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This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Since World War II there have been about fifty episodes of large-scale mass killings of civilians and massive forced displacements. They were usually meticulously planned and independent of military goals. We provide a model where conflict onset, conflict intensity and the decision to commit mass killings are all endogenous, with two main goals: (1) to identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur; and (2) to distinguish conditions under which mass killings and military conflict intensity reinforce each other from situations where they are substitute modes of strategic violence. We predict that mass killings are most likely in societies with large natural resources, significant proportionality constraints for rent sharing, low productivity and low state capacity. Further, massacres are more likely in a civil than in an interstate war, as in the latter group sizes matter less for future rents. In non polarized societies there are asymmetric equilibria with only the larger group wanting to engage in massacres. In such settings the smaller group compensates for this by fighting harder in the first place. In this case we can talk of mass killings and fighting efforts to be substitutes. In contrast, in polarized societies either both or none of the groups can be ready to do mass killings in case of victory. Under the "shadow of mass killings" groups fight harder. Hence, in this case massacres and fighting are complements. We also present novel empirical results on the role of natural resources in mass killings and on what kinds of ethnic groups are most likely to be victimized in massacres and forced resettlements, using group level panel data.

This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages. Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition.

We present a formal model of intra-party politics to explain candidate selection within parties. We think of parties as heterogeneous groups of individuals who aim to implement a set of policies but who differ in their priorities. When party heterogeneity is too large, parties are in danger of splitting into smaller yet more homogeneous groups. In this context we argue that primaries can have a unifying role if the party elite cannot commit to policy concessions. Our model shows how alignment in the preferred policies of various factions within a party, the relative weight of each of these factions and the electoral system interact to create incentives for the adoption of primary elections. We discuss the existing empirical literature in the light of our theoretical predictions to provide a new, structured perspective on the adoption of primary elections.

In this paper, we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised facts and with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better .scal discipline in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of "social cohesion" and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe.

We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely to induce persistent informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars. We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates.

Sexually transmitted diseases (STD) modeling has used contact networks to study the spreading of pathogens. Recent findings have stressed the increasing role of casual partners, often enabled by online dating applications. We study the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemic model -appropriate for STDs- over a two-layer network aimed to account for the effect of casual partners in the spreading of STDs. In this novel model, individuals have a set of steady partnerships (links in layer 1). At certain rates, every individual can switch between active and inactive states and, while active, it establishes casual partnerships with some probability with active neighbors in layer 2 (whose links can be thought as potential casual partnerships). Individuals that are not engaged in casual partnerships are classified as inactive, and the transitions between active and inactive states are independent of their infectious state. We use mean-field equations as well as stochastic simulations to derive the epidemic threshold, which decreases substantially with the addition of the second layer. Interestingly, for a given expected number of casual partnerships, which depends on the probabilities of being active, this threshold turns out to depend on the duration of casual partnerships: the longer they are, the lower the threshold ; Tis material is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants No. DMS 1515810. D.J. has been partially supported by Research Grant MTM2017-86795-C3-1-P of Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO) of the Spanish government. D.J. and J.S. are members of the research groups 2017 SGR 01617 (D.J.) and 2017 SGR 01392 (J.S.) of the Generalitat de Catalunya

This paper is devoted to the analysis of the early dynamics of an SIS epidemic model defined on networks. The model, introduced by Gross et al. (Phys Rev Lett 96:208701, 2006), is based on the pair-approximation formalism and assumes that, at a given rewiring rate, susceptible nodes replace an infected neighbour by a new susceptible neighbour randomly selected among the pool of susceptible nodes in the population. The analysis uses a triple closure that improves the widely assumed in epidemic models defined on regular and homogeneous networks, and applies it to better understand the early epidemic spread on Poisson, exponential, and scale-free networks. Two extinction scenarios, one dominated by transmission and the other one by rewiring, are characterized by considering the limit system of the model equations close to the beginning of the epidemic. Moreover, an analytical condition for the occurrence of a bistability region is obtained ; The authors thank the two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper. This work has been partially supported by the research grants MTM2008-06349-C03-02 and MTM2011-27739-C04-03 of the Spanish government, and the project 2009-SGR-345 of Generalitat de Catalunya

This paper is devoted to the analysis of the early dynamics of an SIS epidemic model defined on networks. The model, introduced by Gross et al. (Phys Rev Lett 96:208701, 2006), is based on the pair-approximation formalism and assumes that, at a given rewiring rate, susceptible nodes replace an infected neighbour by a new susceptible neighbour randomly selected among the pool of susceptible nodes in the population. The analysis uses a triple closure that improves the widely assumed in epidemic models defined on regular and homogeneous networks, and applies it to better understand the early epidemic spread on Poisson, exponential, and scale-free networks. Two extinction scenarios, one dominated by transmission and the other one by rewiring, are characterized by considering the limit system of the model equations close to the beginning of the epidemic. Moreover, an analytical condition for the occurrence of a bistability region is obtained ; The authors thank the two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper. This work has been partially supported by the research grants MTM2008-06349-C03-02 and MTM2011-27739-C04-03 of the Spanish government, and the project 2009-SGR-345 of Generalitat de Catalunya

