Suchergebnisse

Transcript of papers on and social justice and social work in India, presented a national seminar titled: 'Samāja Kārya va Sāmājika Nyāya' organized by Department of Social Work, Mahatma Gandhi Kashi Vidyapeeth and National Association of Professional Social Workers in India, on February, 2017

Abstract
According to the Navya Naiyāyikas, inference is the knowledge, which is produced out of consideration. But what is to be understood by the term 'consideration' or 'parāmarśa'? According to them, parāmarśa or consideration is the factor through the operation of which the inferential conclusion can be attained. Parāmarśa has been defined as the knowledge of the existence of the hetu or reason in the pakṣa or subject, which reason is characterized by its being concomitant with the sādhya, the knowledge in the form of parāmarśa is actually caused by the knowledge of invariable concomitance of probans (hetu) with the probandum (sādhya) and the knowledge of the existence of the hetu in the subject (pakṣa). It has been said by Viśvanātha that the cognition of the existence of probans or hetu in the subject of inference along with the cognition of the prabans or hetu as pervaded by sādhya is called parāmarśa (pakṣasya vyāpyavṛttitvadhīḥ parāmarśa ucyate). The invariable co-existence in the form 'where there is smoke, there is fire' is known as vyāpti or invariable concomitance. Here the invariable coexistence (avyabhicārī sāhacarya) between the probans and probandum (i.e., smoke and fire) is the definition of vyāpti. The term 'co-existence' means remaining in the same locus of the probans with the probandum, which is not the counter positive of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the hetu. To Gangeśa, the knowledge of the co-existence of the probans and probandum along with the absence of the knowledge of deviation of the probans is the cause of ascertaining vyāpti. Repeated observations, of course, sometimes act as a promoter (prayojaka) in ascertaining vyāpti by removing the doubt of deviation. The doubt of deviation can be removed sometimes by Tarka or sometimes by the absence of the collocation of causes of doubt, which is called svataḥsiddhaḥ. Gangeśa admits sāmānyalakṣaṇā as a pratyāsatti in ascertaining vyāpti between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general. To him, the super-normal connection through universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti) has got a prominent role in ascertaining vyāpti. If somebody challenges about the validity of the syllogistic argument in the form "The mountain is fiery as it possesses smoke" (parvato vahnimān dhūmāt), the philosophers of Nyāya and Navya-nyāya persuasion will justify the same with the help of five constituents (avayava-s). The process is called parāthānumāna (syllogistic argument for making others understand). The constituents of a syllogism are proposition (pratijňā), reason (hetu), example (udāharaṇa), application (upanaya), and conclusion (nigamana).

Nyana is the most rational and logical of all the classical Indian philosophical systems. In the study of Nyana philosophy, Karikavali with its commentary Muktavali, both by Visvanatha Nyayapancanana, with the commentaries Dinakari and Ramarudri, have been of decisive significance for the last few centuries as advanced introductions to this subject. The present work concentrates on inference (anumana) in Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari, carefully divided into significant units according to the subject, and translates and interprets them. Its commentary makes use of the primary interpretatio.

The problem -- The approach -- Aim and objectives -- The thesis and its background -- Ideality of language -- ?ruti -- The 'dogma' of sruti: apauru?eya -- The text and its author -- Cit: consciousness in the knowing process -- Dharmar?ja and Navya-ny?ya -- 1. Outline of the Argument for ?abdapramÅ?a -- 2. On Words -- Linguistic kara?a and the word -- 3. On Meaning -- A. Some general remarks on 'meaning' -- B. Indian theories of 'meaning' -- C. The linguistic functions of 'meaning' -- 4. ??bdabodha: Psycholinguistics of Sentence Understanding -- A. ??bdabodha -- B. Sa?sargamary?d? -- 5. The K?ra?s -- A. Ák??k?? — syntactic expectancy -- B. ?satti — linguistic contiguity -- 6. The Phenomenological K?ranas -- A. Yogyat? — semantic competency -- B. T?tparya — intentionality -- 7. ?abdapr?m?nya — Problem of Truth and Authority of the Word -- A. Truth and falsity of ??bdabodha -- B. 'Authority and Praxis' —?ptabh?va -- Appendixes -- B. Bibliography -- A. Primary sources -- B. Secondary sources and related texts -- Indexes -- Name index -- General index.

This study reconstructs the connected history of socio-economic and intellectual practices related to property in seventeenth-century Bengal. From the perspective of socio-economic practices, this study is concerned with the legal transfer of immovable property between individuals. From the perspective of intellectual practice, this study is concerned with how property was understood as an analytical category that stood in a particular relation to an individual. Their connected history is examined by analysing socio-economic practices exemplified in a number of documents detailing the sale and donation of land and then situating these practices within the scholarly analysis of property undertaken by authors within the discipline of nyāya—the Sanskrit discipline dealing primarily with ontology and epistemology. In the first section of the essay, I undertake a detailed examination of available land documents in order to highlight particular conceptions of property. In the second section of the essay, I draw out theoretical issues examined in nyāya texts that relate directly to the concepts expressed in the land documents. In the third and final section of the essay, I discuss the shared language and shared concepts between the documents and nyāya texts. This last section also addresses how the nyāya analysis of property facilitates a better understanding of claims in the documents and what nyāya authors may have been doing in writing about property.

