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Abstract. This conceptual paper describes world-systems theory that is a socioeconomic and political approach that explains the economic development and dynamics of capitalistic world economy. In particular, this study clarifies international market trade, economic division of labor and other relationships between core and periphery areas. Some limitations of this approach conclude this study.Keywords. World-Systems Analysis, World Economy, World Market, Capitalistic World Economy, Core-Periphery areas.JEL. F63, O10, O20.

Der deutsche Vereinigungsprozess wird aus verschiedenen Perspektiven unterschiedlich beurteilt. Die Darstellungen reichen von kaum vorstellbaren Erfolgen bis bin zu einer Traumatisierung der Bevölkerung der östlichen Bundesländer. Sechs Thesen sollen die gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Transformation im Zuge der deutschen Vereinigung verdeutlichen. ; This article outlines the political events related to German unification on the occasion of its 30th anniversary. The revolutionary upheaval of 1989-90 led to the formulation of common economic and social models in the former Eastern bloc countries. The implementation of these transformation goals proved difficult in former socialist countries and met with little success. It became apparent that the political challenges of transforming centrally planned socialist economies into market economies governed by the rule of law were largely underestimated by politicians. In East Germany, the Treuhandanstalt (privatisation agency) made an indispensable, albeit highly conflictual, contribution to solving this problem. The economic and social transformation of East Germany took place with its accession to the German Constitution. The fall of the 'Iron Curtain' gave the process of globalisation a considerable acceleration, which in turn made strengthening competitiveness a growing challenge for German politics.

In den letzten Jahren haben sich im Bereich der Entwicklungsökonomie zwei Debatten entwickelt, die im folgenden Beitrag verknüpft werden sollen. Zum einen wird im Rahmen der Geography vs. Institutions Debatte darüber diskutiert, in welchem Ausmaß geographische oder institutionelle Charakteristika fundamentale Entwicklungsursachen darstellen können, zum anderen hat die Diskussion um Good und Bad Governance die Bedeutung der Regierungsführung für den Entwicklungsprozess deutlich gemacht. Dieser Beitrag analysiert, inwieweit die Erkenntnisse der Geography vs Institutions Debatte zur Erklärung von Governance-Strukturen herangezogen werden können. Die Analyse erfolgt an Hand eines einfachen Entscheidungsmodells, mit dem der Einfluss verschiedener geographischer und institutioneller Faktoren auf das Verhalten von Politikern untersucht werden kann. Eine anschließende empirische Überprüfung der gewonnenen Hypothesen zeigt zwar, dass geographische Charakteristika offenbar tatsächlich zur Erklärung der Governance-Qualität beitragen können. Diese Ergebnisse müssen jedoch auf Grund von Unzulänglichkeiten bei der Messung der Governance-Qualität mit äußerster Vorsicht interpretiert werden.

Karl Polanyi wrote The Great Transformation in 1944 which analysed the double movement Europe experienced, from a situation where the market was heavily regulated and controlled in the eighteenth century to a virtually unregulated market in the nineteenth century, and the huge transformation in which the market was once more brought under control as a reaction to the poverty, unemployment and insecurity brought about by the unregulated market. Yet in both developed and developing countries there has since been a reaction with a new move towards the market. This paper analyses such processes in contemporary developing countries, and considers whether, in the light of the consequences of the unregulated market, a new Great Transformation is needed. It also considers whether such a transformation is likely, reviewing moves towards increased regulation of the market, and also the challenges faced by any contemporary great transformation arising from globalization and the nature of politics. – markets ; social protection ; regulation ; transformation

