Suchergebnisse

This paper outlines main considerations for the design of ownership structures. Different types of ownership are defined, and their efficiency is analysed under different technical, social and cultural conditions. The conditions favouring democratic ownership are identified, and the analysis shows the importance of correspondence between ownership structure and cultural values. A main conclusion is that the employees must participate in the process of selection of ownership structure. In the concluding section a model for democratic privatization is outlined to give an example of such a process. The model is especially relevant to the transformation in Eastern Europe, but the main principles can also be applied to Western economies.

The highly concentrated ownership in the Bosnia and Herzegovina market provides a rich environment to explore corporate governance practices. The paper will assess effects that ownership structure of companies has on the level of implementation of corporate governance in companies listed on the Official market of the Banja Luka Stock Exchange. Results of implementation of the corporate governance in companies will be presented using Scorecard analysis for evaluation of the implementation of practices and principles of corporate governance for companies which are listed on the Official market of the Banja Luka Stock Exchange. Ownership structure will be presented in three groups of owners determined by controlling owner: government, domestic and foreign owners. Paper will show correlation and effect which different owners of companies have on the level of implementation of corporate governance in these companies. ; peer-reviewed

In this study, we examine the impact of ownership structure on the receivables management of Indian corporate firms. We argue that owners' incentives to monitor manager's actions increase with the increase in their stake holding. Therefore, firms with concentrated promoter and institutional ownership should have lower receivables in terms of its sales. Our results obtained using a panel of 1,164 firms show a negative relationship between the percentage of promoter holding and the receivables ratio. Further, for growing firms, both promoter and institutional shareholdings have a negative impact. However, the firm size effect did not show any impact on the relationship between ownership concentration and receivables ratio.

This paper examines the motivation and impact of corporate diversification in Chinese listed firms. We find that in local government owned-firms there is a non-linear relationship between the level of firm diversification and state ownership. As state ownership increases from zero, the level of diversification decreases. After state ownership reaches a certain level, the level of diversification increases as state ownership increases. There is no evidence that ownership is related to corporate diversification in non-state-owned firms or central government-owned firms. We also document that diversification is negatively related to firm performance in local government-owned firms. However, there is no evidence that diversification is negatively related to the firm performance in non-state-owned firms or central government-owned firms. Our findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for local government owned-firms taking value-reducing diversification strategies.

This is the publisher's version, also available electronically from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/003465301753237731#.VMKObnvGp40. ; This paper theoretically and empirically examines ownership structure in foreign direct investment (FDI) projects. We show that in choosing an ownership structure, foreign investors, local entrepreneurs, and government consider the specific, costly-to-market assets that the participants and the country bring to the project. In equilibrium, the foreign equity share rises with the importance of foreign investor assets and declines with the contribution of local assets towards the amount of surplus generated in the project. Government policies and the institutional structure of the country also affect ownership structure.

AbstractIn this paper we examine the relation between bid‐ask spread and ownership structure variables based on 1985 data for 1,063 NYSE firms. We document a nonpositive relation between bid‐ask spread and insider ownership and conclude that spread is unrelated to insider trading. We also find a robust significantly negative relation between spread and institutional ownership. Finally, we find a positive but generally insignificant relation between spread and blockholdings. Overall, our evidence does not support the predictions of asymmetric information models in markets with anonymous trading.