"In the seven chapters constituting Khedrup Jé's presentation of mind and awareness, he primarily explains the full range of objects, including all phenomena that can be known, and object possessors, things that engage objects, such as consciousness and persons. In the first chapter, Khedrup Jé starts by explaining objects of knowledge. Chapter 2 gives an explanation of various non-valid awarenesses. Chapter 3 explains what it means to be a valid cognizer and divides valid cognizers into various categories. In chapter 4, the first division, valid direct perceivers, is discussed. Chapter 4 further defines the four main categories of direct perceivers: sense direct perceivers, mental direct perceivers, self-knowing direct perceivers, and yogic direct perceivers. In chapter 5, Khedrup Jé gives a brilliant elucidation of this essential teachings of the Buddha. The realizations of the path, explained in chapter 6, are results of valid cognizers. Direct realization of selflessness can only come about by having realized it in a conceptual manner-that is, by generating a valid inference realizing selflessness-first. How to generate this kind of inference is precisely explained in chapter 7. In order to give readers some sense of the two main authors involved here, Khedrup Jé Gelek Palsang and Purbu Chok Jampa Gyatso, whom we mainly rely on for additional explanations, brief biographies of these two eminent Buddhist scholars are given at the close of this introduction"--

The author enters an already old dispute, that is whether a countеrepart of the no­tion of philosophy could be encountered in the traditional India, upholds the view that the term ānvīkşikī (lit. "investigation") was nearest to it and traces its meaning along the texts on dharma (from the Gautama-dharmasûtra, i.e. the 2nd century B.C., to the later medieval commentaries on the Mānavadharmaśāstra), politics (the Arthaśāstra and Kamandaki's Nītisāra), poetics (Rājaśekhara's Kāvyamīmāňsā) and philosophy properly (the basic commentary and subcom­mentary on the Nyāya-sûtras by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, i.e. from the 5th to 7th centuries A.D.). Two main avenues to the understanding of philosophy's vocations in India have been paved in the Mānavadharmaśāstra, along with commentaries thereon and by Kamandaki (as the knowledge of Ātman) and in the Arthaśāstra and the texts of the Nyāya school (as a metascience helping the other branches of knowledge bear their fruits). Therefore philosophy in India as well was regarded as the duality of ideological and methodological con­stituents, and it was Vātsyāyana who in all clarity pointed out that his science of Nyāya was not "the mere knowledge of Ātman" in the manner of the Upanişads but the same knowledge as realized in the context of professional investigation of 16 categorial topics. It is the significance of ānvīkşikī as examination of con­cepts with the philosophers of Nyāya and as polemical debate with Rājaśekhara that leads one to conclude that in classical India philosophy has been regarded not as a body of doctrines but as analytical practice (with the exact similarities to Wittgensteins's understanding of it) as realized in controversy and that unfolds very meaningful horizons for comparative philosophy

I. Principal Elements of Navya-ny?ya Logic -- II. Ga?ge?a's Theory of Pervasion -- Anumitinir?pa?a and Vy?ptiv?da by Ga?ge?op?dhy?ya Transliteration, Translation and Commentary Anumitinir?pa?a and Vy?ptiv?da -- Section I. General observations about inference -- Section II. Theory of pervasion -- I. Five definitions of pervasion as non-deviation -- II. Two definitions of pervasion called Lion-Tiger Definition -- III. Absence limited by a property whose loci are different from its counterpositive -- IV. Preliminary refutation of a series of definitions of pervasion -- V. The conclusive definition of pervasion -- VI. Universal absence -- VII. Pervasion between particulars -- Sanskrit Index -- English Index.

Abstract
This special issue on Indian logic consists of nine research papers dealing with different aspects of Indian logic by nine distinguished authors. It is divided into three sections, such as Nyāya logic, Buddhist logic and Jaina logic. The papers deal with the issue of inference and allied concepts from both historical and conceptual considerations. Indian logic followed linguistic model and thereby in India it gives the foundation of epistemology and the development of philosophy of language.

This article discusses the most important ideas of the political thought of Machiavelli in the Prince, in which both are located around the principle of centralization of power and strength, although within a schema and Kautilya Arthasastra in radically different from the Western feudalism. Arthasastra according to the mentioned authors, shows systematic thinking about the political and administrative order publics and the processes of decision in lathe to the ruler. Both texts share comparable key concepts, despite the distance spatio-temporal works which form part of the strategy in the exercise of power. In the same way, the concept of virtu which determines the behavior of the successful rules in political life are compatible. ; El presente artículo aborda las ideas más importantes del pensamiento político de Kautilya en Arthasastra y de Maquiavelo en El Príncipe, en el que ambos se encuentran en torno al principio de centralización del poder y la fuerza, aunque dentro de un esquema radicalmente diferente del régimen feudal occidental. Arthasastra de acuerdo a los mencionados autores, muestra pensamiento sistemático acerca del orden político y administrativo públicos y los procesos de decisión en torno al gobernante. Ambos textos comparten conceptos clave comparables, pese a la distancia espacio-temporal de las obras que forman parte de la estrategia en el ejercicio del poder. De la misma manera, el concepto de virtud, que determina el comportamiento del gobernante exitoso dentro de la vida política resulta compatibles.

This article discusses the perception of time (kāla) in the Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jain schools on the basis of primary Sanskrit sources and critical studies. The study employs an integral methodology – textual-semantic, hermeneutical and comparative – to approach the study. It concludes that the approaches of the schools diverge most prominently on the following questions: is the perception of present possible? Is the sensible present instantaneous, or does it have duration? Is time objective and real, or is it just a subjective construction? It has been revealed that there is no single dominant perspective in the Indian philosophical approaches, with the principal polemic being between the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools. The study concludes that, in Indian philosophy, time is understood not psychologically, but epistemologically, in relation to questions of reliable cognition and the validity of knowledge.