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Sci'fic management & industrial democracy were the 2 fundamental concepts of Justice Louis D. Brandeis' philosophy for improving society within the framework of capitalism. In sci'fic manag, Brandeis saw the means for simultaneously reducing prices & raising wages, increasing production & shortening the workday, increasing productivity & conserving workers' energy, & providing labor with a special responsibility for production & yet allowing employers freely to engage or disengage production. Brandeis argued that sci'fic management was necessary to fill a soc need, offering the principal means whereby capital & labor could cooperate & function harmoniously to the betterment of all society. Neither labor nor capital, however, was eager to support the introduction of sci'fic manag. The greater opposition came from labor, whose leaders, such as Samuel Gompers & John Mitchell, viewed sci'fic management as nothing more than speed-up & maintained that it assumed conditions of eternal prosperity with continuous expansion & regularity of employment. Though the labor unions did not embrace sci'fic manag, Brandeis relied on its principles in his judicial thinking. His later concepts of prudent investment & efficient capitalization were based on his philosophy of sci'fic manag. IPSA.

Before carrying out the empirical analysis of the role of management culture in corporate social responsibility, identification of the philosophical approach and the paradigm on which the research carried out is based is necessary. Therefore, this chapter deals with the philosophical systems and paradigms of scientific research, the epistemology, evaluating understanding and application of various theories and practices used in the scientific research. The key components of the scientific research paradigm are highlighted. Theories on the basis of which this research was focused on identification of the level of development of the management culture in order to implement corporate social responsibility are identified, and the stages of its implementation are described.

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This Element offers a new account of the philosophical significance of logical empiricism that relies on the past forty years of literature reassessing the project. It argues that while logical empiricism was committed to empiricism and did become tied to the trajectory of analytic philosophy, neither empiricism nor logical analysis per se was the deepest philosophical commitment of logical empiricism. That commitment was, rather, securing the scientific status of philosophy, bringing philosophy into a scientific conception of the world.

Can research be studied in a way that is neither logical reconstruction nor empirical psychology or sociology of science? In contemporary philosophy of science this is usually denied—in spite of the recent 'paradigm shift' there. A system-philosophy approach in theory of research is outlined by means of some models: a research enterprise is viewed as a productive, innovative system, the research process as a transformation of complexes of knowledge-problems-instruments (software and hard ware). The direction this development takes is guided by preconceptions about the subject matter and a programmatic conception of the discipline based on them ('internal steering factors'). The dynamics of the research process are schematized as a co-agency of 'theoretical and 'empirical' moments, which is viewed as a flow of problems, information, and conceptual frameworks. Empirically discovered pieces of knowledge may resist all attempts to explain them: the flow is disturbed, and only an extraordinary innovation on the 'theoretical' level can restore the balance. This involves a shift in perspective: a shift in the 'internal steering factors'. (In this way one type of 'scientific revolution' (Kuhn's type) is conceptualized). After a perspectival shift one will ask 'Does it constitute progress ?' Types of criteria are suggested. Although they do not apply to all research situations, they over-arch research-traditions. Eventually the above models are applied in the reflection of Research Theory on itself. Research Theory should improve our knowledge about knowledge-production. This knowledge should contribute to improving our image of science and the researcher's sensitivity—by providing better tools for concept ualizing research situations and for imagining possible alternatives.

AbstractTraditionally, analytic philosophy of religion has focused almost solely on specifically philosophical questions about religion. These include the existence of God and divine attributes, religious language, and the justification of religious beliefs, just to mention a few. Recently, many scholars in the field have begun to engage more directly with scientific results. We suggest that this is a promising direction for philosophy of religion to take. Nevertheless, we want to warn philosophy of religion against the excessive focus on methodology that has preoccupied the "science and religion dialogue" in theology. Instead of attempting to formulate a general methodology for all possible engagements between philosophy of religion and the sciences, philosophers of religion would do well to focus on local and particular themes. Since there is no single method in philosophy and since scientific disciplines that have religious relevance vary in their methods as well, progress can be made only if philosophical tools are employed to analyse particular and clearly demarcated questions.

Speculation on the implications of increased use of information and communication technologies in scientific research suggests that use of databases may change the processes and the outcomes of knowledge production. Most attention focuses on databases as a large-scale means of communicating research, but they can also be used on a much smaller scale as research tools. This paper presents an ethnographic study of the development of a mouse genome mapping resource organized around a database. Through an examination of the natural, social and digital orderings that arise in the construction of the resource, it argues that the use of databases in science, at least in this kind of project, is unlikely to produce wholesale change. Such changes as do occur in work practices, communication regimes and knowledge outcomes are dependent on the orderings that each database embodies and is embedded within. Instead of imposing its own computer logic, the database provides a focus for specifying and tying together particular natural and social orderings. The database does not act as an independent agent of change, but is an emergent structure that needs to be embedded in an appropriate set of work practices.