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Section 1: introduction to unmanned aircraft technology and law -- Introduction to unmanned aircraft law / Donna A. Dulo -- A brieg history of unmanned aircraft / Jonathan B. Rupprecht and Donna A. Dulo -- Aeronautical foundations of the unmanned aircraft / Donna A. Dulo -- Section 2: FAA rulemaking and unmanned aircraft law -- The federal aviation administration rulemaking process -- Unmanned aircraft in the national airspace -- Grounded in the law -- Considerations of a legal framework for the safe and resilient operation of civilian autonomous unmanned aircraft -- Section 3: unmanned aircraft safety, security, and information assurance regulation and technology in the national critical infrastructure -- Information assurance, cybersecurity, and legislation relating to unmanned aircraft in the national critical infrastructure -- Technological context of cybersecurity and unmanned aircraft in the national critical infrastructure -- Section 4: constitutional issues of unmanned aircraft in the national airspace -- Unmanned aircraft and the media -- Sensing and surveillance -- Civilia weapons on unmanned aircraft -- Section 5: unmanned aircraft risk, product liability, and insurance -- Unmanned aircraft product liability and risk management -- Issues of unmanned aircraft insurance and insurance underwriting -- Risk, product liability trends, and insurance in commercial unmanned aircraft

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Since September 1996, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been developing the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) project to replace the outdated computer equipment that air traffic controllers currently use in some facilities to control air traffic within 5 to 50 nautical miles of an airport. Comparing the currently projected cost and deployment schedule for STARS with the original cost and schedule is difficult because the program presently bears little resemblance to the program envisioned in 1996. FAA has officially changed the cost, schedule, and requirements for STARS twice. In October 1999, FAA estimated the cost for its new approach at $1.4 billion, with a schedule to begin deploying STARS in 2002 at 188 facilities and complete installation at all facilities by 2008. The second change occurred in March 2002, when FAA lowered its estimate from $1.4 billion to $1.33 billion, reduced the number of facilities receiving STARS from 188 to 74, and changed the date to complete installation at all facilities from 2008 to 2005. FAA responded to the Department of Transportation Inspector General's concerns about the agency's plans for deploying STARS in Philadelphia by stating that it plans to follow its policy for testing STARS and addressing critical software problems. Because the FAA changed the date for deploying STARS at the first facility from 1998 to 2002, it had to implement interim systems to allow it to continue to meet demands for air traffic services. Specifically, it had to replace radar displays and other hardware that were difficult to maintain and had limited capacity to accommodate software that would allow FAA to add new features. FAA documents show the cost to implement these interim solutions when STARS was delayed was $90.5 million."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Much has changed since the Congress enacted the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) 3 years ago--the downturn in the nation's economy and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have taken a heavy toll on aviation. Competition for federal funding has also grown. The reauthorization of AIR-21 provides an opportunity for the Congress and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to focus on several challenges to improving the national airspace system. These challenges include (1) funding planned airport capital development, (2) increasing capacity and efficiency, (3) implementing human capital and procurement reforms, and (4) ensuring aviation safety. This testimony is based on ongoing and published GAO work. The information on funding and development, obtained from FAA and the Airport Council International (ACI), a key organization representing the airport industry, is preliminary and therefore subject to change."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Congress's formation of the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) and the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), both within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), represent the latest efforts to address the monumental challenges of modernizing the national airspace system (NAS) during the first quarter of the twenty-first century. For more than two decades, FAA has been working to modernize the air traffic control (ATC) system, but projects have repeatedly missed cost, schedule, and performance targets. Consequently, ATC modernization has been on GAO's list of high-risk federal programs since 1995. The ATO's focus is on a rolling 10- year outlook to operate and modernize the NAS. By contrast, the JPDO's vision is longer term, focused on coordinating the research efforts of diverse federal agencies to achieve a common goal of meeting potential air traffic demands in 2025. This statement discusses (1) GAO's assessment of the ATO's efforts to date in addressing some of the key challenges for the ATC modernization program and (2) challenges that lie ahead for the ATO and options that it could consider in addressing the needs of the NAS over the next decade, as well as longer-term needs defined by the JPDO."

