Multilateral Foreign Aid to China After 1979
In: Foreign Aid in China, S. 107-230
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In: Foreign Aid in China, S. 107-230
In: Review of international political economy: RIPE, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 95-121
ISSN: 0969-2290
World Affairs Online
In: Review of international political economy, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 95-121
ISSN: 1466-4526
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development
World Affairs Online
SSRN
Working paper
In: The European journal of development research: journal of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), Band 13, Heft 2, S. 49-57
ISSN: 0957-8811
In: The European journal of development research, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 49-57
ISSN: 1743-9728
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
In: Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path; China’s Foreign Aid, S. 49-95
In: The review of international organizations, Band 8, Heft 3
ISSN: 1559-744X
Why do governments choose multilateralism? We examine a principal-agent model in which states trade some control over the policy for greater burden sharing. The theory generates observable hypotheses regarding the reasons for and the patterns of support and opposition to multilateralism. To focus our study, we analyze support for bilateral and multilateral foreign aid giving in the US. Using new survey data, we provide evidence about the correlates of public and elite support for multilateral engagement. We find weak support for multilateralism and deep partisan divisions. Reflecting elite discourse, public opinion divides over two competing rationales-burden sharing and control-when faced with the choice between multilateral and bilateral aid channels. As domestic groups' preferences over aid policy diverge from those of the multilateral institution, maintaining control over aid policy becomes more salient and support for multilateralism falls. Adapted from the source document.
In: The Architecture of Development Assistance, S. 62-106
In: International organization, Band 69, Heft 1, S. 97-130
ISSN: 1531-5088
Existing studies of foreign aid suggest that donor countries' economic groups, such as exporters, should be generally opposed to multilateral aid because multilateral flows do not allow donor countries to tie their aid implicitly or explicitly to the promotion of their domestic economic interests. However, economic groups can actually benefit from some types of multilateral aid, and this serves as an incentive for donor governments to support international organizations generating the benefits. I test my argument using data on aid allocated to the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol and the Global Environment Facility, and international trade by commodity. I find robust empirical support for the argument that when donors' domestic economic groups are likely to gain from opportunities created by international environmental organizations' programs, donor governments increase aid allocations to these organizations. Adapted from the source document.
The paper builds on recent empirical evidence on the importance of strategic donor behaviour in aid allocation in order to develop a theoretical model where donor pressure on a recipient for influencing the aid disbursement of a multilateral institution is endogenously determined. Our game-theoretic, multi-agent model with one aid recipient, two bilateral donors and one multilateral institution illustrates the advantage of putting pressure on the recipient as an instrument for foreign policy, as seen from the mighty donor's point of view. The model shows how this strategic donor behaviour is damaging to the aid-recipient; we also show that other donors not sharing foreign policy goals similar to the strategic, influential donors will, in fact, reduce their aid contributions to the multilateral organizations. This may obviously have profound implications for the volume of total aid flows and may crucially undermine current efforts to substantially increase ODA to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Our paper also contributes to the common debate on foreign aid by presenting a rigorous model that explains the coexistence of both multilateral aid organizations and bilateral aid programmes.
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