Suchergebnisse

© by De Gruyter 2015. This article presents a model of political insulation of bureaucracies. Political influence can harm competence because it lowers the incentives of bureaucrats to invest in competence. Politicians then want to adopt institutions that insulate the bureaucracy because this establishes a commitment to reward competence. Political leaders insulate the bureaucracy if public good provision is important compared to rent extraction or when political competition forces the political elite to internalize the welfare loss caused by patronage. Through this channel political reforms can lead to reforms of the bureaucracy. The theoretical findings are illustrated with existing empirical studies and data on central bank independence. ; I acknowledge Önancial support from the Ramon y Cajal programme and Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) ; Peer Reviewed

Abstract
This article presents a model of political insulation of bureaucracies. Political influence can harm competence because it lowers the incentives of bureaucrats to invest in competence. Politicians then want to adopt institutions that insulate the bureaucracy because this establishes a commitment to reward competence. Political leaders insulate the bureaucracy if public good provision is important compared to rent extraction or when political competition forces the political elite to internalize the welfare loss caused by patronage. Through this channel political reforms can lead to reforms of the bureaucracy. The theoretical findings are illustrated with existing empirical studies and data on central bank independence.

1. "The only way to run a government" -- 2. Patronage politics at the grass roots -- 3. Statehouse patronage -- 4. Congress : the mother lode -- 5. Justice on eBay -- 6. Presidential patronage -- 7. Pinstripe patronage : outsourcing government -- 8. Harbinger of change.

Latin American parties have been regularly plagued by factional disputes. Such rivalries are puzzling given the traditional importance of state largesse for building support; in most countries patronage has kept politicians loyal & factionalism at bay. The article uses a game-theoretic model to examine intra-party politics & political careers. It argues that ensuring successful careers requires rising within parties & thus cultivating the support of party colleagues with patronage promises & policy appeals. In Latin America, however, where state resources dominate policy goods when building support, maximizing patronage requires politicians to build minimum-winning coalitions inside parties, leading to predictable patterns of factionalism. The model also shows how the effect of state largesse on factional disputes is moderated in some contexts, particularly where the relative strength of politicians is weak. Weak politicians prefer to cooperate, even if this means reduced private rewards. Figures, Appendixes, References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2007.]

Latin American parties have been regularly plagued by factional disputes. Such rivalries are puzzling given the traditional importance of state largesse for building support; in most countries patronage has kept politicians loyal and factionalism at bay. The article uses a game-theoretic model to examine intra-party politics and political careers. It argues that ensuring successful careers requires rising within parties and thus cultivating the support of party colleagues with patronage promises and policy appeals. In Latin America, however, where state resources dominate policy goods when building support, maximizing patronage requires politicians to build minimum-winning coalitions inside parties, leading to predictable patterns of factionalism. The model also shows how the effect of state largesse on factional disputes is moderated in some contexts, particularly where the relative strength of politicians is weak. Weak politicians prefer to cooperate, even if this means reduced private rewards.

This book provides a theoretical and empirical examination of constituency service in developing countries. The predominant view of distributive politics in "patronage democracies" emphasizes the partisan targeting of pork and clientelism. In contrast, this book demonstrates that high-level legislators in India and other contexts often provide direct, non-partisan assistance to individual constituents.

Intro -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Preface -- List of Acronyms -- Introduction -- 1 The Concept and Causes of Runaway State-Building -- 2 Constraining Government Patronage: Different Logics of Party Competition -- 3 The Runaway State-Building Phenomenon: Patronage Politics and Bureaucratic Rationalization -- 4 Remaking the Regions: The Europeanization of the State or Domestic Politics as Usual? -- 5 Local Control: Local Parties and Local State Administrations -- 6 A Runaway Welfare State? Postcommunist Welfare Politics -- 7 Exporting the Argument: Party Competition and State Effectiveness in Other New Democracies -- Conclusion -- Appendixes -- 1 Data on the Number of State Administrative Personnel -- 2 Data on Salaries -- 3 Interview Sample -- 4 Data Used to Calculate Party System Fractionalization -- 5 Countries Used in Cross-National Comparison -- Notes -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

Patronage Politics Divides Us: A Study of Poverty, Patronage and Inequality in South Africa is the culmination of a research project that forms part of MISTRA's first suite of eight priority research projects. The research explores the relationship between patronage, poverty, and inequality with a particular focus on its impact on the conduct of local politics. The overall aim of the study was to explore the possibility of constituting public institutions in a manner that enables them to become legitimate arbiters between the various interests, rather than as instruments that are captured by c

Western policymakers, political activists and academics alike see patronage as the chief enemy of open, democratic societies. Patronage, for them, is a corrupting force, a hallmark of failed and failing states, and the obverse of everything that good, modern governance ought to be. South Asia poses a frontal challenge for this consensus. Here the world's most populous, pluralist and animated democracy is also a hotbed of corruption with persistently startling levels of inequality. Patronage as Politics in South Asia confronts this paradox with calm erudition: sixteen essays by anthropologists, historians and political scientists show, from a wide range of cultural and historical angles, that in South Asia patronage is no feudal residue or retrograde political pressure, but a political form vital in its own right. This volume suggests that patronage is no foe to South Asia's burgeoning democratic cultures, but may in fact be their main driving force