing on a series of colorful examples from the ancient world, he illustrates some of the many ways in

In two recent investigations into the economic problems of externality the authors have noted in passing that the welfare or optimality conditions in the case of a consumption externality seemed identical with the welfare conditions in the case of public goods as originally stated by Samuelson.1 The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the welfare conditions for a public good are a special case of the welfare conditions for a consumption externality where a public good is defined as a good 'which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good' (Samuelson [4]). Since the welfare conditions for a private good are also a special case of the welfare conditions for a consumption externality, it follows that we have a range of externality with the pure private good and the pure public good as polar cases.

Examines private equity (PE) as a reflection of the latest stage of capitalism, asserting that an appropriate response to this new capitalism requires understanding the Adolf Berle-Gardiner Means paradigm (1932). This paradigm derives from an attempt to understand the public corporation's key governance problem -- ie, tensions between inside managers & outside investors -- & position a solution to that problem within their social democratic vision of governance. From this, emerged the idea of the principal (investor)-agency (manager) relationship & associated agency costs. The notion of eliminating agency costs is partly the impetus behind the rise of PE. The labor movement's ambivalent response to PE is discussed, highlighting the unions' focus on the role of debt. Attention is then given to the financialization of capitalism & the rise of industrial pluralism, rejecting the casting of PE as financialization & contending that PE is doing what capital has always done. D. Edelman

The collapse of the credit markets over the last year has hit more than just the homebuilding and mortgage sectors of the economy. As interest rates increased, private equity, or "PE," an important new form of financial capital, was also rocked on its heels.

THE PROBLEM OF GOODS WITH BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTIES HAS GENERATED A VOLUMINOUS LITERTURE SINCE SAMUELSON'S INITIAL EXPLORATIONS OF THE PROPERTIES OF PUBLIC GOODS THIRTY YEARS AGO, BUT A COMPARATIVELY RECENT DEVELOPMENT HAS INVOLVED TAKING MORE EXPLICIT ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENT WAYS SUCH GOODS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO UTILITY. HENCE, WITH GOODS LIKE PUBLIC PARKS OR MUSEUMS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE INDIVIDUAL'S UTILITY IS LIKELY TO BE A FUNCTION BOTH OF HIS UTILISATION OF THE FACILITIES PROVIDED AND THE QUALITY OF PROVISION. MILLWARD AND HOLTERMAN INCLUDED SOME RECOGNITION OF THIS PHENOMENON IN THEIR RESPECTIVE DISCUSSIONS OF EXTERNALITIES AND THE IDEA ALSO SURFACED, ALTHOUGH ITS IMPLICATIONS WERE NOT FULLY EXPLORED, IN AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN EVANS AND NG. MORE RECENTLY, THE IDEAS INVOLVED HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED FURTHER BY STEPHEN SHMANSKE BUT IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT EVEN HE DID NOT FULLY EXHAUST THE POTENTIALITIES OF THE APPROACH AND DID NOT SUCCEED IN RELATING HIS DISCUSSION SATISFACTORILY TO THE EARLIER LITERATURE. THE PRESENT PAPER THEREFORE ATTEMPTS TO TAKE THE ANALYSIS FURTHER BY CONSIDERING IN MORE DETAIL SOME OF ITS IMPLICATIONS, AND ON THE BASIS OF THIS DISCUSSION, TO SUGGEST A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CATEGORIZATION OF PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND 'MIXED' GOODS WHICH IS A GENERALISATION OF THE MORE RESTRICTED CATEGORIZATIONS PROPOSED BY EARLIER WRITERS.