Suchergebnisse

The economic conservation instrument of payments for ecosystem services (PES) enjoys an increasing popularity among scientists, politicians, and civil society organizations alike, while others raise concerns regarding the ecological effectiveness and social justice of this instrument. In this review article, we showcase the variety of existing PES definitions and systematically locate these definitions in the range between Coasean conceptualizations, which describe PES as conditional and voluntary private negotiations between ES providers and ES beneficiaries, and much broader Pigouvian PES understandings that also assign government-funded and involuntary schemes to the PES approach. It turns out that the scale at which PES operate, having so far received very little attention in the literature, as well as critique of PES must be considered in the context of the diversity of definitions to ensure the comparability between studies researching PES programs. Future research should better target linkages between global, regional, and local scales for the development of PES programs, while taking local collective governance systems for a sustainable use of resources into account more seriously. ; Peer Reviewed

Ce texte est une version anglaise et plus complète (analyse du dispositif PES en plus de la Bioprospection et des REDD), jamais publiée, du texte "Néo-libéraliser sans marchandiser" publié en 2017 dans l'ouvrage "Les politiques de la biodiversité" coordonné par Estienne Rodary et Daniel Compagnon. Pensée à l'origine comme une discussion des thèses principales de la Political Ecology sur la néolibéralisation et la marchandisation de l'environnement, ce texte n'a malheureusement pas pu être publié dans les revues de ce champs. Les idées présentées ici font désormais l'objet d'un projet particulier, le projet PRISME, coordonné par Valérie Bosivert depuis l'Université de Lausanne. ; Thispaperstarts from thepremise thatat theRio+20Summit,historyhas repeateditselfand that thesame expectations raised by bioprospecting 20 years ago are now attached to the market-basedinstruments associated with conservation policies (Payments for environmental services, REDDmechanisms, biodiversity offsets,.). The promise that market mechanisms are best suited to reachbiodiversity conservation goals has been renewed. Building on Polanyian definition of fictitiouscommodities and on the idea of the 'economy of promises' (developed by P.B. Joly in relation tobiotechnologies and nanotechnologies), we argue that beyond their ideological foundations, marketmechanisms require complex institutional arrangements that are often irrelevant and ineffective inreaching theirenvironmental objectives.Thesevariousmarket-based ormarket-like arrangements relyonthereassertedpromiseofasynergybetweenmarketandconservationratherthanonactualmarketmechanisms. They are supposedly meant as conservation tools. However, they rather foster thedevelopmentofamarketforconsultingandeconomicexpertiseinconservationissues,thegrowthandperpetuation of which depend on the renewal of this promise, in the form of changing institutionalarrangementsandmechanisms.

Ce texte est une version anglaise et plus complète (analyse du dispositif PES en plus de la Bioprospection et des REDD), jamais publiée, du texte "Néo-libéraliser sans marchandiser" publié en 2017 dans l'ouvrage "Les politiques de la biodiversité" coordonné par Estienne Rodary et Daniel Compagnon. Pensée à l'origine comme une discussion des thèses principales de la Political Ecology sur la néolibéralisation et la marchandisation de l'environnement, ce texte n'a malheureusement pas pu être publié dans les revues de ce champs. Les idées présentées ici font désormais l'objet d'un projet particulier, le projet PRISME, coordonné par Valérie Bosivert depuis l'Université de Lausanne. ; Thispaperstarts from thepremise thatat theRio+20Summit,historyhas repeateditselfand that thesame expectations raised by bioprospecting 20 years ago are now attached to the market-basedinstruments associated with conservation policies (Payments for environmental services, REDDmechanisms, biodiversity offsets,.). The promise that market mechanisms are best suited to reachbiodiversity conservation goals has been renewed. Building on Polanyian definition of fictitiouscommodities and on the idea of the 'economy of promises' (developed by P.B. Joly in relation tobiotechnologies and nanotechnologies), we argue that beyond their ideological foundations, marketmechanisms require complex institutional arrangements that are often irrelevant and ineffective inreaching theirenvironmental objectives.Thesevariousmarket-based ormarket-like arrangements relyonthereassertedpromiseofasynergybetweenmarketandconservationratherthanonactualmarketmechanisms. They are supposedly meant as conservation tools. However, they rather foster thedevelopmentofamarketforconsultingandeconomicexpertiseinconservationissues,thegrowthandperpetuation of which depend on the renewal of this promise, in the form of changing institutionalarrangementsandmechanisms.

