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Front Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Information -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Negotiating Political Agreements -- Part 1: Stalemate in the United States -- Causes and Consequences of Polarization -- Making Deals in Congress -- Part 2: The Problem and the Solution -- Negotiation Myopia -- Deliberative Negotiation -- Part 3: Institutions and Rules of Collective Political Engagement -- Conditions for Successful Negotiation -- Negotiating Agreements in International Relations -- Contributors -- Index -- Back Cover

Research in behavioral economics finds that moral considerations bear on the offers that people make and accept in negotiations. This finding is relevant forpoliticalnegotiations, wherein moral concerns are manifold. However, behavioral economics has yet to incorporate a major theme from moral psychology: People differ, sometimes immensely, in which issues they perceive to be a matter of morality. We review research about the measurement and characteristics of moral convictions. We hypothesize that moral conviction leads to uncompromising bargaining strategies and failed negotiations. We test this theory in three incentivized experiments in which participants bargain over political policies with real payoffs at stake. We find that participants' moral convictions are linked with aggressive bargaining strategies, which helps explain why it is harder to forge bargains on some political issues than others. We also find substantial asymmetries between liberals and conservatives in the intensity of their moral convictions about different issues.

The paper discusses how revolutionaries must comprehend how the sudden shift in the political situation at the aftermath of the February revolution to prepare refinements in revolutionary strategy and utilize new forms of struggle. The fascist rule was replaced by a bourgeois democratic regime overnight, which made such promises: the new democratic republic will represent the interests of all classes equally; free competition of ideologies and political programs; naked force will not be the main instrument of political rule, and so on. The Communist Party has yet to qualitatively rebound from the loss of political momentum it suffered as a result of the boycott blunder. To regain initiative, the Party must enrich its understanding of the specific characteristics of the Philippine revolutionary process, wherein the framework of national struggle is against imperialism. History necessitated that the struggle against fascism and for a democratic government be pursued as a substage in the national democratic struggle – a transition form for eventual political dominance which in turn is the basis to proceed step-by-step to socialist transformation. The Party must determine the form of struggle most appropriate to the prevailing conditions. In this case, from armed struggle there is a need to shift to the unarmed form as a means to educate the masses, through their own political experience, ultimately seize revolutionary power by force. The paper proposes strategy and tactics to approach political negotiations with the current conditions and as well as an alternative to the peace negotiations.

Who gains legislative influence in early agreement negotiations (trilogues) between the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union? Practitioners from both institutions suspect that it is the other side. Meanwhile, critics point at trilogues' lack of transparency. This article proposes that legislative power and institutional transparency are inversely related: Opacity makes an actor more influential in political negotiations. The argument is tested on a matched sample of legislative files from the 1999–2009 period. The findings suggest that the European Parliament became more influential in early agreement negotiations – where it became opaque vis-à-vis the Council. In such negotiations, the relative influence of the European Parliament substantially increased; by contrast, the European Parliament did not gain influence in negotiations where it remained transparent.

Purpose
The media, private citizens and other stakeholders regularly appraise political negotiations, but the character of these negotiations and the reasons for outcomes are little understood. The purpose of this conceptual paper is to discuss this character and explore its implications.


Design/methodology/approach
This is a conceptual paper. The author carried out a literature review and used his experiences in supervising political negotiation simulations.


Findings
The author argues that political negotiations have several specific characteristics that distinguish them from other kinds of negotiations. Political negotiations, for instance, tend to address often rather fuzzy public interests, involve value conflicts or are simultaneously performed "on stage" and "behind the scenes." These characteristics may matter, as they can provide structural disincentives to negotiators, who might be tempted to focus on selling outcomes rather than on improving them ("saleability-oriented negotiating"). Hence, the author argues that political negotiators and their stakeholders face the challenge that political contexts may foster weak negotiation performances.


Practical implications
The author proposes an approach to political negotiations' training that takes the findings of this paper into consideration.


Originality/value
This paper is the first, to the best of the author's knowledge, to provide a detailed characterization of political negotiations and to discuss related implications.

This article contributes to the perception of the role of the legislator as political initiator in modern parliamentarianism. Most of the research literature relates to the parliament member as a 'eam player' of their faction and party. This research was conducted into the functioning of the Israeli parliament The Knesset and into private members' legislation. The article examines in an innovative way the act of legislation, not only as a judicial or procedural process but as a process of political negotiation. The concept and findings that arose from the study of the role of the legislator as initiator of bills and negotiator with the government gives important knowledge and perspective on legislation as a political negotiation process.