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Un mécanisme en prix et quantité pour décentraliser les allocations de Lindahl de manière transparente Cet article propose un nouveau mécanisme en prix et quantité, tel que le jeu associé décentralise des allocations de Lindahl en équilibre de Nash. Nous montrons qu'il vérifie la propriété de déclaration franche ( forthrightness ), introduite par Saijo et al. [1996]. En effet, à l'équilibre de Nash, chaque joueur annonce directement et honnêtement son prix personnalisé et sa demande de bien public, et obtient l'allocation économique correspondante. Dans le cas d'une économie quasi-linéaire, nous montrons que l'équilibre de Nash du jeu est globalement stable, en formalisant le comportement hors équilibre des joueurs comme un processus du gradient.

In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians\' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We derive the following results: i) Political competition is a necessary but not a suffcient condition for the elimination of political rents. ii) Agents utilize the separation of powers in order to endogenously select institutions which restrict the power of politicians. iii) In conjunction with political competition, these institutions implement the Lindahl allocation in the economy as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the political game. iv) As a consequence of the previous result, political rents are zero in equilibrium, in the sense that the winning politician does not extract part of the social surplus because of his power. To the best of our knowledge, this in the only citizen-candidate model with this equilibrium property.

We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners

We study distributional ("social") preferences in adolescent peer networks. Using incentivized choices between allocations for themselves and a passive agent, children are classified into efficiency-loving, inequality-loving, inequality-averse, and spiteful types. We find that pairs of students who report a friendship link are more likely to exhibit the same preference type than other students that attend the same school. The relation between types is almost completely driven by inequality-loving and spiteful types. Further analyses suggest that preference peer networks are mainly formed by selection into the network and, to a smaller degree, by preference transmission. The role of peer networks in explaining distributional preferences goes beyond network composition effects. A low rank in academic performance and a central position within the network relate positively to a higher likelihood of being classified as spiteful. Hence, social hierarchies seem to be correlated with distributional preference types.

Cover -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1 Economies with Public Goods -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Efficiency and public goods -- 1.3 The Core and public goods -- 1.4 Lindahl's equilibrium -- 1.5 Kaneko's ratio equilibrium -- 1.6 Mas-Colell and Silvestre's cost-share equilibrium -- 1.7 A criticism of the notions of equilibrium with an auctioneer -- 1.8 Exercises -- 1.9 References -- 2 Resource Allocation Mechanisms -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 An example of resource allocation: the case of Adam and Eve -- 2.3 Description of the economic environment -- 2.4 Social objectives and incentives -- 2.5 Mechanisms -- 2.6 Strategic aspects -- 2.7 The problem of design -- 2.8 Summary -- 2.9 Exercises -- 2.10 References -- 3 Dominant Strategies and Direct Mechanisms -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The revelation principle -- 3.3 The impossibility of truthful implementation in economic environments (I) -- 3.4 The impossibility of truthful implementation in economic environments (II) -- 3.5 The manipulation of the initial endowments -- 3.6 Conclusion -- 3.7 Exercises -- 3.8 References -- 4 Implementation in Nash Equilibrium (I): General Results -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Characterization of social choice correspondences implementable in Nash equilibrium -- 4.3· Implementation in Nash equilibrium in economic environments -- 4.4. Implementation when the feasible set is unknown and credible implementation -- 4.5 Exercises -- 4.6 References -- Appendix: the King Solomon problem -- 5 Implementation in Nash Equilibrium (II): Applications -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2. Implementing the Lindahl and the Walras correspondences by means of abstract mechanisms -- 5.3 Doubly implementing the ratio and the Walras correspondences by means of market mechanisms -- 5.4 Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division -- 5.5 Exercises -- 5.6 References.

We characterize a mechanism for reducing pollution emissions in which countries, acting non-cooperatively, commit to matching each others' abatement levels and may subsequently engage in emissions quota trading. The mechanism leads to an efficient level of emissions, and if the matching abatements process includes a quota trading stage, the marginal benefits of emissions are also equalized across countries. Given equilibrium matching rates, the initial allocation of emission quotas (before trading) reflects each country's marginal valuation for lower pollution relative to its marginal benefit from emissions. These results hold for any number of countries, in an environment where countries have different abatement technologies and different benefits from emissions, and even if the emissions of countries are imperfect substitutes in each country's damage function. In a two-period setting, the mechanism achieves both intra- and inter-temporal efficiency. If one country can commit to matching the other's abatements, efficient levels will be chosen. If abatement permits can be traded, abatements will be allocated efficiently across countries. The analysis applies if countries' emissions are imperfect substitutes. The analysis also extends to an inter-temporal setting, where pollution is persistent. The equilibrium costs of abatements in each country, will reflect Lindahl prices. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

