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This paper compares the ECB's conduct of monetary policy with that of the Bundesbank. Estimated monetary policy reaction functions for the Bundesbank (1979:4-1998:12) and the European Central Bank (1999:1-2004:5) show that, while the ECB and the Bundesbank react similarly to expected inflation, the ECB reacts significantly stronger to the output gap. Theoretical considerations suggest that this stronger response to the output gap may rather be due to a higher interest rate sensitivity of the German output gap than to a higher weight given to output stabilisation by the ECB. Counterfactual simulations based on the estimated interest rate reaction functions suggest that German interest rates would not have been lower under a hypothetical Bundesbank regime after 1999. However, this conclusion crucially depends on the assumption of an unchanged long-run real interest rate for the EMU period. Adjusting the Bundesbank reaction function for the lower long-run real interest rate estimated for the ECB regime reverses this conclusion.

This paper proposes a probit regression with autocorrelated errors (PAR) to estimate the reaction function of monetary policy in Taiwan using newly constructed binary monetary indicators. We develop a practical sampling scheme via the Gibbs sampling algorithm with data augmentation to make posterior inference of the binary monetary policy reaction function. In contrast to the conventional approach, our method avoids the problem of multiple integrals by directly drawing values of latent variables from the relevant full conditional density along with all the other parameters. Empirical results show that the monetary authority responds to macroeconomic conditions asymmetrically. Specifically, in the high‐inflation regime, a contractionary monetary policy is implemented to reduce the inflation rate. Once inflation is under control, that is, in the low‐inflation regime, attention is paid to stimulating the growth of the economy.

In this paper, we test whether public preferences for price stability (obtained from the Eurobarometer survey) are actually reflected in the interest rates set by eight central banks. We estimate augmented Taylor (1993) rules for the period 1976-1993 using the dynamic GMM estimator. We find, first, that interest rates do reflect society's preferences since the central banks raise rates when society's inflation aversion is above its long-run trend. Second, the reaction to inflation is non-linearly increasing in the degree of inflation aversion. Third, this emphasis on fighting inflation does not have a detrimental effect on output stabilization. We conclude with some implications concerning the democratic legitimation of central banks.

I propose a discrete choice method for estimating monetary policy reaction functions based on research by Hu and Phillips (2004). This method distinguishes between determining the underlying desired rate which drives policy rate changes and actually implementing interest rate changes. The method is applied to ECB rate setting between 1999 and 2010 by estimating a forward-looking Taylor rule on a monthly basis using real-time data drawn from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. All parameters are estimated significantly and with the expected sign. Including the period of financial turmoil in the sample delivers a less aggressive policy rule as the ECB was constrained by the lower bound on nominal interest rates. The ECB's non-standard measures helped to circumvent that constraint on monetary policy, however. For the pre-turmoil sample, the discrete choice model's estimated desired policy rate is more aggressive and less gradual than least squares estimates of the same rule specification. This is explained by the fact that the discrete choice model takes account of the fact that central banks change interest rates by discrete amounts. An advantage of using discrete choice models is that probabilities are attached to the different outcomes of every interest rate setting meeting. These probabilities correlate fairly well with the probabilities derived from surveys among commercial bank economists.

This paper specifies and estimates a hybrid monetary policy base reaction function for the Dominican Republic (DR). The estimated reactions suggest that the Central Bank has been biased towards targeting the gap between the parallel and official exchange rates, apparently doing so in a more systematic fashion after the mid 1980s. Remarkably, these findings are in line with the Central Bank's long-standing endorsement of a multiple exchange rate regime, and could imply a process of learning, given the monetary authorities' preferences.

We estimate monetary policy reaction functions with threshold effects for the Deutsche Bundesbank using a real-time data set. Estimates based on the deviation of inflation from the Bundesbank's inflation target as threshold variable suggest a switch to a stronger output gap response in the reaction function if past inflation was high. The reaction function in the regime with higher inflation implies an overall less contractionary monetary policy than that for the low inflation regime. A modified model with three regimes shows this result to be related to periods of substantial excess inflation. We explore a threshold reaction function with a moving inflation target that captures a gradual adjustment of an intermediate to a long-term inflation target and find the Bundesbank to follow a more restrictive monetary policy stance if inflation is above the intermediate-term inflation target.

We use quantile regressions to model monetary policy reaction functions in three small open economies: Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Focusing on Taylor‐type rules, we find evidence of asymmetric interest rate responses for all the countries considered, with monetary policy reacting more strongly to inflation when interest rates are high than when they are low. This is consistent with previous research suggesting that central bankers place more weight on positive deviations of inflation from its target than negative ones. In contrast, the interest rate response to the output gap is largely symmetric and small.

We extend Romer and Romer's (2004) analysis of the estimation and the effects of monetary policy shocks by controlling for (1) changes in the monetary policy reaction function and (2) changes in the response of output and prices over time with an extended data set. The results suggest that the post 1979 responses of output and prices to a monetary policy shock are significantly different from what has been reported for the whole sample: While output and prices respond significantly and negatively if their response is estimated for the whole sample period (1969–2005), the response of output is insignificant for the period of 1979–2005, and the response of prices is much weaker. The analysis of the changes in the monetary policy conducted over time allows us to partly attribute the diminished price and output responses to a successful monetary policy which led to a less volatile economy during the great moderation. (JEL E52, E32, C50)