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With a dataset from all 20 Finnish regions spanning a time period from 1950 to 2010, this article analyses how the market share mobility index in newspaper circulation and ownership has developed over time and whether entry and exit have played any significant role therein. It compares the results obtained at the ownership level with those of the newspaper level and infers whether the market share mobility index complements or substitutes the conventional concentration measures. The results show that entry and exit of newspapers have not contributed significantly to the market share mobility index and that analysis of ownership and newspaper circulation yields remarkably different results. Our conjecture that market share mobility would peak in the decade of a severe economic downturn was not indisputably upheld. The results indicate that traditional concentration measures and compound market indices should rather be seen as allies than rivals.

One of the tenets of the conventional wisdom of the strategic management literature is that if a business succeeds in increasing its market‐share it will usually enjoy an improvement in its profitability. It is not simply that it serves as one of a battery of measures of relative performance, nor that, ceteris paribus, increases in the volume of sales must be linked to increases in the total amount of profits earned, but that increases in market share will directly cause increases in profitability, that is profits deflated to take into account the level of output. As might be expected, the strength of feeling that is displayed about the virtues of market‐share as a strategic tool varies enormously among opinion leaders. Those from the influential Boston Consulting Group (1970) are almost messianic in their exhortations to businesses to aim single mindedly for increased market‐share in order to move down their experience curves. Others, most notably from the Strategic Planning Institute, through its Profit Impact of Market Strategies Programme (PIMS), e.g. Schloeffer, et al., (1974), Buzzell, et al., (1975) and Gale (1972), imply the importance of market‐share by the emphasis they place upon its influence in their reporting of the results of regressing return‐on‐investment in a model which contains over thirty other variables.

This article extends the single-market measure of market power to a multimarket setting in order to develop the concept of effective market share—what the market share of the hypothetical, single-market firm would have to be to exercise the same degree of market power as the actual, multimarket-dominant firm. This approach yields four main findings. First, traditional market power measures tend to overstate (understate) market power in the case of net complements (substitutes). Second, cost complementarities compound the effects of demand complementarities in tempering the dominant firm's market power. Third, the errors in measuring market power are asymmetric: policy makers are more likely to conclude that market power is present when it is absent than to conclude that market power is absent when it is present. Fourth, effective market shares facilitate more reliable inferences about market power and hence fewer errors in adjudicating merger and deregulation cases.

AbstractConfidence intervals and tests for the market share of a group of products are developed, using an approximation to the variance of the market share estimate based either on a random sample or on the relationship between actual and estimated product sales from a non‐random sample.RésuméCette étude met en évidence des intervalles et des tests de confiance pour la part de marché dun groupe de produit grǎce à une approximation de la variance de l'estimation de la part de marché basée soil sur un échantillon aléatoire, soit sur les relations entre les ventes réelles et estimées d'un produit à partir d'un échantillon non‐aléatoire.

The majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim. Ideally, the development of Islamic banking in Indonesia runs significantly, but the facts show that the market share of Islamic banks is still relatively small. This article aims to analyze the market share of Islamic banking in Indonesia. This study uses a descriptive quantitative approach. The data collection method used is the non-communication method, namely in the form of observation, literature review and experimentation through secondary data. Based on the results of the analysis and discussion, it shows that the market share of Islamic banking in Indonesia is still relatively low. The factors causing the low market share of Islamic banks and the improvement strategy are focused on three sides: Islamic banks' internal elements, aspects of government, regulators, and characteristics of society. In the future, there is a need for strategic steps from all parties to increase the market share of Islamic Banking in Indonesia.

The question I wish to take up in this paper is whether competitive markets, as mechanisms that initiate the distribution of scarce goods, allocate those goods in accordance with what participants in those markets deserve. I want to argue that in general people do not in fact deserve what they get from market interactions, when "what they get" is determined by the competitive forces coming to bear on the market (the laws of supply and demand). This more general claim is meant to apply to all participants in the market (workers and their wages as well as capitalists and their profits). However, my strategy here is to focus on the particular case of the role of entrepreneurs, as I will define them, and whether they deserve the profits they reap in a competitive capitalist market. In particular, I will argue that the claim that entrepreneurs deserve their profits, when spelled out precisely, is indeed not plausible. Generalizing from this claim, I want to suggest how moral desert is inappropriate as a justification of market shares whenever competition determines the magnitude of those shares.I should stress, though, the particularity of my central claim: it is that "(strictly speaking) entrepreneurs do not (strictly speaking) deserve their (strictly speaking) profits." This is not to say that, forotherreasons (for example, reasons of entitlement or utility), people should not receive the rewards doled out by a market. My claim is only that desert has nothing directly to do with it.I am deviating significantly here from the usual strategy for denying the relevance of desert claims to principles of distributive justice.