Suchergebnisse

We study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game in a naturally occuring group setting. An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of around 20 recipients each and also to themselves. The groups are supporters of two rival political movements in Thailand and politically neutral subjects. The non-rival outgroup acts as a reference point and allows us to measure in-group favouritism and outgroup discrimination. A treatment with artificial groups serves as a control. We find both ingroup favouritism and out-group discrimination among the naturally occurring groups. In artificial groups, favouritism is observed, but not discrimination. Our results suggest that the two behaviours are not driven by the same motive, and only when groups are in conflict that out-group discrimination is likely to occur.

Abstract
This paper presents an experiment measuring how lab-induced group identity affects trust and trustworthiness in a repeated trust game with random matching. Identity had positive in-group and negative out-group effects on trust. However, the in-group effect was small and statistically insignificant, while the out-group effect was large. Trustworthiness was determined mainly by reciprocity effects.

AbstractRecent studies of alcohol consumption among students have consistently linked in‐group influence with excessive drinking. Concurrently, these studies have largely overlooked the influence of non‐alcohol‐consuming peers (the out‐group) on the in‐group's decisions to consume alcohol. However, out‐groups can have a significant impact on in‐group members' decisions regarding publicly consumed products (White, Simpson, & Argo, ), such as is the case of alcohol. In light of this, our study aims to explore how in‐group members' views of their consumption of alcohol are influenced by their out‐group. This study uses Social Identity Theory as the theoretical lens to explain consumer interaction with the out‐group (abstainers) and subsequent views of in‐group members (alcohol consumers). A social constructivist approach is adopted to enable this exploration of meaning, with concomitant use of the qualitative narrative methodology. A sample of 18 postgraduate students studying in the UK was selected. Narratives were collected and analysed using thematic analysis. Although the widely accepted view is that people tend to avoid products or behaviours that are linked with an out‐group, this paper demonstrates conditions in which alcohol consumers appreciate the out‐group. Furthermore, it reveals how drinkers' interaction with their out‐group can lead to negative attitudes towards their in‐group and their own consumption of alcohol. Based on their views of out‐groups, we propose a categorisation of alcohol consumers into 3 groups: avoiders, open admirers, and covert admirers. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and practical implications for social marketers and policy makers.

AbstractAdults manifest a number of attributional biases in explaining the behavior of in‐ versus out‐group members. The present study investigated the developmental origins of such biased explanation. Children from majority and minority populations in Israel, and from majority populations in Germany (N = 165), were asked to explain the behavior of in‐ and out‐group members. Across ages and groups, children more often referred to group membership when explaining an out‐group as compared to an in‐group member's behavior; and more often to individual factors when explaining an in‐group as compared to an out‐group member's behavior. These findings are consistent with the early emergence of fundamental differences in the conceptualizations of in‐ and out‐group members.

There has been growing concern about the role social media plays in political polarization. We investigated whether out-group animosity was particularly successful at generating engagement on two of the largest social media platforms: Facebook and Twitter. Analyzing posts from news media accounts and US congressional members (n = 2,730,215), we found that posts about the political out-group were shared or retweeted about twice as often as posts about the in-group. Each individual term referring to the political out-group increased the odds of a social media post being shared by 67%. Out-group language consistently emerged as the strongest predictor of shares and retweets: the average effect size of out-group language was about 4.8 times as strong as that of negative affect language and about 6.7 times as strong as that of moral-emotional language-both established predictors of social media engagement. Language about the out-group was a very strong predictor of "angry" reactions (the most popular reactions across all datasets), and language about the in-group was a strong predictor of "love" reactions, reflecting in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. This out-group effect was not moderated by political orientation or social media platform, but stronger effects were found among political leaders than among news media accounts. In sum, out-group language is the strongest predictor of social media engagement across all relevant predictors measured, suggesting that social media may be creating perverse incentives for content expressing out-group animosity.

We study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game. An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of 20 recipients each and Self. Allocations to groups are divided equally among the group members. The three groups are supporters of the two rival political movements in Thailand ("yellow shirts" versus "red shirts") and political neutral subjects. A control treatment with artificial groups ("group A", "group B", and "non-affiliated") is also conducted. We find that allocators strongly favour their own group and discriminate against supporters of the rival party. Despite a strong anti-corruption stance of the yellow-shirt movement members of both political groups are indistinguishable in both favouritism and discrimination. Allocators tend to be rather selfish: on average 45% of the pie is given to Self, despite the large number of recipients.

Hebrew University of Jerusalem students participated in two experiments of repeated play of the Intergroup Prisoners' Dilemma (IPD) game, which involves conflict of interests between two groups and, simultaneously, within each group. The experiments manipulated the level of competition exhibited by the out-group members (i.e. their level of contribution to their group's effort in the conflict). Consistent with the hypothesis that participants use strategies of reciprocal cooperation between groups, higher levels of out-group competition caused participants to increase their contribution and lower levels caused them to decrease it. In addition, participants had accurate recall of the contribution levels of out-group members, and they attributed motivations to out-group members in a manner that reflected their level of contribution. The nature of reciprocation with the out-group is discussed in light of both behavioral and cognitive data.

Many autocrats govern with an in-group, whose support must be secured, and an out-group, which is subject to repression. How do autocrats exploit in-group/out-group dynamics to secure their survival? One strategy, we argue, is to broadcast out-group repression to the in-group as a signal of the regime's capacity for violence. Empirically, we focus on China, where the government represses ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Drawing on 1 million articles from six propaganda newspapers, we show that the regime broadcasts out-group repression to urban elites on each anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, when 10% of Beijing residents joined anti-regime protests. To understand its effects, we conducted a survey experiment balanced on the national census during the June 2020 Tiananmen anniversary. Using a list experiment to mitigate preference falsification, we show that CCP propaganda about Uyghurs during the Tiananmen anniversary discourages protests among politically engaged urban elites because they fear repression.

Many autocrats govern with an in-group, whose support must be secured, and an out-group, which is subject to repression. How do autocrats exploit in-group/out-group dynamics to secure their survival? One strategy, we argue, is to broadcast out-group repression to the in-group as a signal of the regime's capacity for violence. Empirically, we focus on China, where the government represses ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Drawing on 1 million articles from six propaganda newspapers, we show that the regime broadcasts out-group repression to urban elites on each anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, when 10% of Beijing residents joined anti-regime protests. To understand its effects, we conducted a survey experiment balanced on the national census during the June 2020 Tiananmen anniversary. Using a list experiment to mitigate preference falsification, we show that CCP propaganda about Uyghurs during the Tiananmen anniversary discourages protests among politically engaged urban elites because they fear repression.