Ce texte est une version anglaise et plus complète (analyse du dispositif PES en plus de la Bioprospection et des REDD), jamais publiée, du texte "Néo-libéraliser sans marchandiser" publié en 2017 dans l'ouvrage "Les politiques de la biodiversité" coordonné par Estienne Rodary et Daniel Compagnon. Pensée à l'origine comme une discussion des thèses principales de la Political Ecology sur la néolibéralisation et la marchandisation de l'environnement, ce texte n'a malheureusement pas pu être publié dans les revues de ce champs. Les idées présentées ici font désormais l'objet d'un projet particulier, le projet PRISME, coordonné par Valérie Bosivert depuis l'Université de Lausanne. ; Thispaperstarts from thepremise thatat theRio+20Summit,historyhas repeateditselfand that thesame expectations raised by bioprospecting 20 years ago are now attached to the market-basedinstruments associated with conservation policies (Payments for environmental services, REDDmechanisms, biodiversity offsets,.). The promise that market mechanisms are best suited to reachbiodiversity conservation goals has been renewed. Building on Polanyian definition of fictitiouscommodities and on the idea of the 'economy of promises' (developed by P.B. Joly in relation tobiotechnologies and nanotechnologies), we argue that beyond their ideological foundations, marketmechanisms require complex institutional arrangements that are often irrelevant and ineffective inreaching theirenvironmental objectives.Thesevariousmarket-based ormarket-like arrangements relyonthereassertedpromiseofasynergybetweenmarketandconservationratherthanonactualmarketmechanisms. They are supposedly meant as conservation tools. However, they rather foster thedevelopmentofamarketforconsultingandeconomicexpertiseinconservationissues,thegrowthandperpetuation of which depend on the renewal of this promise, in the form of changing institutionalarrangementsandmechanisms.

Ce texte est une version anglaise et plus complète (analyse du dispositif PES en plus de la Bioprospection et des REDD), jamais publiée, du texte "Néo-libéraliser sans marchandiser" publié en 2017 dans l'ouvrage "Les politiques de la biodiversité" coordonné par Estienne Rodary et Daniel Compagnon. Pensée à l'origine comme une discussion des thèses principales de la Political Ecology sur la néolibéralisation et la marchandisation de l'environnement, ce texte n'a malheureusement pas pu être publié dans les revues de ce champs. Les idées présentées ici font désormais l'objet d'un projet particulier, le projet PRISME, coordonné par Valérie Bosivert depuis l'Université de Lausanne. ; Thispaperstarts from thepremise thatat theRio+20Summit,historyhas repeateditselfand that thesame expectations raised by bioprospecting 20 years ago are now attached to the market-basedinstruments associated with conservation policies (Payments for environmental services, REDDmechanisms, biodiversity offsets,.). The promise that market mechanisms are best suited to reachbiodiversity conservation goals has been renewed. Building on Polanyian definition of fictitiouscommodities and on the idea of the 'economy of promises' (developed by P.B. Joly in relation tobiotechnologies and nanotechnologies), we argue that beyond their ideological foundations, marketmechanisms require complex institutional arrangements that are often irrelevant and ineffective inreaching theirenvironmental objectives.Thesevariousmarket-based ormarket-like arrangements relyonthereassertedpromiseofasynergybetweenmarketandconservationratherthanonactualmarketmechanisms. They are supposedly meant as conservation tools. However, they rather foster thedevelopmentofamarketforconsultingandeconomicexpertiseinconservationissues,thegrowthandperpetuation of which depend on the renewal of this promise, in the form of changing institutionalarrangementsandmechanisms.

This paper examines the level of payment for ecosystem services (PES) concept implementation in the financing of water-related forest ecosystem services (ES) in the Republic of Croatia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB& ; H), the Republic of Slovenia, and the Republic of Serbia. The focus is on water-related forest ES recognised by the millennium ecosystem assessment (MEA). For the purpose of this paper, the term pure PES describes schemes that comply to all five conditions set by Wunder definition and term PES like for those schemes that miss some of those conditions. In the first step, the most important legislative documents related to forests, water, and environmental protection were selected. The second consists of a content analysis ; focusing on the definition of ES ; the definition of fees or payments ; the establishment of &rsquo ; forest funds&rsquo ; &lsquo ; water funds&rsquo ; or &lsquo ; environmental funds&rsquo ; and the way these funds were spent. Here we looked at the flow of funding into the forestry sector recognising forest management as the main water-related forest ES provider. Research revealed existence of well-established payments schemes in forestry in Croatia for almost 30 years and in FB& ; H for some 20 years which were assessed as closest to pure PES. In Serbia and Slovenia, there were no PES or PES like schemes in the forestry sector. In the water sector the well-established PES like payments schemes existing in all four countries. The environmental protection sector, however, rely more on the tax like rather than on the PES like schemes. Legislation in general recognised the link between forests and water, but this was much more evident in the forestry than in the water or environment sector. The role of the state is strongly pronounced in all countries studied, and was the main driving force behind all payments. However, this position of the state represents also the main obstacle for the development of pure PES schemes, together with underdeveloped private forestry and complex socio-economic conditions. Nevertheless, there is room for further development of pure PES and PES like schemes based on EU or global experiences.

