Suchergebnisse

This note derives a new formula for determining a monopolist's optimal multitier pricing scheme for any given number of tiers. It further characterizes Gabor's ( Review of Economic Studies) two-tier pari passu marginal revenue function to the [Formula: see text]-tier case. By introducing the individual tier's marginal revenue and the pari passu marginal revenue in a linear demand case, this note provides a perceptive graphical representation of the optimal pricing scheme, revealing that all tiers' outputs are equal, the last tier's price is always higher than the marginal cost, and an increase in the number of tiers increases social welfare. In a class of nonlinear demand functions, it shows that starting from the first tier, the tiers' outputs are monotonically increasing (decreasing) if the demand function is strictly convex (concave). It also shows that the equal-tier-output property preserves in the linear demand case with the total output fixed as a constraint. JEL Classification: D01, D21, D42, L12, L21

Dissertação de mestrado em Economia e Política da Saúde ; The increasing costs of health services stressed the need to control and contain expenditure. The Pharmaceutical sector has been chosen by many governments as a generous field for such containment. That way, the present thesis analyses one of the most popular regulatory policies in force, the reference pricing schemes. Through the thesis, we provide a review of published literature on the theme, underlining effects and consequences of the policy discussed in the economic literature. We then develop a theoretical model to derive the implications of the policy introduction. We conclude that the model built is able to capture main effects predicted by the economic literature. The policy introduction produces a sharp reduction of prices of all firms in the cluster and reduction in third payer expenditure. However, effects on consumer surplus are ambiguous. Final discussion on present thesis relates to the scheme engineering in order to power the effect of the policy. Using the model built we present strategies that policy maker might use to increase welfare. ; Os custos crescentes dos serviços de saúde salientaram a necessidade de controlar e conter a despesa em saúde. O sector farmacêutico foi escolhido por vários governos como um campo generoso para tal contenção. Dessa forma, a presente tese analisa uma das políticas de regulação mais populares em vigor, os esquemas de preços de referência. Ao longo da tese, realizamos uma revisão da literatura publicada sobre o tema, sublinhando efeitos e consequências da política discutidos na literatura económica. Em seguida, desenvolvemos um modelo teórico que nos permite derivar implicações da introdução da politica. Concluímos que o modelo construído é capaz de capturar os principais efeitos previstos pela literatura económica. A introdução da medida produz uma redução significativa dos preços de todas as empresas no grupo farmacêutico e uma redução das despesas do financiador. Contudo, os efeitos sobre o excedente ...

Abstract
Most policies for pricing pollution under asymmetric information proposed in the literature to date are rarely – if ever – used in practice. This is likely due to their complexity. We investigate the scope for using somewhat simpler policies that are more closely related to pricing schemes already used by regulators in many jurisdictions. These schemes have a discrete block pricing (DBP) structure whereby a given unit price for pollution is applied up to a specified level of pollution for any given polluter, and a higher unit price is applied to any pollution from that polluter above the specified level. If the same price schedule is applied uniformly to all firms, we call it UDBP. We derive the optimal UDBP schedule for any given number of price blocks. We also derive the optimal limiting case of the UDBP schedule (with an infinite number of price blocks) as a uniform linear increasing marginal price schedule (ULIMP). The optimal ULIMP scheme strikes a balance between the information-related benefits of increasing marginal prices on one hand, and an increase in aggregate abatement cost, due to the non-equalization of marginal abatement costs across firms, on the other. In particular, the optimal schedule is steeper with larger aggregate uncertainty about marginal abatement costs, and flatter with more observable heterogeneity across firms. We then compare our price schemes with those proposed by Weitzman (1978) and Roberts and Spence (1976).

This paper aims to measure the efficiency of different road pricing schemes (Pigouvian tax, flat tax and cordon toll) to address congestion externalities when the locations of jobs and dwellings within a city are endogenous. The model captures the fact that commuters face a trade-off between taking advantage of the wage premium in the Central Business District (CBD) and being stuck in traffic. I find that the Pigouvian tax strategy is not a social optimum due to the presence of two market failures in the urban economy: congestion and misallocation of jobs within the city. A Pigouvian tax on commuters cannot solve two different problems simultaneously, namely, reducing the congestion level given the locations of jobs and reaching the optimal spatial allocation of firms. Without regulation, the number of jobs in the CBD is too high (and the congestion cost is excessive), while the Pigouvian tax generates a CBD that is too small. In addition, a flat tax is not necessarily worse than a Pigouvian tax, in contrast to the cordon toll.

This paper aims to measure the efficiency of different road pricing schemes (Pigouvian tax, flat tax and cordon toll) to address congestion externalities when the locations of jobs and dwellings within a city are endogenous. The model captures the fact that commuters face a trade-off between taking advantage of the wage premium in the Central Business District (CBD) and being stuck in traffic. I find that the Pigouvian tax strategy is not a social optimum due to the presence of two market failures in the urban economy: congestion and misallocation of jobs within the city. A Pigouvian tax on commuters cannot solve two different problems simultaneously, namely, reducing the congestion level given the locations of jobs and reaching the optimal spatial allocation of firms. Without regulation, the number of jobs in the CBD is too high (and the congestion cost is excessive), while the Pigouvian tax generates a CBD that is too small. In addition, a flat tax is not necessarily worse than a Pigouvian tax, in contrast to the cordon toll.

This paper aims to measure the efficiency of different road pricing schemes (Pigouvian tax, flat tax and cordon toll) to address congestion externalities when the locations of jobs and dwellings within a city are endogenous. The model captures the fact that commuters face a trade-off between taking advantage of the wage premium in the Central Business District (CBD) and being stuck in traffic. I find that the Pigouvian tax strategy is not a social optimum due to the presence of two market failures in the urban economy: congestion and misallocation of jobs within the city. A Pigouvian tax on commuters cannot solve two different problems simultaneously, namely, reducing the congestion level given the locations of jobs and reaching the optimal spatial allocation of firms. Without regulation, the number of jobs in the CBD is too high (and the congestion cost is excessive), while the Pigouvian tax generates a CBD that is too small. In addition, a flat tax is not necessarily worse than a Pigouvian tax, in contrast to the cordon toll.

This paper aims to measure the efficiency of different road pricing schemes (Pigouvian tax, flat tax and cordon toll) to address congestion externalities when the locations of jobs and dwellings within a city are endogenous. The model captures the fact that commuters face a trade-off between taking advantage of the wage premium in the Central Business District (CBD) and being stuck in traffic. I find that the Pigouvian tax strategy is not a social optimum due to the presence of two market failures in the urban economy: congestion and misallocation of jobs within the city. A Pigouvian tax on commuters cannot solve two different problems simultaneously, namely, reducing the congestion level given the locations of jobs and reaching the optimal spatial allocation of firms. Without regulation, the number of jobs in the CBD is too high (and the congestion cost is excessive), while the Pigouvian tax generates a CBD that is too small. In addition, a flat tax is not necessarily worse than a Pigouvian tax, in contrast to the cordon toll.