Kautsky - Munich agreement
In: Marxism, communism and Western society: a comparative encyclopedia Vol. 5
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In: Marxism, communism and Western society: a comparative encyclopedia Vol. 5
In: International relations: the journal of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, Band 4, Heft 5, S. 472-478
ISSN: 1741-2862
In: In: Bol'shaja Rossijskaja jenciklopedija [Great Russian encyclopedia], Band 21(Moscow, Heft 2013)
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Blog: The Duck of Minerva
When I was but a lad, it was still quite common for foreign-policy hawks to invoke "Munich" as an all-purpose rebuttal to compromise with (they would say the "appeasement of") rival states, most notably the Soviet Union. The failure of the 1938 agreement — which handed Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich the Sudetenland region […]
In: World affairs: a journal of ideas and debate, Band 101, S. 202-210
ISSN: 0043-8200
In: Voprosy istorii: VI = Studies in history, Band 2018, Heft 11, S. 120-127
In: Journal of Central European affairs, Band 21, S. 200-218
ISSN: 0885-2472
In: Journal of Central European affairs, Band 21, S. 200-218
ISSN: 0885-2472
In: Journal of contemporary history, Band 48, Heft 4, S. 688-716
ISSN: 1461-7250
This article is concerned with British foreign policy and the legacy of the Munich Agreement during and after the Second World War. It argues that contemporary policy requirements necessitated an unapologetic attitude to the past that often entailed the adoption of evasive legal formulae. Thus, while West Germany and Czechoslovakia achieved a modus vivendi in 1973, the British refused to repudiate Munich ab initio and applauded the West German decision to do likewise. London steadfastly maintained this position until 1992, three years after the end of the Cold War. This article explores the reasoning in British policy formulation and demonstrates that while historians discussed the 'shame' of Munich, policymakers rarely experienced feelings of guilt – seeking instead to derive the maximum possible benefit from the continuing significance of Munich. Furthermore, many of the actions of the British government during the Second World War, not least with regard to the Katyń massacres and the Yalta Conference, reinforced the idea that Munich had been a creature of its time and a 'necessary evil'. Drawing extensively on primary sources, this article will make a contribution to the historiography of British foreign relations and that of collective institutional memory and appeasement.
The book In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from the Endorsement to the Renunciation of the Munich Agreement (1938 to 1942) analyses the varying attitudes and gradual change of British policy towards Czechoslovakia in the period from the Munich Conference in September 1938 to August 1942 when the British government proclaimed the Munich Agreement as dead and thus having no influence whatsoever on the future territorial settlement. The key focus of this work lies in the influence of 'Munich' upon the British political scene and upon the resulting British policy towar.
In: Australian outlook: journal of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 21-41
In: Diplomacy and statecraft, Band 21, Heft 3, S. 522-525
ISSN: 1557-301X
In: Journal of world history: official journal of the World History Association, Band 22, Heft 3, S. 647-650
ISSN: 1527-8050
In: Politische Studien: Magazin für Politik und Gesellschaft, Band 24, S. 375-383
ISSN: 0032-3462