We use a novel method to measure racism at both the individual and the country level. We show that our measure of racism has a strong negative and significant impact on economic development, quality of institutions and education. We then test different hypotheses concerning the origin of racism and its channels of impact in order to establish causality. We find that racism is not correlated with any possible measure of coexistence of different racial or ethnic groups, like ethno-linguistic fragmentation, share of migrants, or ethnically-motivated conflicts among others. Racism has a negative effect on social capital measured as generalized trust and voice and accountability. More importantly, we show that for former colonies, racism is strongly correlated with the presence of extractive institutions during the colonial time, even when we control for current institutions, current GDP per capita or current education. We argue that extractive colonial institutions not only had a negative impact on the political and economic institutions of the colonized countries, but also shaped the cultural values of the population. We claim that colonial powers instilled racism among the population of their colonies in order to weaken their ability for collective action, justify their own role as extractive elite in the eyes of the ruled and facilitate the internal cohesion of the elite. We also show that, at the individual level and using country fixed effects, racism is negatively correlated with those cultural values that one would expect if an extractive elite would be able to decide the cultural values of the society they control: lower trust, higher obedience, lower respect for others, lower feeling of control of one's live, lower preference for democracy, higher support for military intervention of the government, lower preference for political participation, lower valuation of civil rights, higher preference for state intervention in the economy, lower support for economic competition, and higher acceptance of dishonest behavior. We finally show that racism still has a significant impact on our outcome variables even when we control for these potential cultural correlates.

How can a small group of insurgents believe they can overcome the government by turning violent, even if the government is strongly superior? When does a conflict develop towards a peaceful conflict resolution, terrorism, a guerilla war, or a widely spread conventional civil war? We develop a formal model for rebels and government and derive optimal choices. Further, we focus on three elements as important ingredients of a "destabilization war". All three of these - large random events, time preference (which we relate to ideology), and choice of duration of fight - are rarely considered in formal conflict theory. We can answer the above two questions with game theory analysis. First, insurgents rise up because they believe in the effect of destabilization through permanent challenging attacks. Large randomness is an important ally of rebels. While each single attack may have low impact, maybe at some time a large random event could lead to success. Hence, duration of activities is a constitutive element of this kind of violent conflict. Patience (low time preference), which may reflect the degree of ideological motivation of rebels, is crucial. Second, the mode of warfare or conflict resolutions that develops is generally path-dependent and conditioned on the full set of options (including compromise). Various conditions (level of funding, ease of recruitment, access to weapons) favor in a complex way different modes of warfare or a peaceful compromise. Unlike in a "one battle war" with no time dimension, in a "continuing violent conflict" economic instruments become very powerful in terms of guiding conflict resolution in a certain direction.

This contribution studies the impact of modernization on the onset of Islamist conflict. To capture the multi-dimensional phenomenon of modernization, we create a unique modernization index. Our empirical analysis for 154 countries for the 1971-2006 period provides robust evidence that modernization rather than economic underdevelopment or a lack of democracy increases the likelihood of the onset of Islamist conflict. This relationship especially matters to Islamist groups that aim at a regime change, i.e., the establishment of an Islamic state, while separatist groups seem to be more strongly affected by minority discrimination. We argue that from a rational-economic point of view the adverse effects of modernization lower the opportunity costs of conflict and raise its benefits. Additionally, an Islamist framing of modernization grievances affects the cost-benefit considerations of potential Islamist militants in ways that make violence even more likely (e.g., by offering spiritual rewards). An Islamist interpretation of modernization grievances furthermore provides Islamist militants with a political objective (the establishment of an Islamic state) to remedy the perceived ills of modernization.

This contribution examines the role of market-capitalism in anti-American terrorism. It differentiates between level- and rate-of-change-effects associated with market-capitalist development and their respective relationship with anti-U.S. violence. While this contribution argues that higher levels of capitalist development consistent with the capitalist-peace literature coincide with less anti-American terrorism, it also suggests that the process of marketization has inflammatory effects on anti-American terrorism. Using panel data for 149 countries between 1970 and 2007, this contribution indeed finds support for these two hypotheses. The findings are further corroborated by system-level time-series evidence. Considering the findings, it is argued that a higher level of market-capitalism is associated with less anti-American terrorism by creating economic interdependencies and a convergence of pro-peace values and institutions. The destabilizing effects of the marketization process are argued to stem from the violent opposition of various anti-market interest groups to economic, politico-institutional and cultural change initiated by a transition towards a market economy. These interest groups deliberately target the U.S. as the main proponent of modern capitalism, globalization and modernity, where anti-American terrorism serves the purpose of consolidating their respective societal position by means of voicing dissent, rolling back pro-market reforms and limiting the perceived Americanization of their communities. The findings of this contribution suggest that the U.S. may ultimately become a less likely target of transnational terrorism through the establishment of market economies, but should not disregard the disruptive political, economic and cultural effects of the marketization process in non-capitalist societies.