This paper is devoted to the analysis of the early dynamics of an SIS epidemic model defined on networks. The model, introduced by Gross et al. (Phys Rev Lett 96:208701, 2006), is based on the pair-approximation formalism and assumes that, at a given rewiring rate, susceptible nodes replace an infected neighbour by a new susceptible neighbour randomly selected among the pool of susceptible nodes in the population. The analysis uses a triple closure that improves the widely assumed in epidemic models defined on regular and homogeneous networks, and applies it to better understand the early epidemic spread on Poisson, exponential, and scale-free networks. Two extinction scenarios, one dominated by transmission and the other one by rewiring, are characterized by considering the limit system of the model equations close to the beginning of the epidemic. Moreover, an analytical condition for the occurrence of a bistability region is obtained ; The authors thank the two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper. This work has been partially supported by the research grants MTM2008-06349-C03-02 and MTM2011-27739-C04-03 of the Spanish government, and the project 2009-SGR-345 of Generalitat de Catalunya

This paper is devoted to the analysis of the early dynamics of an SIS epidemic model defined on networks. The model, introduced by Gross et al. (Phys Rev Lett 96:208701, 2006), is based on the pair-approximation formalism and assumes that, at a given rewiring rate, susceptible nodes replace an infected neighbour by a new susceptible neighbour randomly selected among the pool of susceptible nodes in the population. The analysis uses a triple closure that improves the widely assumed in epidemic models defined on regular and homogeneous networks, and applies it to better understand the early epidemic spread on Poisson, exponential, and scale-free networks. Two extinction scenarios, one dominated by transmission and the other one by rewiring, are characterized by considering the limit system of the model equations close to the beginning of the epidemic. Moreover, an analytical condition for the occurrence of a bistability region is obtained ; The authors thank the two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper. This work has been partially supported by the research grants MTM2008-06349-C03-02 and MTM2011-27739-C04-03 of the Spanish government, and the project 2009-SGR-345 of Generalitat de Catalunya

This paper is devoted to the analysis of the early dynamics of an SIS epidemic model defined on networks. The model, introduced by Gross et al. (Phys Rev Lett 96:208701, 2006), is based on the pair-approximation formalism and assumes that, at a given rewiring rate, susceptible nodes replace an infected neighbour by a new susceptible neighbour randomly selected among the pool of susceptible nodes in the population. The analysis uses a triple closure that improves the widely assumed in epidemic models defined on regular and homogeneous networks, and applies it to better understand the early epidemic spread on Poisson, exponential, and scale-free networks. Two extinction scenarios, one dominated by transmission and the other one by rewiring, are characterized by considering the limit system of the model equations close to the beginning of the epidemic. Moreover, an analytical condition for the occurrence of a bistability region is obtained ; The authors thank the two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper. This work has been partially supported by the research grants MTM2008-06349-C03-02 and MTM2011-27739-C04-03 of the Spanish government, and the project 2009-SGR-345 of Generalitat de Catalunya

We consider the spread of an infectious disease on a heterogeneous metapopulation defined by any (correlated or uncorrelated) network. The infection evolves under transmission, recovery and migration mechanisms. We study some spectral properties of a connectivity matrix arising from the continuous-time equations of the model. In particular we show that the classical sufficient condition of instability for the disease-free equilibrium, well known for the particular case of uncorrelated networks, works also for the general case. We give also an alternative condition that yields a more accurate estimation of the epidemic threshold for correlated (either assortative or dissortative) networks ; Supported by Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness of the Spanish Government grant numbers MTM2011-27739-C04-03 (first author) and DPI2011-25822 (second author). Also by Generalitat de Catalunya projects 2009-SGR-345 (first author) and 2009-SGR-1228 (second author).

We consider the spread of an infectious disease on a heterogeneous metapopulation defined by any (correlated or uncorrelated) network. The infection evolves under transmission, recovery and migration mechanisms. We study some spectral properties of a connectivity matrix arising from the continuous-time equations of the model. In particular we show that the classical sufficient condition of instability for the disease-free equilibrium, well known for the particular case of uncorrelated networks, works also for the general case. We give also an alternative condition that yields a more accurate estimation of the epidemic threshold for correlated (either assortative or dissortative) networks ; Supported by Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness of the Spanish Government grant numbers MTM2011-27739-C04-03 (first author) and DPI2011-25822 (second author). Also by Generalitat de Catalunya projects 2009-SGR-345 (first author) and 2009-SGR-1228 (second author).