This paper examines the level of payment for ecosystem services (PES) concept implementation in the financing of water-related forest ecosystem services (ES) in the Republic of Croatia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB&H), the Republic of Slovenia, and the Republic of Serbia. The focus is on water-related forest ES recognised by the millennium ecosystem assessment (MEA). For the purpose of this paper, the term pure PES describes schemes that comply to all five conditions set by Wunder definition and term PES like for those schemes that miss some of those conditions. In the first step, the most important legislative documents related to forests, water, and environmental protection were selected. The second consists of a content analysis ; focusing on the definition of ES ; the definition of fees or payments ; the establishment of 'forest funds', 'water funds', or 'environmental funds' ; and the way these funds were spent. Here we looked at the flow of funding into the forestry sector recognising forest management as the main water-related forest ES provider. Research revealed existence of well-established payments schemes in forestry in Croatia for almost 30 years and in FB&H for some 20 years which were assessed as closest to pure PES. In Serbia and Slovenia, there were no PES or PES like schemes in the forestry sector. In the water sector the well-established PES like payments schemes existing in all four countries. The environmental protection sector, however, rely more on the tax like rather than on the PES like schemes. Legislation in general recognised the link between forests and water, but this was much more evident in the forestry than in the water or environment sector. The role of the state is strongly pronounced in all countries studied, and was the main driving force behind all payments. However, this position of the state represents also the main obstacle for the development of pure PES schemes, together with underdeveloped private forestry and complex socio-economic conditions. Nevertheless, there is room for further development of pure PES and PES like schemes based on EU or global experiences.

This is a preprint version of a published work at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jcc.20424/abstract ; A set of rules is defined to systematically number the groups and the atoms of polypeptides in a modular manner. Supported by this numeration, a set of internal coordinates is defined. These coordinates (termed Systematic, Approximately Separable, and Modular Internal Coordinates—SASMIC) are straightforwardly written in Z-matrix form and may be directly implemented in typical Quantum Chemistry packages. A number of Perl scripts that automatically generate the Z-matrix files are provided as supplementary material. The main difference with most Z-matrix-like coordinates normally used in the literature is that normal dihedral angles ("principal dihedrals" in this work) are only used to fix the orientation of whole groups and a different type of dihedrals, termed "phase dihedrals," are used to describe the covalent structure inside the groups. This physical approach allows to approximately separate soft and hard movements of the molecule using only topological information and to directly implement constraints. As an application, we use the coordinates defined and ab initio quantum mechanical calculations to assess the commonly assumed approximation of the free energy, obtained from "integrating out" the side chain degree of freedom, by the Potential Energy Surface (PES) in the protected dipeptide HCO-L-Ala-NH2. We also present a subbox of the Hessian matrix in two different sets of coordinates to illustrate the approximate separation of soft and hard movements when the coordinates defined in this work are used. ; This work has been supported by the Arag ón Government "Biocomputaci on y F í sica de Sistemas Complejos" group) and by the research grants MEC (Spain) FIS2004-05073 and MCYT (Spain) BFM2003-08532. P. Echenique was supported by a MEC (Spain) FPU grant.

Payments for environmental services (PES) have attracted increasing interest as amechanism to translate external, non-market values of the environment into real financial incentives for local actors to provide environmental services (ES). In this introductory paper, we set the stage for the rest of this Special Issue of Ecological Economics by reviewing the main issues arising in PES design and implementation and discussing these in the light of environmental economics. We start with a discussion of PES definition and scope. We proceed to review some of the principal dimensions and design characteristics of PES programs and then analyze how PES compares to alternative policy instruments. Finally, we examine in detail two important aspects of PES programs: their effectiveness and their distributional implications. PES is not a silver bullet that can be used to address any environmental problem, but a tool tailored to address a specific set of problems: those in which ecosystems are is managedbecause many of their benefits are externalities from the perspective of ecosystem managers. PES is based on the beneficiary-pays rather than the polluter-pays principle, and as such is attractive in settings where ES providers are poor, marginalized landholders or powerful groups of actors. An important distinction within PES is between user-financed PES in which the buyers are the users of the ES, and government-financed PES in which the buyers are others (typically the government) acting on behalf of ES users. In practice, PES programs differ in the type and scale of ES demand, the payment source, the type of activity paid for, the performance measure used, as well as the payment mode and amount. The effectiveness and efficiency of PES depends crucially on program design.

