Suchergebnisse

Since its unveiling on October 28, 1980, Canada's National Energy Program has been commented upon abundantly in government circles, newspaper articles, trade magazines, and financial industry seminars, drawing both oil industry and foreign reactions. It has received less notice in scholarly publications, however, perhaps because it is a complex and continuously changing program that did not become effective until legislation was enacted. The purpose of this Article is to sketch a broad picture of the National Energy Program (NEP) while focusing on its Canadianization aspects, the new oil and gas taxation situation, and the Program's various transnational law implications. As of September 1982, most of the National Energy Program has been enacted by federal legislation.

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc. ; June 28, 1979. ; At head of title: 96th Congress, 1st session. Committee print. Committee print 96-IFC-38. ; CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 79 H502-54 ; Microfiche. ; Mode of access: Internet.

AbstractThis study investigates the differential wealth impact of the National Energy Program on Canadian‐ versus foreign‐owned oil companies operating in Canada. The issue is analyzed with a stochastic oligopoly model of the industry, and the model's empirical implications are tested using the share prices of 60 firms. Both the cross‐sectional test and the time‐series test indicate that the Program announcement had an adverse impact on foreign‐owned firms relative to Canadian‐owned firms in terms of significant negative returns during the budget week, but the evidence indicates that this impact was not anticipated by the market before the announcement.RésuméCette étude examine I'impact du Programme national de I'énergie sur la valeur des compagnies pétrolières étrangères et le compare à I'impact sur les compagnies sous contrǒle canadien. L'analyse est faite à partir d'un modèle stochastique d'oligopole pour le secteur pétrolier. Les conclusions de l'analyse sont testées empiriquement à partir duprix des litres de 60 compagnies. Les résultats des tests inter‐compagnies et de ceux sur les séries temporelles suggèrent que I'annonce du Programme a eu un effet négatif plus grand sur les compagnies étrangères, comme I'indiquent les rendements négatifs importants observés durant la semaine du discours du budget. II n'est cependant pas évident que cet effet ait été anticipé par le marché boursier avant I'annonce du programme.

Shows how proponents of the obsolescing bargain argument have oversimplified MNC-host government bargaining relations by ignoring mitigating factors such as the international economy, power of home governments, international opprobrium, domestic politics, and the impressive bargaining skills of the MNCs. Refers to the attempts by the Canadian government to control multinational oil companies through a policy known as the National Energy Program. (Original abstract--Amended)

Seit kurzem ist die wachsende Verhandlungsmacht von Gastgeberregierungen über multinationale Unternehmen ein weithin anerkanntes Phänomen. Die Literatur zum "obsolescing bargain" postuliert eine sich mit der Zeit verschlechternde Verhandlungsposition der multinationalen Unternehmen, was sich aber anhand von Kanadas nationalem Energieprogramm nicht belegen läßt. Verfechter dieses theoretischen Ansatzes haben die Verhandlungsbeziehungen zwischen multinationalem Unternehmen und Gastgeberregierung zu sehr vereinfacht. Sie ignorieren die entschärfenden Faktoren internationale Wirtschaft, Macht der Heimatregierungen, inländische Politik und das beeindruckende Verhandlungsgeschick der multinationalen Unternehmen. (SWP-Bmt)