Suchergebnisse

According to current regulation, European banks can apply zero risk weights to sovereign exposures in their balance sheet, irrespective of the assigned rating. We show that a zero risk weighting of sovereign bonds has implications by distorting banks' asset allocation decisions. Due to the lower regulatory cost of sovereign bonds, banks invest more in those bonds at the expense of lending to the real sector. To quantify the effect of this distortion, we build a standard RBC model featuring financial intermediation and a government sector calibrated to the euro area economy. Financial regulation is introduced via a penalty function that punishes banks if they deviate from the target capital ratio. We study the zero risk weight policy during normal times when there is no sovereign default risk and find that a policy introducing positive risk weights on government bonds has both long-run effects and stabilising properties with respect to the business cycle. This policy makes the steady state lending spread on loans to firms decline, stimulating investment and output. Also, it stabilises the lending spread, leading to a lower volatility of investment and output.

AbstractAlong with China's economic downturn, there has been an increase in the size of China's underground lending market. The mounting risk in connection with this underground lending market triggers tremendous interest and debates over appropriate and effective regulatory responses. Because of its private and non-transparent character, the underground lending market is likely to confound those seeking to find "black letter" law governing its regulatory framework. Instead of relying on its conventional tighten-up strategy—using the muscle of the Criminal Law—China has orchestrated an experiment by allowing local legislation to formalize part of the underground lending market, as well as a judicial approach by recognizing a higher interest rate charged by underground lenders to borrowers. This article tries to understand the underlying rationale of regulatory and judicial movements through both law and society, and law and finance lens.

The literature on early modern credit markets emphasizes both the social embeddedness of credit relationships and the role of notaries. To enhance our understanding of how credit markets functioned in a "less-developed" economy, we investigate the local lending activities of a merchant-banker family that operated at the intersection of formal and informal credit. A combination of economic rationality and social motivations in lending decisions emerges. The credit network of this family firm provides a portrait of the social structure of the local community, where the central position of a few trusted notaries and members of the business and political elite highlights the prevalence of relationships of power and favor over impersonal market exchange. The predominance of informal credit reveals a preference for loans made outside of notarial circuits. Nonetheless, notaries were crucial in lending to borrowers of lower social status and with weak ties, thus helping the liquidity of these merchants to "trickle down" into local society.