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The author traces the development of the term 'macro‐prudential policy' since it was first coined three decades ago. He considers whether the UK Government's planned reforms of the financial regulatory system mean that future threats to UK financial stability are likely to be identified earlier and better than has been the case hitherto. He concludes that there are a number of requirements that the UK Government and the Bank of England will have to fulfill if the reforms are to have that effect and that the scope for action in the UK is inevitably determined in part by similar exercises internationally.

Since the 2007–2008 global banking crisis, systemic risk has become the central target of policy design in banking regulation in many countries. At the same time, a growing attention has been paid to the systemic importance of bank heterogeneity. The need for diversity has even found its way into official policy documents, both at the European and national level. However, most of the new thinking on the regulatory reforms targeting systemic risk has been conducted within the framework of macro-prudential regulation, which may not be adequate to deal with diversity-related causes of systemic risk. This paper aims, therefore, at contributing to the growing literature on the relationship between systemic risk and banking regulation by (i) explicating the links between systemic risk and banking diversity; (ii) discussing the adequacy of macro and micro-prudential policy instruments to address diversity-related causes of systemic risk in banking; and (iii) laying out a basic framework for diversity-enhancing policies.

Bank Regulation, Risk Management, and Compliance is a concise yet comprehensive treatment of the primary areas of US banking regulation – micro-prudential, macroprudential, financial consumer protection, and AML/CFT regulation – and their associated risk management and compliance systems. The book's focus is the US, but its prolific use of standards published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and frequent comparisons with UK and EU versions of US regulation offer a broad perspective on global bank regulation and expectations for internal governance. The book establishes a conceptual framework that helps readers to understand bank regulators' expectations for the risk management and compliance functions. Informed by the author's experience at a major credit rating agency in helping to design and implement a ratings compliance system, it explains how the banking business model, through credit extension and credit intermediation, creates the principal risks that regulation is designed to mitigate: credit, interest rate, market, and operational risk, and, more broadly, systemic risk. The book covers, in a single volume, the four areas of bank regulation and supervision and the associated regulatory expectations and firms' governance systems. Readers desiring to study the subject in a unified manner have needed to separately consult specialized treatments of their areas of interest, resulting in a fragmented grasp of the subject matter. Banking regulation has a cohesive unity due in large part to national authorities' agreement to follow global standards and to the homogenizing effects of the integrated global financial markets. The book is designed for legal, risk, and compliance banking professionals; students in law, business, and other finance-related graduate programs; and finance professionals generally who want a reference book on bank regulation, risk management, and compliance. It can serve both as a primer for entry-level finance professionals and as a reference guide for seasoned risk and compliance officials, senior management, and regulators and other policymakers. Although the book's focus is bank regulation, its coverage of corporate governance, risk management, compliance, and management of conflicts of interest in financial institutions has broad application in other financial services sectors.

AbstractThe New York stock market was plagued by a series of financial crises during the National Banking Era, culminating in the Panic of 1907. The traditional view holds that the crises were rooted in structural flaws related to trade settlement as well as excessive and indiscriminate margin lending that remained unaddressed until the formation of the Federal Reserve Bank. An examination of the historical record, however, shows that brokers sought to control contagion and spillover effects through reform of the settlement process and by modulating margin lending rates and maintenance requirements according to macroeconomic conditions, counterparty credit‐worthiness and market volatility. Using newly gathered archival data, we show that the New York Stock Exchange enacted macro‐prudential regulations that may have reduced the severity of crises during this period. By providing early evidence of private sector responses to rising systemic risk, the paper addresses an important aspect of early market microstructure.

This article aims to theorise corruption from a "macro" perspective. It elaborates upon a range of social sciences literatures, notably from criminology and political sciences, that have discussed various "macro"-level factors contributing to corruption, including market characteristics. Its most distinct contribution to the literature is in importing the concept of "systemic risk" – thus far chiefly examined in the financial regulation literature – to the analysis of corruption. It draws on the financial literature on systemic risk and macro-prudential regulation and supervision. In so doing, it elaborates upon concepts such as "network" and "contagion" as to theorise the effects of corruption on resource allocation. This is supplemented by reference to the legal canon of literature on market regulation.

Monetary, macro-prudential and micro-prudential policies are intimately linked. The macroprudential authority should be allocated to the body where the overall balance of synergies (between policy objectives) over conflicts and the required expertise are the largest. This report reviews the pros and cons of the four institutional models for the allocation of macro-prudential powers: (1) the government, (2) the central bank, (3) the financial authority and (4) a committee with representatives from these three bodies.