The pay‐as‐you‐go plan
In: National municipal review, Band 13, Heft 6, S. 334-340
AbstractThe pay‐as‐you‐go plan is costly for the taxpayer and ignores the wealth‐producing capacity of wise public improvements.
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In: National municipal review, Band 13, Heft 6, S. 334-340
AbstractThe pay‐as‐you‐go plan is costly for the taxpayer and ignores the wealth‐producing capacity of wise public improvements.
An unfunded Social Security system faces the major risk, sometimes referred to as "political risk", that future generations modify or even suppress the contributions. In order to account properly for this risk, the paper considers a political process in which the support to the system is asked from each new born generation. The analysis is conducted in an overlapping generations economy that is subject to macro-economic shocks. As a consequence, the political support varies with the evolution of the economy. The impact of various factors -intra-generational redistribution, risk aversion, financial markets, governmental debt- on the political sustainability of a pay-as-you-go system is discussed. ; Un système de retraite par répartition encourt le risque de modification voire de suppression du système par les futurs contributeurs. L'objet de ce papier est d'analyser ce risque dit "politique". Pour cela, nous considérons un processus de décision dans lequel chaque génération nouvelle doit soutenir le système. L'analyse est conduite dans une économie à générations imbriquées soumise à des chocs macro-économiques. De ce fait, le support politique change avec l'évolution de l'économie. Nous discutons l'impact de divers facteurs - redistribution intra-générationnelle, aversion de risque, marchés financiers, dette gouvernementale - sur la soutenabilitéé politique d'un système par répartition.
BASE
An unfunded Social Security system faces the major risk, sometimes referred to as "political risk", that future generations modify or even suppress the contributions. In order to account properly for this risk, the paper considers a political process in which the support to the system is asked from each new born generation. The analysis is conducted in an overlapping generations economy that is subject to macro-economic shocks. As a consequence, the political support varies with the evolution of the economy. The impact of various factors -intra-generational redistribution, risk aversion, financial markets, governmental debt- on the political sustainability of a pay-as-you-go system is discussed. ; Un système de retraite par répartition encourt le risque de modification voire de suppression du système par les futurs contributeurs. L'objet de ce papier est d'analyser ce risque dit "politique". Pour cela, nous considérons un processus de décision dans lequel chaque génération nouvelle doit soutenir le système. L'analyse est conduite dans une économie à générations imbriquées soumise à des chocs macro-économiques. De ce fait, le support politique change avec l'évolution de l'économie. Nous discutons l'impact de divers facteurs - redistribution intra-générationnelle, aversion de risque, marchés financiers, dette gouvernementale - sur la soutenabilitéé politique d'un système par répartition.
BASE
An unfunded Social Security system faces the major risk, sometimes referred to as "political risk", that future generations modify or even suppress the contributions. In order to account properly for this risk, the paper considers a political process in which the support to the system is asked from each new born generation. The analysis is conducted in an overlapping generations economy that is subject to macro-economic shocks. As a consequence, the political support varies with the evolution of the economy. The impact of various factors -intra-generational redistribution, risk aversion, financial markets, governmental debt- on the political sustainability of a pay-as-you-go system is discussed. ; Un système de retraite par répartition encourt le risque de modification voire de suppression du système par les futurs contributeurs. L'objet de ce papier est d'analyser ce risque dit "politique". Pour cela, nous considérons un processus de décision dans lequel chaque génération nouvelle doit soutenir le système. L'analyse est conduite dans une économie à générations imbriquées soumise à des chocs macro-économiques. De ce fait, le support politique change avec l'évolution de l'économie. Nous discutons l'impact de divers facteurs - redistribution intra-générationnelle, aversion de risque, marchés financiers, dette gouvernementale - sur la soutenabilitéé politique d'un système par répartition.
