Suchergebnisse

Germany seems to be an ideal case for the cartel theory. Public funding for political parties is strongly advanced and there is much inter-party cooperation with respect to the organisational self-interests of parties. This contribution will take a closer look at the formation of the German party cartel and the three analytical dimensions of the cartel model. I will argue that in terms of party organisations, societal linkages and competitive styles German parties only partly match the expectations of the cartel model. Or, to put it more bluntly, there is a party cartel in Germany, but there are no cartel parties. (German Politics / FUB)

The article applies and develops Katz and Mair's 'cartel party' thesis to the Russian case. Challenging the accepted characterization of the Russian party system as 'hegemonic', the article contends that this underplays the systemic importance of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and its collusion with pro-Kremlin parties in the fields of electoral and party reform. By applying the concepts of cartelization to the Russian case, it appears that the intersection of state and party goes beyond simply the 'top-down' establishment of political parties towards a party system in which there is inter-party collusion around a strong state-based regime.

The article applies and develops Katz and Mair's 'cartel party' thesis to the Russian case. Challenging the accepted characterization of the Russian party system as 'hegemonic', the article contends that this underplays the systemic importance of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and its collusion with pro-Kremlin parties in the fields of electoral and party reform. By applying the concepts of cartelization to the Russian case, it appears that the intersection of state and party goes beyond simply the 'top-down' establishment of political parties towards a party system in which there is inter-party collusion around a strong state-based regime. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article reads the restructuring of European party systems in the 2010s as a transition from cartel to techno-populist parties, with a specific focus on left-populist challengers. Adopting a historical-institutionalist perspective, it demonstrates how a long-term cartelization and particular mode of crisis management after 2008 drove the gradual replacement of the party cartel with a cohabitation of populism and technocratic politics: techno-populism. Although this techno-populist template has been deployed for parties such as Five Star Movement and some right-wing populist outfits, it has usually been left aside for left-wing variants. This article investigates two techno-populist subtypes from the left: Corbynism in the United Kingdom and Podemos in Spain. The former took place within a cartel party ('intra-party'), while the latter occurred from outside the party cartel ('extra-party'). Although such party cartelization cuts across cases, the rise of Corbynism and Podemos took place under different institutional conditions: different electoral systems, different European Union membership and different dynamics of party competition on the left. The article concludes with the observation that rather than an anomaly, the presence of techno-populist tropes in and outside of parties and across institutional settings indicates the pervasiveness of these logics in contemporary European party politics.

This article reads the restructuring of European party systems in the 2010s as a transition from cartel to techno-populist parties, with a specific focus on left-populist challengers. Adopting a historical-institutionalist perspective, it demonstrates how a long-term cartelization and particular mode of crisis management after 2008 drove the gradual replacement of the party cartel with a cohabitation of populism and technocratic politics: techno-populism. Although this techno-populist template has been deployed for parties such as Five Star Movement and some right-wing populist outfits, it has usually been left aside for left-wing variants. This article investigates two techno-populist subtypes from the left: Corbynism in the United Kingdom and Podemos in Spain. The former took place within a cartel party ('intra-party'), while the latter occurred from outside the party cartel ('extra-party'). Although such party cartelization cuts across cases, the rise of Corbynism and Podemos took place under different institutional conditions: different electoral systems, different European Union membership and different dynamics of party competition on the left. The article concludes with the observation that rather than an anomaly, the presence of techno-populist tropes in and outside of parties and across institutional settings indicates the pervasiveness of these logics in contemporary European party politics.

This article reads the restructuring of European party systems in the 2010s as a transition from cartel to techno-populist parties, with a specific focus on left-populist challengers. Adopting a historical-institutionalist perspective, it demonstrates how a long-term cartelization and particular mode of crisis management after 2008 drove the gradual replacement of the party cartel with a cohabitation of populism and technocratic politics: techno-populism. Although this techno-populist template has been deployed for parties such as Five Star Movement and some right-wing populist outfits, it has usually been left aside for left-wing variants. This article investigates two techno-populist subtypes from the left: Corbynism in the United Kingdom and Podemos in Spain. The former took place within a cartel party ('intra-party'), while the latter occurred from outside the party cartel ('extra-party'). Although such party cartelization cuts across cases, the rise of Corbynism and Podemos took place under different institutional conditions: different electoral systems, different European Union membership and different dynamics of party competition on the left. The article concludes with the observation that rather than an anomaly, the presence of techno-populist tropes in and outside of parties and across institutional settings indicates the pervasiveness of these logics in contemporary European party politics. ; Horizon 2020, "Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions", "The Post-Crisis Legitimacy of the European Union (PLATO)", Grant Agreement No. 722581

In this article I discuss the empirical validity of the cartel thesis, and review three analytical dimensions of the concept: organizational change, functional change and change of party competition in Denmark, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. I use the empirical findings to elaborate the cartel party model, with three main results. First, in Denmark and Germany party cartels have developed in different ways; second, while the cartel thesis points to important developments, some assumptions are far-fetched and we therefore have to look for the core defining elements of cartel parties; third, the favourable and unfavourable conditions facilitating or hindering the development of party cartels have to be clarified.

In spite of the fact that Katz and Mair's cartel party article has been one of the most widely cited, read, discussed, criticized scholarly works of the past decade, Italian politics experts have been somewhat reluctant to apply the cartel party framework to analyze the Italian party system.1 This reluctance was probably motivated by an improper understanding of what the cartel party hypothesis actually entails. Italian politics scholars seemed to think that the cartel is a specific type of oligopolistic market in which the supply of goods is distorted by the collusion of the oligopolistic firms which, by colluding, form the cartel. Italian politics scholars further believed that oligopolistic markets, and cartels of oligopolistic firms, are created to resist change and to prevent other firms from entering the market and that they are able to do so successfully.