This dissertation is a collection of several models to understand airline and passenger dynamics in the National Airspace System (NAS). Agent-based modeling is one of the most widely used modeling simulation-analysis approaches to understanding the dynamic behavior of complex systems. The usefulness of agent-based modeling has been demonstrated by simulating the complex interactions between airlines, travelers, and airports of a small-scale transportation system. Three airlines, one low cost and two network airlines are simulated to examine how each airline behaves over time to maximize their profit margins for a given passenger demand and operation cost structure. Passenger mode choice and itinerary choice sub modules are embedded in the framework to characterize traveler agent's response to the evolved airline schedule. An airport delay model was implemented to estimate the average delay at each airport. The estimated delay fed into the mode choice and itinerary choice models to update the travel time related variables. International passenger demand is a very important component of the air transportation system in the United States. The proportion of international enplanements relative to total enplanements increased from 8% in 1990 to 11% in 2008. Nine linear regression models are developed to forecast the enplanements from the United States to each of nine international regions. The international enplanements from the CONUS to each world region are modeled as a function of GDP and GDP per capita of both the United States and the specific region. A dummy variable is also used to account for the effects of September 11, 2001. The total number of international enplanements is forecast to increase from 74.7 million in 2008 to 184.4 million in 2028. The average annual growth rate is expected to be 4.7%. The European Union United States Open Skies Agreement, which became effective March 30, 2008. Mathematical models are developed to forecast the effect of EU-US Open Skies Agreement on commercial airline passenger traffic over the North Atlantic Ocean. Nine econometric models were developed to forecast passenger traffic between the United States and nine selected European countries between 2008 through 2020. 68 new nonstop flights between the United States airports and the European airports are predicted by the model in 2020 using the airport pair passenger demand forecast. London, Heathrow is demonstrated as an example for rerouting the excess air travel passengers from one airport to other airports when the airport operational capacity is exceeded. The proportion of international enplanements relative to total enplanements within CONUS increased from 8% in 1990 to 11% in 2008. 51% of the sampled international and U.S. territories passengers served by U.S. carriers had at least one domestic coupon in 2007. The number of DOI passengers through airport-pairs in each of the historical years (1990-2007) is estimated based on the adjusted 100% international itineraries including pure international itineraries plus the non-CONUS itineraries. The total number of DOI enplanements is estimated to grow from 37.3 million in 1990 to 79.4 million in 2007. 193 CONUS airports are estimated to have at least 10,000 DOI enplanements in 2007. The number of DOI enplanements is forecast to grow from 79.4 million in 2007 to 206.2 million in 2030 with average growth rate of 4.2% per year. In recent years, there has been an increasing use of secondary airports both in Europe and the U.S. Regional airports have long been considered as a possible source of relief to reduce airport congestion at the hub airport and to efficiently accommodate future air travel demand. The conditions under which the secondary airports develop in a metropolitan area are examined. Fifteen multi-airport systems including 19 Operational Evolution Plan airports and 25 active secondary airports are identified in the National Airspace System. Diverse trends of traffic distribution among airports in the same metropolitan area are observed. We observed that the number of markets served at the secondary airports is less than that at the primary airport in the same metropolitan area. Most of the secondary airports are currently dominated by the low-cost carriers. The share of seats supplied by the low-cost carriers at the secondary airports has increased during the period 1990-2008. Full service carriers concentrate their service mainly on the primary airport in all the multi-airport systems analyzed. The average seat capacity per aircraft at the secondary airports is higher than that of primary airports in most of the multi-airport systems. The secondary airports mainly serve the domestic O&D passengers. ; Ph. D.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This report reviews the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) progress on implementing the Free Flight Program, which would provide more flexibility in air traffic operations. This program would increase collaboration between FAA and the aviation community. By using a set of new automated technologies (tools) and procedures, free flight is intended to increase the capacity and efficiency of the nation's airspace system while helping to minimize delays. GAO found that the scheduled March 2002 date will be too early for FAA to make an informed investment decision about moving to phase 2 of its Free Flight Program because of significant technical and operational issues. Furthermore, FAA's schedule for deploying these tools will not allow enough time to collect enough data to fully analyze their expected benefits. Currently, FAA lacks enough data to demonstrate that these tools can be relied upon to provide accurate data."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS)--a system intended to safely accommodate a possible tripling of air traffic by 2025--will become one of the federal government's most comprehensive and technically complex undertakings, and a preliminary estimate indicates it will also be expensive. However, the current approach to managing air transportation is becoming increasingly inefficient and operationally obsolete. In 2003, Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to coordinate the efforts of several federal partner agencies--including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in which JPDO is housed--to plan for and develop NGATS. GAO's testimony addresses (1) the current estimate and uncertainties over NGATS costs, (2) advantages and concerns that stakeholders have raised about the current approach to collecting revenues from national airspace users to fund FAA, (3) the advantages and disadvantages of adopting alternative funding options for FAA, and (4) the advantages and disadvantages of authorizing FAA to use debt financing for capital projects. This testimony is based in part on GAO's analysis of FAA and JPDO documents and interviews with officials of those two agencies."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "As requested, this statement discusses issues for the reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The aviation industry is in a period of economic turmoil and faces an uncertain future. At the same time, FAA is undertaking one of its most ambitious efforts ever to transform the nation's air traffic control system. The reauthorization of FAA provides an opportunity for Congress and FAA to focus on several key issues to improve the national airspace system. This statement is based on recent and ongoing work and on discussions with selected senior FAA officials and representatives of the aviation industry. This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that GAO plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for findings and conclusions based on the audit objectives. GAO believes that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions based on the audit objectives."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Initiatives to address flight delays include adding new runways to accommodate more aircraft and better coordinating efforts to adjust to spring and summer storms. Although most of these efforts were developed separately, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has incorporated many of them into an Operational Evolution Plan (OEP), which is designed to give more focus to these initiatives. FAA acknowledges that the plan is not intended as a final solution to congestion and delay problems. The plan focuses on initiatives that can be implemented within 10 years and generally excludes approaches lacking widespread support across stakeholder groups. The current initiatives, if successful, will add substantial capacity to the nation's air transport system. Even so, these efforts are unlikely to prevent delays from becoming worse unless the reduced traffic levels resulting from the events of September 11 persist. One key reason is that most delay-prone airports have limited ability to increase their capacity, especially by adding new runways--the main capacity-building element of OEP. The air transport system has long-term needs beyond the initiatives now under way. One initiative would add new capacity--not by adding runways to existing capacity-constrained airports, but rather by building entirely new airports or using nearby airports with available capacity. Another would manage and distribute demand within the system's existing capacity. A third would develop other modes of intercity travel, such as, but not limited to, high-speed rail where metropolitan areas are relatively close together. Because of increasing demands on the air transport system or because of the need to meet security and other concerns prompted by the recent terrorist attacks, the federal government will need to assume a central role."