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The paper discusses the differences between a practical emphasis on binary
logic on the one hand, and modal logic, on the other, specifically in the
fields of philosophical practice and psychotherapy. Although studies of
practical applications of modal logic in the helping professions are recent,
the discussion largely revolves around the controversial application of
modality in psychotherapy by C.G. Jung and Lacan?s psychoanalysis. The
present argument touches on some of the conceptual dilemmas associated with
the relationship between logical modality, intuition and scientificity in
psychotherapy, all of which are a part of the philosophical foundation of
psychotherapy.

The contemporary versions of the ontological argument that originated from Charles Hartshorne are formalized proofs (in the metalogical sense of the word) based on unique modal theories. The simplest well-known theory of this kind arises from the b system of modal logic by adding two extra-logical axioms: (AA) "If the perfect being exists, then it necessarily exists" (Anselm's Axiom) and (AL) "It is possible that the perfect being exists" (Leibniz's Axiom). In the paper a similar argument is presented, however none of the systems of modal logic is relevant to it. Its only premises are the axiom (AA) and, instead of (AL), the new axiom (AN): "If the perfect being doesn't exist, it necessarily doesn't". The main goal of the work is to prove that (AN) is no more controversial than (AA) and – in consequence – the whole strength of the modal ontological argument lies in the set of its extra-logical premises. In order to do that, three arguments are formulated: ontological, "cosmological" and metalogical.

I: Signs and Signalling -- I.1. Lewis on Signalling Systems -- I.2. Signs and Meaning -- I.3. Sign Systems and the Possibility of Deceit -- I.4. Generalization of Rules of Information -- I.5. ISS's and Lewis Indicative Signalling Systems -- I.6. Conventions of Truthfulness and Trust v. Rules of Information -- II: A Formal Language -- II.1. LC: its Syntax and the General Form of its Semantics -- II.2. Action Modalities -- II.3. Normative Modalities -- II.4. The Belief Modality -- II.5. Mutual Belief -- II.6. The Modality Va -- II.7. Deontic Modalities -- II.8. Knowledge that p -- II.9. On the Alleged Circularity of Possible-World Semantics -- III: Some Features of Communication Situations -- III.1. Truthfulness and Trust -- III.2. Moore's Paradox of Saying and Disbelieving -- III.3. Informing and Asserting -- III.4. Trust of Type No-Deceit, Communicators' Intentions and "Saying One Thing and Meaning Another" -- III.5. Non-Deceiving Performances and the Implementation of Rules of Information -- IV: Non-Indicatives -- IV.1. Non-Indicatives and Truth Conditions -- IV.2. Performatives -- IV.3. Sketch for a Logic of Imperative Inference -- IV.4. Other Types of Non-Indicatives -- IV.5. Non-Indicative Usage of Indicatives -- V: Intention-Dependent Evidence -- V.1. Bennett's Defence of the Gricean Theory -- V.2. The Modality Shall and the Analysis of Signalling -- VI: The Double Bind -- VI.1. General Features of a Double-Bind Situation -- VI.2. The Illustration from Clinical Data — a Formal Description -- VI.3. Bateson's Theory of Communication -- VI.4. The Double Bind and Levels of Communication -- Concluding Remarks -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

In this paper we show the possibility to formalize the design process by means of one type of non-standard logic - modal logic [1]. The type chosen for this study is modal logic S4. The reason for this choice is the ability of this formalism to describe modeling of the individual discrete steps of design, respecting necessity or possibility types of design knowledge.

In this note, I show how Christian List's modal logic of republican freedom (as published in this journal in 2006) can be extended (1) to grasp the differences between liberal freedom (noninterference) and republican freedom (non-domination) in terms of two purely logical axioms and (2) to cover a more recent definition of republican freedom in terms of `arbitrary interference' that gains popularity in the literature.