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There has been a long debate about whether speculators are stabilizing or not. We consider a model where speculators have a stabilizing role in normal times, but may also provoke large risk panics. The very feature that makes arbitrageurs liquidity providers in normal times, namely their tolerance of risk, enables a large increase in asset price risk during a financial panic. We show that a policy that discourages balance sheet risk reduces the magnitude of financial panics, as well as asset price risk in both normal and panic states.

The financial and popular media report almost daily on the volatility of securities market prices. Yet, many people continue to buy securities to hedge against or speculate on certain risks. People can also buy or sell derivatives to hedge against or speculate on fluctuations in securities prices. This Article discusses three regulatory policy implications of utilizing derivatives markets to reallocate the bearing of securities price risks. First, if there are too few non-redundant derivative markets, a competitive market equilibrium allocation of securities price risks is typically constrained Pareto inefficient. This financial economic result means that for typical economies, a regulator can in principle improve social welfare by financial market interventions. Second, introducing some but not enough non-redundant derivatives markets has indeterminate normative consequences for the allocation of securities price risks. This financial economic result means that for typical economies, introducing a new derivative market can improve, worsen, or have no effect on the welfare of consumers and investors. Finally, government regulation might not improve the social allocation of securities price risks because of informational or political economy obstacles. This financial economic result means that for typical economies, the ability of regulatory intervention may be constrained by limited knowledge.

We examine the effects of unconventional monetary policy (UMP) events in the United States on asset price risk using risk-neutral density functions estimated from options prices. Based on an event study including a key exchange rate, an equity index, and five commodities, we find that ?tail risk? diminishes in the immediate aftermath of UMP events, particularly downside left tail risk. We also find that QE1 and QE3 had stronger effects than QE2. We conclude that UMP events that serve to ease policies can help to bolster market confidence in times of high uncertainty