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The view (most prominently advocated by Justice Scalia) that original meaning entails the constitutionality of original practices has strong intuitive appeal. Indeed, as indicated above, it is a position that has been broadly, if implicitly, assumed by originalists and nonoriginalists alike. But the position is mistaken. We will suggest that a failure to distinguish between two different notions of meaning accounts for the position's wide currency. According to the first notion, the meaning of a term is roughly what a dictionary definition attempts to convey--the semantic or linguistic understanding necessary to use the term, as opposed to nonlinguistic facts about the objects or activities to which the term applies. In contrast, according to the second, looser notion, the meaning of a term incorporates the objects or activities to which the term is applied. The first notion lies behind originalism's theoretical force; it is untenable that the meaning of the Constitution in the first sense could evolve. In sharp contrast, it is not only tenable but inevitable that changes occur over time in the class of things to which a constitutional provision is applied. The assumption that originalism entails the validity of original practices derives its plausibility from a failure to distinguish between the two notions of meaning. Once recognized, the distinction undermines the seemingly natural move from the necessity of interpreting the Constitution in accordance with how it was originally understood to the necessity of upholding practices originally understood to be constitutional. By taking the distinction on board and rejecting the assumption, originalism can readily deflect the challenges based on unacceptable original practices; as a consequence, however, it will not be tenable for originalism, in any case challenging an original practice, simply to rule out the possibility of the practice's invalidity.

The idea that the Constitution ought to be understood and interpreted based on its original meaning has come to find expression across the liberal-conservative divide. If originalism has been deemed a conservative mode of jurisprudence associated most often with Justice Antonin Scalia, today some of its most intrepid defenders are left-of-center scholars Akhil Amar of the Yale Law School is a prominent example who earnestly insist on capturing and adhering to original meaning in constitutional interpretation. It would be going too far to say that we are all originalists now, yet many of the most interesting debates in constitutional law occur within the contours of original meaning. If there is a twist, it is that much of the current debate over original meaning focuses on the Civil War amendments, particularly the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Constitution of 1787 and the Bill of Rights of 1791. To be sure, this is an overstatement. Originalists like Justice Scalia have always considered constitutional amendments as essential to capturing original constitutional meaning; indeed, originalists have long insisted that constitutional amendment is the only legitimate way to bring about constitutional change. Thus when originalists speak of 'the Constitution' they necessarily include amendments to the Constitution as such amendments may legitimately alter constitutional meaning. Even so, the Fourteenth Amendment is of particular interest as so much contestation in constitutional law and interpretation occurs over precisely what liberties the amendment protects and just how these liberties relate to the Constitution of 1787 and the Bill of Rights of 1791. As Steven Calabresi -- a professor of law at Northwestern University and founding member of the Federalist Society -- says regarding constitutional rights: 'The period you should look to to find out the original understanding is 1868, not 1791.'. Adapted from the source document.

The rule against compelled subsidization of speech is at the forefront of modem First Amendment disputes. Challenges to mandatory union dues, laws preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and the federal "contraceptive mandate" have all featured variants of the anti-subsidization principle, reasoning that the government cannot compel people to support the objectionable activities of others. But the literature currently fails to evaluate modem compelled-subsidy doctrine in terms of the original meaning of the First Amendment. This Essay takes up that task. Approaching any question of original meaning requires a willingness to encounter a constitutional world that looks very different from our own. And that is especially true when it comes to the First Amendment. In certain contexts, some Founders argued that compelled subsidies violated their rights. But these were contested arguments. The challenge, then, is to situate Founding Era ideas in a historical frame that may bear little resemblance to modem law. Such a frame, this Essay argues, indicates that rights of expression and religious exercise undergirded by freedoms of thought and conscience-neither entirely excluded nor inviolably privileged arguments against compelled subsidies. Rather than providing determinate answers, the Founding-Era conception of rights encouraged active debate about the boundaries of governmental power. Compelled-subsidy doctrine thus sits in a precarious position within the bounds of reasonable historical argument but also deeply novel in its modem rigidity and judicial enforceability.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISMBy "originalism" I mean the familiar approach to constitutional adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters. At least since Marbury, in which Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the significance of our Constitution's being a written document, originalism in one form or another has been a major theme in the American constitutional tradition.

This book examines the fundamental issues of Marxism in the 21st century and explores its contributions through the explanatory framework of the unity of continuity and stages, spatial and temporal analysis, and the dialectical relationship of universality and particularity of Marxist historical development. Marxism in the 21st century is a concept closely related to the historical changes of capitalism and the historical shift of the center of the socialist movement. Marxism in the 21st century should be developed on the basis of the continuation of the fundamental position, value orientation, ideals and beliefs, basic principles, and methodological principles of Marxism. This book explores the logic of the development of modernization in contemporary China and the world, the communication and interaction between contemporary China and the world, and the coexistence of socialism and capitalism. It also examines the relationship between the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context, Marxism in contemporary China, and Marxism in the 21st century. The book also discusses Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, which provides a scientific theoretical system for interpreting the contemporary world and could become the core theoretical form of Marxism in the 21st century. The book will be essential reading for students and scholars of Marxism, Chinese studies, and modernization theory.