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This work aimed at proposing a new combination of technologies to improve military performances and reduce costs of nuclear attack submarines, without overlooking safety constraints. The last generation of nuclear attack submarines increased size to meet safety and operational requirements, imposing huge burden on costs side, reducing fleet size. The limitations of current Technologies employed were qualitatively discussed, explaining their limitations. There are new technologies (plate and shell heat exchangers) and architectural choices, like passive safety, and segregation of safety and normal systems, which may lead to reduction of costs and size of submarines. A qualitative analysis was provided on this combination of technologies, stressing their commercial nature and maturity, which reduced risks. The qualitative analysis showed the strong and weak points of this proposal, which adopted the concept of strength in numbers. Concluding, new Technologies enabled the existence of 3800 t nuclear attack submarines with powerful propulsion systems and good acoustic discretion.

This article proposes a methodology that enables one who has actual cost figures to perform the calculations for benefit-to-cost, strictly from the tactical and logistical standpoints, on the performance equivalence not of nuclear vs. air-independent-propulsion (AIP) submarines, but of nuclear v. AIP submarine fleets. With that in hand, it becomes possible for whomever might have sounder figures than what we could find about the complete life-cycle cost of either alternative to figure out, given our results about the benefit assessment, what would be the result of a benefit-to- cost analysis. We didn't perform the latter, due to uncertainty about the methodology by which the public available cost estimates were calculated. By providing a method for benefit calculation of the military worth of alternatives to support an assessment of the SSN/SSP fleet alternatives, we hope to have provided a sounder point of departure for debate, both in general terms, a method, and for the Brazilian case in particular, an application.

New Delhi's plans for nuclear-armed submarines could undermine efforts to restrict fissile materials, and set off a naval arms race. (Survival / SWP)

This book examines the development of nuclear propulsion in the Royal Navy from the first proposal in 1946 to the start-up of the last core improvement for the first submarine reactor power plant PWR 1 in December 1974. Drawing from unreleased records and archives, the book answers questions around three main themes. Political: what problems were encountered in transferring nuclear knowledge from the USA to the UK in the post-war period, and how much support was there for the development of nuclear propulsion? Military: why was there a requirement to develop nuclear propulsion, and in particular, why submarines? Technical: were the problems associated with nuclear energy fully appreciated, and did the UK have the technical and engineering capability to develop nuclear propulsion? Aside from the political considerations and military motives for developing nuclear propulsion in the Royal Navy, the author focuses on the technical problems that had to be overcome by all participants in the Royal Navys development of nuclear propulsion, adding significantly to naval historiography. Providing a critical analysis of the political, technological, operational and industrial issues of introducing nuclear propulsion into the Royal Navy, the author situates his research in the context of the evolving Cold War, changing Anglo-American relations, the end of Empire and the relative decline of British power. Gareth Michael Jones is a former CPO(WSM) Royal Navy submariner retiring from the service in 2003. He is currently working as a Project Engineer with Babcock International Group at Devonport Royal Dockyard. He is interested in the history of nuclear propulsion development and completed his PhD at the University of Plymouth in the UK.

1 Introduction -- Overview -- Chapters -- Literature Review -- Nuclear Historiography -- The Nuclear Submarine in Context -- Summary -- 2 Improving the Submersible -- Introduction of World War II Submarine Developments -- The Soviet Submarine Threat -- Conversions to "Fast Battery Drive" -- HTP and Air-Independent Engines -- The Discovery of Nuclear Fission and Its Application to Submarines -- Discussions on the Development of the Nuclear "Engine" -- 3 The Nuclear Option -- Tube Alloys, US Cooperation and the McMahon Act -- Acquiring an Experienced Team -- Harwell and the Admiralty -- Initial Considerations -- The Mark I Enriched Reactor -- Metropolitan-Vickers and the Problem of Scale -- The End of the Beginning -- 4 The Pressurised Water Reactor -- The Reactor Technical Challenge -- The Brontosaurus in the Museum: Quality Assurance -- Industry Joins the Project -- Miracle Metals -- The Fuel Element Decision -- Neptune: The Zero Energy Experimental Reactor -- 5 HMS/m Dreadnought -- Admiral Hyman G. Rickover USN -- What Price Exchange of Information? -- The Offers to Purchase a US Submarine Reactor -- Choices and Decisions -- Mountbatten Corrections -- Management and Establishment of the Dreadnought Project Team -- Purchase of the S5W Reactor -- Final Adjustments -- 6 Nuclear Training and Dounreay -- Training Facilities -- Off to School -- Practical Training and Jason -- Dounreay Submarine Prototype (DS/MP) -- Dounreay's Future Questioned -- A Very Serious Snag -- HMS/m Valiant -- 7 Future Developments -- Refuelling Preparations -- The Strength of Steel -- Core Development -- Amended Access Agreements -- Core Development Programme (CORDEP) -- Nuclear Development (Submarines): NuDe(S) -- NuDe(S) II—FLIP—ANP -- Core Z -- Secondary Machinery Improvement -- Reporting the Nuclear Navy -- Project Cost -- 8 Conclusions -- Political Problems and Indifference -- Technical Considerations -- The Military Situation -- The Nuclear Propulsion Legacy -- Research in the "Secret (Nuclear) State" -- Appendix A -- Appendix B -- Glossary -- Bibliography -- Index.