BASE
An unfunded Social Security system faces the major risk, sometimes referred to as "political risk", that future generations modify or even suppress the contributions. In order to account properly for this risk, the paper considers a political process in which the support to the system is asked from each new born generation. The analysis is conducted in an overlapping generations economy that is subject to macro-economic shocks. As a consequence, the political support varies with the evolution of the economy. The impact of various factors -intra-generational redistribution, risk aversion, financial markets, governmental debt- on the political sustainability of a pay-as-you-go system is discussed. ; Un système de retraite par répartition encourt le risque de modification voire de suppression du système par les futurs contributeurs. L'objet de ce papier est d'analyser ce risque dit "politique". Pour cela, nous considérons un processus de décision dans lequel chaque génération nouvelle doit soutenir le système. L'analyse est conduite dans une économie à générations imbriquées soumise à des chocs macro-économiques. De ce fait, le support politique change avec l'évolution de l'économie. Nous discutons l'impact de divers facteurs - redistribution intra-générationnelle, aversion de risque, marchés financiers, dette gouvernementale - sur la soutenabilitéé politique d'un système par répartition.
BASE
In: International law reports, Band 20, S. 431-432
ISSN: 2633-707X
Individual in International Law — Treaties Affecting Property Rights — Requirement of Municipal Legislation — "Pay As You Go" Agreement between Austria and United States of America.Treaties — Operation and Enforcement of — Treaty Affecting Private Property Rights — Whether Municipal Legislation Required — "Pay As You Go" Agreement between Austria and United States of America.
"Pay-as-you-go" (PAYGO) procedures play an important role in enforcing budget policies with respect to the consideration of revenue and direct spending legislation. Generally, the purpose of PAYGO procedures is to discourage or prevent the enactment of legislation that would cause, or increase, a deficit or reduce a surplus.
BASE
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9969
SSRN
In: NEW FRONTIERS IN INSURANCE AND BANK RISK MANAGEMENT, pp. 85-95, Mc Graw-Hill Italia, 2009
SSRN
In: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/2533
The following paper analyses the sustainability of the Peruvian "Pay as You Go System" which is provided by the Government. In Peru, the "Pay as you Go System" coexists with Private Pension Funds or "Fully Funded Pension". Sometimes both systems compete with each other with advantages and disadvantages between them. We found that "Pay as You Go System" cannot be sustainable over a long period of time. In addition, based on a comparative analysis of advantages and disadvantages, we propose some recommendations to make Private Pension Funds (Fully Funded Pension) the best alternative to Pay as You Go System. ; Este trabajo analiza la sostenibilidad del sistema pensional colectivo implementado por el gobierno peruano. En Perú, este sistema coexiste con el de fondos privados de pensiones o fondo individual. En algunos casos, estos dos sistemas compiten entre sí, con sus ventajas y desventajas entre ambos sistemas. Según nuestros hallazgos, el sistema pensional de reparto colectivo de pensiones no es sostenible en un largo plazo. Asimismo, sobre la base de un análisis comparativo de las ventajas y desventajas entre ambos sistemas, se formulan algunas recomendaciones para que los fondos privados de pensión (Sistema Individual) se conviertan en la mejor alternativa al sistema pensional colectivo.
BASE
In: National municipal review, Band 19, Heft 10, S. 697-699
AbstractThe Smith One Per Cent Law compelled the abandonment of pay‐as‐you‐go but liberalizing legislation passed in 1925 is permitting the Cleveland School Board to return to its original police. Large savings for taxpayers effected.
Blog: American Enterprise Institute – AEI
The most pressing budgetary challenge for governments in advanced economies is paying for rising benefit obligations tied to aging populations. Exposing the scale of the problem would seem to be in everyone's interest.
The post Do Pay-as-You-Go Entitlements Create Unfunded Liabilities? appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI.
In: European journal of social security, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 286-308
ISSN: 2399-2948
This study outlines and compares the possible ways of reforming modern, pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems – reforms which are necessitated by unfavourable demographic processes. This comparison is made in a general context and the examination does not focus on any specific country. Pension reform ideas usually stay within the pension paradigm outlined by Samuelson ('AI scenario'). While also describing these approaches, the study points out – citing lesser-known ideas in this context – that there are several ways out of the situation. There is an alternative to Samuelson's framework within the pension paradigm (pension reform based on the 'IAI scenario'), but the problems can also be managed starting from that framework, by redistributing available job opportunities or introducing a basic income. However, one country, independently of the others, may not choose one of these alternatives.
In: UB Economics Working Papers E20/402
SSRN
Working paper
In: University of California, Bureau of Public Administration, 1961 Legislative Problems 4