Suchergebnisse

La reforma concursal de 2009 ha pretendido eliminar las deficiencias que la Ley Concursal ha manifestado en sus cinco años de vigencia y en consecuencia, ha favorecido tanto la liquidación anticipada de las empresas como el convenio anticipado; ha reducido los plazos del procedimiento y ha abaratado los costes y, finalmente, ha favorecido la refinanciación previa de las empresas. La nueva regulación no está exenta de problemas jurídicos, tanto en la forma como en el fondo, que pueden dificultar las finalidades pretendidas por el legislador. Pero al margen del mayor o menor acierto del legislador sobre los términos jurídicos de la reforma, conviene tener en cuenta que sin la creación de una auténtica cultura concursal esta reforma puede fracasar en los mismos términos que lo hiciera la Ley Concursal de 2003. ; The 2009 Insolvency Act reform has tried to eliminate the deficiencies revealed by the Insolvency Act throughout its five year life and therefore, it has favoured both the early liquidation of companies and the proposal of advanced agreements with creditors; it has also reduced the insolvency proceeding time limits and it has made procedural costs cheaper; finally, it has favoured the pre¿insolvency refunding of companies. The new regulation is not exempt from legal problems, both in form and substance, which could hinder the legislature¿s aims. However, leaving aside the reform legal terms set forth by the legislature in a more or less wise move, it should be borne in mind that without the creation of a real insolvency culture, this reform may fail on the same terms as the Insolvency Act 2003 did.

© 2020, The Author(s). The decade since the financial crisis has witnessed a proliferation of various 'light touch' financial restructuring techniques in the form of so-called pre-insolvency proceedings. These proceedings inhabit a space on the spectrum of insolvency and restructuring law, somewhere between a pure contractual workout, the domain of contract law, and a formal insolvency or rehabilitation proceeding, the domain of insolvency law. While, to date, international insolvency instruments have tended to define insolvency proceedings quite expansively, discussion of the cross-border implications of pre-insolvency proceedings has barely begun. The question is whether pre-insolvency proceedings should qualify as proceedings related to insolvency for the purpose of private international law characterization. The risk is over-inclusivity of cross-border insolvency law, which, where it is based on universality and unity, might defeat contractual expectations. This article argues, however, that we should be slow to exclude pre-insolvency proceedings from cross-border insolvency law: these proceedings are initiated in the zone of insolvency, their effectiveness depends on a statutory mandate and not purely on private ordering, they interact and intersect with formal proceedings, and can benefit from the unique system developed by cross-border insolvency law. We suggest, though, that modified universalism (the leading norm of cross-border insolvency) and international insolvency instruments, should, and are able to, adjust to the peculiarities of pre-insolvency proceedings to address concerns about inclusivity and accommodate pre-insolvency proceedings adequately.

Several countries and regions around the world, including Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, are amending their restructuring framework to implement a pre-insolvency mechanism that includes most of the features that exist in the US Chapter 11 reorganization procedure. However, unlike what happens in the United States, where unsuccessful reorganizations lead to Chapter 7 liquidations, companies using this 'de facto Chapter 11' (DFCH11) are still allowed to use formal reorganization procedures. This article argues that, while the rise of the DFCH11 is not necessarily undesirable provided that various protections are put in place, jurisdictions implementing this restructuring tool need to adapt their formal insolvency framework to this new era of 'pre-insolvency law'. Otherwise, some inefficiencies can be created from the lack of coordination between insolvency and pre-insolvency law, since non-viable firms as well as viable businesses managed by the wrong people can opportunistically delay the commencement of a liquidation procedure even when it is the most desirable outcome for society.

Several countries and regions around the world, including Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the European Union are amending their restructuring framework to implement a pre-insolvency mechanism that looks like a US Chapter 11 reorganization. However, unlike what happens in the United States, where unsuccessful reorganizations lead to Chapter 7 liquidations, companies using this 'de facto Chapter 11' (DFCH11) are still allowed to use the formal reorganization procedures existing in their insolvency jurisdictions if the DFCH11 fails.