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This report reviews the legislative history of ESPCs, the federal program to promote them, the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) scoring rationale, and ESPCs' cost and benefits.

"Constrained budgets and increasing energy efficiency goals have led federal agencies to explore innovative ways to fund energy improvements, including the Department of Energy's Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPC). An expected increase in the use of ESPCs has raised questions about agencies' ability to ensure that the government's interests are protected. ESPCs can span up to 25 years and be valued at millions of dollars each. This book examines the extent to which agencies have used ESPCs and plan to use them; projects have achieved their expected cost and energy savings; and agencies have overseen and evaluated such projects."--

Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) originated to accomplish several objectives: (1) to meet energy efficiency goals mandated by executive orders and energy policies; (2) to improve federal government facilities using funds allocated for utility bills; and (3) to receive repayment of expenditures through energy savings reflected in reduced utility bills. In ESPC's, the contractor guarantees savings to the federal government agency. 10 CFR 436 limits the time necessary for payback. However, this regulation and others were written prior to the deregulation of utility companies. This theory is based on the underlying premise that the contractor payback is a direct result of the energy savings. The population of study is all of the Air Force ESPCs. The sampling frame used will be the ESPCs and their task orders (TO's) listed in the Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency (AFCESA) database. The primary unit of analysis will be the individual task order. Data will be collected from interviews, observations, conferences, archives, and other task order related documents. Using case study methodology, contract financial data, energy rates contract decision memorandums, contract clauses and statements of work, observation, open interviews, and other relevant meetings and materials will be evaluated to determine whether deregulation has an effect on contractor payback and what the effect entails.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore how the performance management (PM) process may be affected by the design and contents of logistics service performance (LSP) contracts between customer and supplier.Design/methodology/approachA case study of four manufacturing companies' way of working with contracts towards their suppliers was conducted.FindingsDifferent design and contents of contracts, containing some patterns related to industry, company size and degree of formalization, were found. The PM process with contracts was split up into one setup and one execution sub‐process. Once the setup was made, all resources were focused on measuring, analysing and improving LSP. The changed management of the PM process may be one factor explaining the improved LSP all studied customer companies perceived.Research limitations/implicationsAn explorative approach with few cases limits the possibilities to generalize the results to analytical generalization.Practical implicationsThis paper has illustrated how companies can apply LSP contracts.Originality/valueFew empirical and especially case‐based studies of LSP contracts were found.

AbstractThe underlying assumption in this paper is that autonomy and accountability are both fundamental prerequisites for the effective functioning of state‐owned enterprises. The paper first examines the traditional, dichotomous approach to the autonomy‐accountability conundrum. This approach posits the relationship as process oriented, pervasive, quantitative and based ona prioricontrols. A more recent view of control and accountability asa posteriori, qualitative, strategic, results‐oriented and non‐zero sum is then briefly analysed. The paper presents a review of the theory and practice of performance contracts (PC) as tools to implement the latter approach. Three basic models of PCs—Senegal'scontratplan, Pakistan's signalling system and India's memorandum of understanding—have been analysed, comparing the negotiating process, major players, substantive elements and results. Thecontratplan is more of a legal document, at least in formal terms, than the other two. None of the three models, however, provides any sanctions in case of a violation of the contract by the governments. Although the Indian and Pakistani PCs appeared to be more successful than the Senegalese contracts, the relationship between financial performance and performance contracts remains far from conclusive. In all the three countries, the contracts have failed to provide a single window through which government‐enterprise interface can be effectively managed. Thus the problem of multiple principals and single agents remains unresolved.

An einen Überblick über die Literatur und die theoretischen Begründungen der Vergangenheit für Staatsunternehmen und die lange Zeit als Gegensätze verstandenen Komplexe Autonomie und Verantwortlichkeit, schließen sich Verfahren zur Leistungskontrolle öffentlicher Unternehmungen, wie sie in Senegal, Indien und Pakistan gehandhabt werden, an. Der Verfasser geht von der Annahme aus, daß Autonomie und Verantwortlichkeit Grundvoraussetzungen für die Effizienz von Staatsbetrieben sind. In allen drei Fällen zeigt sich, daß die Kontrollverfahren ihr Ziel nur sehr bedingt erreichen. Vor allem das Verhältnis und die Festlegung der Zuständigkeit zwischen Regierung resp. den einzelnen Ressorts und den Managern der Staatsbetriebe bedürfen der sorgfältigen Überlegungen. (APAF-Glz)