PurposeIn this paper we show how the Kolm triangle method, which is a standard tool for visualizing allocations in a public good economy, can also be used to provide a diagrammatical exposition of matching mechanisms and their effects on public good supply and welfare. In particular, we describe, on the one hand, for which income distributions interior matching equilibria result, and on the other hand, for which income distributions the agents voluntarily participate in a matching mechanism. As a novel result, we especially show that the "participation zone" is larger than the "interiority zone"Design/methodology/approachWe employ the Kolm triangle approach, which has – compared to most other graphical methods for representing allocations in a public good economy – the advantage that it allows for showing the aggregate budget constraint, the levels of considered agents' private consumption, and the level of public good supply directly in the same diagram.FindingsThe Kolm triangle method can be used to visualize important effects of matching in an elegant way, so basically the increase of public good supply through matching. The interiority of matching depends on the income distribution and especially, on how the "interiority zone" is shrinking when the matching rate increases. Moreover, we were able to delimit the "participation zone" in the Kolm triangle. An important and novel insight is that the participation zone is larger than the interiority zone, which means that also corner matching equilibria in which only one agent makes a positive flat contribution to the public good may make both considered agents better off.Research limitations/implicationsCorner matching equilibria in which only one agent makes a positive flat contribution to the public good may improve all considered agents' welfare. How this welfare effect can be generalized to the case of different utility functions and matching rates will be an issue of future research.Practical implicationsThe examined matching mechanism finds application in many policy fields where public good undersupply is pending. International climate policy is one of these fields of application, for example.Originality/valueThe Kolm triangle method has been particularly helpful to describe the Nash equilibrium in the case of non-cooperative public good provision and to compare this outcome with Pareto efficient public good allocations. Furthermore, the Kolm triangle approach facilitates the analysis of mechanisms for attaining an efficient public good allocation like the Lindahl equilibrium as well as the study of preconditions and limitations faced by such mechanisms. An important and novel insight of our study is that the participation zone is larger than the interiority zone.

Book Review in this Article: The Human Dimension of Housing
Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design by Oscar Newman The Welfare Mess
Do the Poor Want to Work? A Social‐Psychological Study of Work Orientations by Leonard Coodwin. Work and Welfare Go Together by Sar A. Levitan, Martin Rein, and David Marwick. Traditional Issues Examined
An American Philosophy of Social Security: Evolution and Issues by J. Douglas Brown A Potpourri of Attitudes
Poverty, Economics, and Society, edited by Helen Ginsburg. The Contemporary American City
The Social Construction of Communities by Gerald D. The Social Sciences and the City
The City in the Seventies, edited by Robert K. Yin. Itasca Political Turnabout in Dixie
The Changing Politics of the South, edited by William C. Microscope on Nova Scotia
Regional Science Techniques in Practice: The Case of Nova Scotia by Stan Czamanski. A Reasonably Balanced Picture
Human Resources and Labor Markets: Labor and Manpower in the American Economy by Sar A. Levitan Race and Class
Busing and Backlash: White against White in a California School District by Lillian B. Rubin. Capital Issues
Rate of Profit, Distribution and Growth: Two Views by J. A. Kregel Farm Problems Discussed
The Overproduction Trap in U.S.Agriculture: A Study of Resource Allocation from World Warf to the Late 1960's, edited by Glenn L. Johnson and C. Leroy Quance. First of Its Kind
Conservation in the Soviet Union by Philip R. Pryde. On Nature's Behalf
Let Them Live: A Worldwide Survey of Animals Threatened with Extinction by Kai Curry‐Lindahl.

The Concerns of Welfare Economics -- The Concerns of Social Choice Theory -- Practical Concerns of Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory -- 1 Preferences and Utility -- Fundamental Assumptions -- Best Alternatives and Utility Functions -- The Formal Model of Preferences -- to Social Preferences -- Exercises -- Selected References -- 2 Barter Exchange -- Allocations -- The Edgeworth Box Diagram -- Pareto Optimal Allocations and the Core -- Algebraic Examples -- Final Notes on the Core: The Number of Coalitions -- Exercises -- Selected References -- 3 Market Exchange and Optimality -- The Two-Person, Two-Goods Model -- Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy: Formal Preliminaries -- The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics -- The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics -- An Algebraic Example -- Exercises -- Selected References -- 4 Production and Optimality -- Optimal Production Plans -- Competitive Equilibrium Production Plans -- The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, Production Version -- The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, Production Version -- Extending the Production Model, and Combining Production and Exchange -- An Algebraic Example in a Simple Production Model -- Exercises -- Selected References -- 5 Externalities -- Externalities in an Exchange Economy: An Example -- Pigouvian Taxes and Subsidies: The Exchange Example Continued -- Pigouvian Taxes and Subsidies: A Production Example -- Exercises -- Selected References -- 6 Public Goods -- The Public Goods Model -- The Samuelson Public Good Optimality Condition -- Private Financing of the Public Good and the Free Rider Problem -- The Wicksell-Lindahl Tax Scheme -- Fixed Tax Shares and Majority Voting -- The Demand-Revealing Tax Scheme -- The Groves-Ledyard Tax Scheme -- Selected References -- 7 Compensation Criteria -- Notational Preliminaries -- The Pareto Criterion -- The Kaldor Criterion -- The Scitovsky Criterion -- The Samuelson Criterion -- Exercises -- Selected References -- 8 Fairness and the Rawls Criterion -- Fairness -- The Rawls Criterion -- Exercises -- Selected References -- 9 Majority Voting -- The Majority Voting Criterion -- Majority Voting and Single-Peakedness -- Majority Voting and Single-Peakedness: The Multidimensional Case -- Exercises -- Selected References -- 10 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem -- The Model -- Requirements on the Collective Choice Rule -- Applying the Requirements -- Arrow's Impossibility Theorem -- Relaxing the Universality Requirement -- Reaction to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem -- Exercises -- Selected References -- 11 Strategic Behavior -- Examples of Strategic Behavior -- The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem -- Significance of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem -- Exercises -- Selected References -- 12 Epilog -- Author Index.