Although parts of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 2009 considered the Antarctic bioprospecting was adequately regulated by existing Antarctic legislation, this article shows that there are legal issues regarding the definition of fundamental concepts and possible incompatibilities with basic principles of Antarctic Treaty, not yet resolved, so that there is legal clarity for bioprospecting activities in Antarctica. ; Pese a que las partes de la Reunión Consultiva del Tratado Antártico de 2009 consideraron que la bioprospección antártica estaba regulada de forma adecuada por la legislación antártica vigente, el presente artículo demuestra que existen problemas jurídicos respecto de la definición de conceptos fundamentales así como posibles incompatibilidades con principios básicos del Tratado Antártico que aún no están resueltas, de manera que haya claridad jurídica para realizar actividades de bioprospección en la Antártida.

Pese a que las partes de la Reunión Consultiva del Tratado Antártico de 2009 consideraron que la bioprospección antártica estaba regulada de forma adecuada por la legislación antártica vigente, el presente artículo demuestra que existen problemas jurídicos respecto de la definición de conceptos fundamentales así como posibles incompatibilidades con principios básicos del Tratado Antártico que aún no están resueltas, de manera que haya claridad jurídica para realizar actividades de bioprospección en la Antártida. ; Although parts of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 2009 considered the Antarctic bioprospecting was adequately regulated by existing Antarctic legislation, this article shows that there are legal issues regarding the definition of fundamental concepts and possible incompatibilities with basic principles of Antarctic Treaty, not yet resolved, so that there is legal clarity for bioprospecting activities in Antarctica.

This paper updates and extends the Political Market Framework (PMF) by integrating elements of interest groups and political market theory with policy entrepreneurs' (PEs) roles in explaining the patterns of urban infrastructure construction. The prominent role of PEs is observed through a grounded analysis of two large infrastructure projects in Mexico City. A comparative study of the cases suggests that: (1) The agency of PEs in political markets is central to explaining the construction of urban infrastructure; (2) PEs contribute to the definition of pro-growth or anti-growth coalitions and the definition of public problems; (3) the legitimacy of PEs is grounded in their political or technical reputation, or both; (4) the appropriate use of political institutions requires that PEs know how to use electoral timing strategically; and (5) the role of PEs seems to be better understood within a bounded analysis framework, such as the political markets approach.

ABSTRACTVietnam has had a national Payments for Forest Environmental Services (PFES) policy in place since 2010, which transfers money for forest protection from water and energy users to households who live in upland watersheds. However, despite a loose resemblance to general Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) principles, implementation in Vietnam differs strongly from a theoretical ideal, and has a number of unique features, including: strong state involvement in transactions; no use of markets to set payments; poor definition and monitoring of ecosystem services; and the adoption of non‐conditional incentives that strongly resemble livelihood subsidies for poor rural areas. The form that PES takes in Vietnam has been shaped by institutional histories of forest management that have envisioned a strong role for the state and for financial transfers to the rural uplands. At the same time, PES has also been influenced by active engagement and agency of central and local government actors, and local payment recipients, and key areas in which they have impacted PES design include shared governance and more equitable benefit distribution models. These institutional priorities and local values that have shaped PES policy and implementation in Vietnam have led to a hybrid model, full of contradictions and compromises, that neither fits a classical definition nor resembles neoliberal conservation outcomes, and whose success is difficult to judge.

Payment for environmental services (PES) can be a poverty reduction strategy. Findings from two PES case studies in Vietnam indicate that the involvement of the poor is enhanced by increasing attention and interest from donors and the private sector. However, their participation is limited due to political influences which weaken environmental services monitoring, and weak local intermediaries who are limited in their capacity to represent and protect the poor. Whether PES schemes can be pro-poor depends on the scope of the project, the political, social and economic context of the case, and the local definition of poverty. Capacity building for the poor, coupled with better coordination for transparent and equitable benefit-sharing and monitoring mechanisms, need to be in place to ensure that the poor will not be marginalised. Adapted from the source document.

Payment for environmental services (PES) can be a poverty reduction strategy. Findings from two PES case studies in Vietnam indicate that the involvement of the poor is enhanced by increasing attention and interest from donors and the private sector. However, their participation is limited due to political influences which weaken environmental services monitoring, and weak local intermediaries who are limited in their capacity to represent and protect the poor. Whether PES schemes can be pro-poor depends on the scope of the project, the political, social and economic context of the case, and the local definition of poverty. Capacity building for the poor, coupled with better coordination for transparent and equitable benefit-sharing and monitoring mechanisms, need to be in place to ensure that the poor will not be marginalised. Adapted from the source document.